Dismissal for Second Marriage While First Wife Alive Not Harsh or Disproportionate: Supreme Court Restores CISF Constable’s Removal, Slams High Court for Acting as Appellate Body

“Hardship or Financial Consequences Cannot Override Statutory Prescription” –Supreme Court of India decisively set aside the judgment of the Tripura High Court that had reduced the punishment of a dismissed CISF constable for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first. Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi restored the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, ruling that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by substituting the penalty.

In a strong affirmation of the disciplinary framework governing armed and uniformed services, the Court held that the respondent’s conduct amounted to grave misconduct, and no interference with the punishment was warranted in the absence of procedural infirmities or violation of natural justice.

“The maxim dura lex sed lex – the law is hard, but it is the law – is attracted in this case. Inconvenience or unpleasant consequences of violation of law cannot detract from the prescription of the law.”

“Judicial Review Is Not an Appeal”: SC Rebukes High Court’s Substitution of Penalty in CISF Misconduct Case

The crux of the dispute centered around the interpretation of Rule 18(b) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001, framed under Section 22 of the CISF Act, 1968. Rule 18(b) explicitly disqualifies any person who, “having a spouse living, has entered into or contracted a marriage with another person” from appointment in the force. Though technically framed as a disqualification for appointment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that such rules, embedded in the institutional ethos of discipline, apply to continued service as well and carry enforceable consequences.

Pranab Kumar Nath, a constable in the CISF since 2006, was dismissed from service on July 1, 2017, following departmental proceedings. The proceedings arose out of a complaint by his wife, Chandana Nath, alleging that he had entered into a second marriage with one Parthana Das in March 2016 while the first marriage subsisted. The complaint also included allegations of domestic abuse and neglect of his minor daughter.

The departmental enquiry found the allegations proved. The Disciplinary Authority held his conduct as violative of Rule 18(b) and declared it to be “grave misconduct and highly unbecoming of a good member of a disciplined CAPF.” The dismissal was confirmed by both the Appellate and Revisional Authorities.

However, the High Court—both the Single Judge and the Division Bench—held the penalty of dismissal to be disproportionate and remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to impose a lesser punishment. The High Court had reasoned that while the act of entering a second marriage could be treated as indiscipline, it did not justify the “extreme punishment” of dismissal, especially considering the financial hardship it imposed.

1. Whether the act of entering into a second marriage during the subsistence of the first, in violation of Rule 18(b), warranted dismissal from service.
2. Whether the High Court under Articles 226/227 had the jurisdiction to interfere with the penalty imposed in a disciplinary proceeding.

The Union of India challenged the High Court’s decision, arguing that the High Court had assumed appellate jurisdiction, reappreciated evidence, and substituted its own sense of proportionality over the disciplinary authority’s findings—an approach consistently prohibited by Supreme Court precedent.

The Bench conducted a thorough examination of Rule 18(b) and emphasized the fundamental purpose of such service conditions in armed forces:

“It is important to observe that such Rules are premised on an institutional requirement for all members of the force(s) to maintain the highest standards of discipline, public confidence and integrity... these rules are not a moral censure, but simply a service condition, which an employer is perfectly within their rights to prescribe.”

The Court decisively ruled that there was no ambiguity in Rule 18(b) and that it imposed clear penal consequences for such conduct. Notably, the Court drew attention to the strict construction principle applicable to penal service rules:

“Clause 18(b) is a clause prescribing penal consequences... It is trite in law that any provision... prescribing penal consequences, has to be strictly construed... In the instant case, it cannot be said that there is any ambiguity.”

Rejecting the High Court's interference as legally impermissible, the Court cited long-standing jurisprudence:

From B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India:

“Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made... The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence.”

From Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran:

“The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence... or go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

The Supreme Court held that since no procedural illegality, bias, or perversity in the enquiry was alleged or proved, the High Court erred in interfering with the punishment:

“We are of the considered view that the High Court... erred in exercising its power... There is no averment as to the proper procedure not being followed... The law is hard, but it is the law.”

The Court also brushed aside the argument of financial hardship:

“Hardship or financial consequences cannot override statutory prescription... Inconvenience or unpleasant consequences of violation of law cannot detract from the prescription of the law.”

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the disciplinary authority’s decision to dismiss the respondent, and set aside the orders passed by both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. No costs were imposed.

“The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, no order is required to be passed on cost.”

The judgment marks a reaffirmation of judicial discipline in the context of service law and draws a sharp boundary around the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. It underscores that courts should not don the mantle of appellate authorities in service matters unless the punishment imposed is so outrageous that it shocks judicial conscience.

The Supreme Court's invocation of dura lex sed lex carries a stern message: the law may be harsh, but when clearly expressed and fairly enforced, it must be followed. Especially in forces like the CISF, personal conduct with potential public consequences is not beyond regulatory scrutiny, and rules framed in furtherance of discipline are to be enforced with seriousness.

Date of Decision: December 19, 2025