Determination Of Victim's Age Under Section 94 JJ Act Must Follow Statutory Hierarchy Of Documents: Madras High Court

"The school certificate or the matriculation certificate issued for the victim would have precedence for ascertaining the age of the victim and only in the absence of either the school certificate or the matriculation certificate, the birth certificate of the victim could be relied on." Madras High Court, in a judgment delivered on September 16, 2026, held that the determination of a victim's age in criminal proceedings, particularly under the POCSO Act, must strictly adhere to the hierarchical procedure prescribed under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

A bench of Justice G. Arul Murugan observed that courts cannot overlook academic records in favor of municipal birth certificates when establishing whether a victim qualifies as a "child" under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act.

The appellant was convicted by a Mahila Court for offences including kidnapping and aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act, based on a prosecution claim that the victim was 17 years old at the time of the alleged incident in 2017. While the trial court relied on a municipal birth certificate to establish minority, the appellant filed an appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC, subsequently introducing the victim's SSLC mark sheet as additional evidence under Section 391 of the CrPC, which proved the victim had attained the age of majority prior to the incident.

The primary legal question was whether the court could rely on a municipal birth certificate when more reliable educational documents, as prescribed by Section 94 of the JJ Act, were available. The court was also tasked with determining whether the conviction for kidnapping under Section 366 IPC and the POCSO Act could be sustained in the absence of evidence confirming the victim's minority and the lack of proof regarding forced abduction.

Hierarchy of Age Determination

The court emphasized that Section 94 of the JJ Act provides a clear legislative mandate for age determination, which courts must follow to avoid miscarriage of justice. By citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in P. Yuvaprakash v. State, the bench reiterated that school or matriculation certificates hold superior evidentiary value.

"School or matriculation certificates have precedence for ascertaining age, and only in their absence can birth certificates be relied upon."

Proof of Age Overrides Municipal Records

In the present case, the trial court had relied on a birth certificate to trigger the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act. However, the High Court noted that the SSLC mark sheet and transfer certificate, marked as Ex.D3 and Ex.D4, definitively established the victim's date of birth as June 28, 1999. Consequently, on the date of the occurrence (August 25, 2017), the victim was over 18 years of age.

"The very invocation of the charge under Section 5(1) r/w Section 6 of the POCSO Act cannot be sustained as the victim was not a child."

Absence of Evidence for Kidnapping

The bench further criticized the prosecution for failing to prove the ingredients of Section 366 IPC. The court highlighted that key witnesses, including the victim and her parents, gave contradictory statements regarding the alleged abduction. Furthermore, investigation records revealed no evidence that the victim was forcibly taken or confined against her will, especially given her earlier history of leaving home voluntarily.

"There is nothing placed on record to suggest that the victim was kidnapped, particularly when the victim herself had stated in earlier proceedings that she was living voluntarily at her aunt's house."

Perversity in Trial Court Finding

The High Court concluded that the trial court’s reliance on the municipal birth certificate—despite the availability of superior academic documentation—led to a perverse finding. By incorrectly determining the victim's age, the lower court erroneously applied the presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, leading to an unsustainable conviction.

"The finding of the trial Court in convicting the appellant suffers from serious infirmity, is perverse and cannot be sustained."

The Madras High Court allowed the criminal appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentences imposed by the trial court. The appellant was acquitted of all charges, and the court directed the immediate cancellation of bail bonds and the refund of any paid fines, reinforcing the necessity of strict compliance with evidentiary standards in age-sensitive cases.

Date of Decision: 16 September 2026