Demand and Acceptance Not Proved – Presumption Under Section 20 PC Act Not Attracted: Supreme Court Restores Acquittal of Labour Officer

“Suspicion, However Strong, Cannot Replace Proof” – In a latest Judgement Supreme Court of India restored the acquittal of a public servant previously convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The judgment sets a significant precedent on the evidentiary standards for conviction in corruption cases and reiterates the restrictive principles for appellate interference with acquittals. The Court held that “demand and acceptance” of bribe must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and rejected the High Court’s reasoning that relied on speculative inferences and ignored material contradictions in the prosecution’s case.

The appellant, P. Somaraju, an Assistant Labour Commissioner, was accused of demanding ₹9,000 and accepting ₹3,000 as illegal gratification from a labour contractor for renewing licences under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. A trap was laid by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), and tainted money was allegedly recovered from the drawer of his table. The Trial Court acquitted him, citing serious procedural flaws and absence of credible evidence. The High Court, however, reversed the acquittal and convicted him under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The Supreme Court has now set aside that conviction, calling the High Court’s approach flawed and legally unsustainable.

The core issue was whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court’s acquittal. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court’s decision failed to meet the threshold for interference with acquittal, noting: “An appellate court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.”

Referring to Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 4 SCC 415], the Court reiterated that interference with an acquittal requires demonstration that the trial court’s view was perverse, unreasonable, or based on a complete misreading of evidence. “If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court,” it held.

The bench, comprising Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Joymalya Bagchi, found that the Trial Court had rightly considered key inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, procedural lapses in the trap proceedings, and credible alternative explanations provided by the defence.

One crucial procedural flaw noted was the negative result of the phenolphthalein hand-wash test conducted during the trap. While the High Court dismissed this as an irrelevant technicality, the Supreme Court criticised this view, observing, “It is not the case of either side that the appellant physically handled the tainted notes... For either side, the handwash test... cannot advance the case one way or the other.” The Court emphasized that “suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.”

The presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act was also held to be inapplicable in the absence of proven demand and acceptance. Citing Rajesh Gupta v. State through CBI [2022 INSC 359], the Court reaffirmed that mere recovery of currency notes does not constitute a crime under the PC Act unless it is shown that the accused voluntarily accepted the money as a bribe. “Demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt,” the Court reiterated.

The defence case, which claimed that the money was planted by the complainant during the appellant’s brief absence from his office, was corroborated by two independent defence witnesses – a union leader and a practicing advocate – both of whom placed the complainant alone in the chamber at the time of the alleged incident. The Court found their testimonies consistent and credible, noting, “This convergence on material details is not easily explained away as a product of bias.”

The testimony of Mohd. Abbas, the office attendant, further supported the defence. Though Abbas turned hostile at trial, he had previously submitted a contemporaneous letter (Exhibit D-1) corroborating the appellant’s absence and claiming the drawer was closed by the complainant. The Supreme Court found the High Court’s rejection of this evidence unjustified, especially as Abbas had also stated he was pressured by the ACB to support the prosecution.

On the High Court’s finding that the appellant’s demand for inspection of registers was a coercive pretext to solicit bribes, the Supreme Court sharply disagreed. The bench held, “An Assistant Commissioner of Labour is statutorily empowered to call for and inspect registers... To describe inspection as an exploitative device and then conjecture that a file was cleared only because ₹3,000/- was paid as a bribe... is totally unwarranted.”

Crucially, the Court noted that no charge had been framed regarding the alleged demand for the remaining ₹6,000, yet the High Court had speculated on the full ₹9,000 as the bribe. The Court stated, “The High Court has convicted him for something which he was not asked to meet.”

In sum, the Court held that the Trial Court’s acquittal was based on sound reasoning and careful evaluation of evidence, while the High Court's reversal ignored critical inconsistencies and adopted speculative reasoning. “The strength of the criminal process lies in restraint as much as in scrutiny,” the Court observed.

The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal, restored the appellant’s acquittal, and discharged his bail bonds. This decision not only reinforces the primacy of the presumption of innocence and high threshold of proof in criminal trials but also serves as a caution against overturning acquittals without compelling and reasoned justification.

Date of Decision: 28 October 2025