Detaining Authority Need Not Personally Verify In-Camera Statements to Uphold Preventive Detention: Bombay High Court Validates MPDA Detention

In a recent verdict  Bombay High Court upheld a preventive detention order passed under Section 3(2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 (MPDA Act), clarifying that personal verification of in-camera witness statements by the Detaining Authority is not legally mandated, and that verification by a senior police officer such as an Assistant Commissioner of Police is sufficient to meet the procedural safeguards required under the Constitution and the Act.

Rejecting the petitioner’s argument that his detention was vitiated by the Detaining Authority’s failure to personally verify in-camera statements, the Division Bench comprising Justices A.S. Gadkari and Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale ruled, “It is not the requirement of law, that the in-camera statements have to be personally verified by the Detaining Authority.”

“Verification by ACP is a Sufficient Procedural Safeguard Against Fabrication in Preventive Detention Cases”

The Court emphasised that the procedural structure surrounding preventive detention is designed to ensure fairness, not to indulge in ritualistic formalities. It observed that the in-camera statements forming the basis of the detention were not only recorded by the Sponsoring Authority but also personally verified by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, who ensured their truthfulness, voluntary nature, and credibility by interacting with the witnesses, visiting the scene of the incidents, and corroborating the facts with local residents and shopkeepers.

Justice Bhonsale recorded that, “The Assistant Commissioner of Police has personally interacted with the witnesses, confirmed that the statements have been given without any fear or pressure and are voluntarily. He also visited the spot and confirmed the narration through local enquiries.”

The Court further noted that this entire process, including the Assistant Commissioner’s verification report and the in-camera statements, was placed before the Detaining Authority, who recorded his subjective satisfaction after examining all the material.

“Subjective Satisfaction of Detaining Authority Cannot Be Tested by Objective Standards”: High Court Reaffirms Limits of Judicial Review

While dismissing the petition, the Court reiterated the well-established principle that courts cannot substitute their own opinion for that of the Detaining Authority, provided the latter has acted within the legal framework. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, AIR 1964 SC 334, the Bench held that subjective satisfaction must be tested only on the basis of procedural compliance and not on the Court's view of reasonableness.

The Bench remarked, “It would not be open to the detenu to ask the Court to consider whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority can be justified by an objective test. Reasonableness of satisfaction is not to be questioned.”

The Detaining Authority had in fact noted the verification of in-camera statements in the grounds of detention and acknowledged the report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner of Police. The Court held that this satisfied the requirements under Section 8 of the MPDA Act and Article 22(5) of the Constitution, as the petitioner was provided with all the relevant documents, excluding only the identifying particulars of the in-camera witnesses, as permitted under Section 8(2) of the MPDA Act and Article 22(6) of the Constitution.

“Judicial Scrutiny of Preventive Detention Cannot Be Used to Undermine Effective Policing Through Procedural Overreach”

The petitioner had urged the Court to strike down the detention order solely on the ground that the Detaining Authority had not personally verified the in-camera statements, relying on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, SLP (Criminal) No. 8510 of 2023. The Court, however, distinguished the facts and held that in the present case, all procedural safeguards had been rigorously observed, and that a senior officer’s verification provided a sufficient guarantee of the authenticity of the in-camera material.

The Court cited its own precedent in Shri Nagnarayan Saryu Singh v. A.N. Roy, 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 2147, to hold that the very purpose of involving a senior police officer is to “lend assurance that the statements can be safely relied upon”. It concluded that unless there was a procedural illegality or manifest arbitrariness, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority could not be interfered with.

Refusing to reduce the MPDA Act’s safeguards to a formalistic checklist, the Court noted, “Verification of the in-camera statements by the Assistant Commissioner of Police is in accordance with the procedure and complies with the requirement of law.”

“MPDA Act Does Not Require Redundant Duplication of Safeguards — Real Checks, Not Rituals, Are Constitutionally Required”

The Court took a firm stand against the overextension of procedural formalism, especially in the context of preventive detention. While acknowledging the importance of protecting individual liberty, the Bench drew a line between genuine safeguards and redundant procedural duplication.

In its concluding observations, the Bench held, “The process of verification undertaken by the Assistant Commissioner of Police and its careful consideration by the Detaining Authority provide sufficient procedural safeguard. There is no infirmity in the detention order.”

Thus, finding no merit in the challenge, the Court dismissed the writ petition, discharged the rule, and disposed of the interim application as infructuous.

In reaffirming that preventive detention need not be undermined by hyper-technical procedural demands, the Bombay High Court has clarified that substantial compliance with statutory and constitutional protections is sufficient, and that judicial scrutiny should not dilute the operational framework of preventive law unless genuine abuse or procedural breach is demonstrated.

The judgment provides a balanced jurisprudence—protecting both individual liberty and public order—and underscores that “safeguards must be real, not ritual.”

Date of Decision: 14.11.2025