Decree Passed in Favour of Dead Persons Is a Nullity: Supreme Court

Judgment of appellate court rendered in favour of dead appellants is void ab initio — only the trial court’s decree survives and is executable” — Supreme Court On November 6, 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered a significant ruling clarifying that a first appellate decree passed in favour of parties who had died before the hearing of the appeal, without substitution of their legal heirs, is a nullity in law. The Court allowed the execution of the original trial court decree passed in 2006, setting aside the contrary orders of the executing court and the High Court, which had dismissed the execution petition.

The Bench comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar held that the first appellate decree was a legal nullity, having been passed after the death of both appellants (defendant Nos. 4 and 5) and without their legal representatives being brought on record. Thus, the decree of the trial court alone could be executed, and the execution petition filed by the appellant was wrongly dismissed.

"Abatement of Appeal Prior to Hearing Nullifies Appellate Decree"

At the heart of the dispute was a decree passed by the trial court on 14.08.2006 in RCS No. 181 of 2001, where the plaintiff’s right over agricultural land originally allotted to his predecessor, an ex-serviceman, was upheld. The court held that the subsequent re-allotment of the land to defendant Nos. 3 to 5 was illegal and decreed possession in favour of the plaintiff.

However, defendant Nos. 4 and 5 alone appealed, and both died before the first appellate court heard the matter — defendant No. 4 on 27.10.2006, and defendant No. 5 on 20.09.2010. Their legal heirs were never brought on record, and yet, the appellate court proceeded to partially allow the appeal on 20.10.2010, reducing the land allotted to the plaintiffs.

The Supreme Court held:

“The decree passed by the first appellate Court having been passed in an appeal where both the appellants had expired prior to the appeal being heard, its decree in favour of dead persons was a nullity.” — [Para 10]

Citing Order XXII Rule 6 CPC, the Court noted that the provision saves proceedings where death occurs after the hearing but before judgment, not before. In the present case, both appellants were already dead at the time of hearing, and hence the protection of Rule 6 did not apply.

"Trial Court Decree Revives Automatically in Absence of Valid Appellate Decree"

The Court made it clear that where an appellate decree is nullified due to abatement, the original trial court decree automatically revives, and is the only valid and executable decree.

Relying on Rajendra Prasad v. Khirodhar Mahto, Amba Bai v. Gopal, and Bibi Rahmani Khatoon v. Harkoo Gope, the Court emphasized:

“The judgment in favour of the deceased appellants would be a nullity in the absence of legal heirs being brought on record, and the judgment of the trial Court would be the one that would govern the rights of the parties.” — [Para 13]

"Merger Principle Inapplicable to Void Appellate Decrees"

The executing court had earlier rejected the execution petition on the reasoning that the trial court decree had merged into the appellate decree, and thus could not be independently executed.

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding:

“Since the decree of the first appellate Court was a nullity, the plaintiffs were entitled to execute the decree passed by the trial Court.” — [Para 14]

Relying on the landmark precedent of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1954) SCR 1178], the Court reaffirmed the principle that a decree that is a nullity can be challenged at any stage, including during execution.

"Limitation Period Under Article 120 Does Not Save Proceedings Where Appellants Were Already Dead at Hearing"

An argument advanced before the executing court — and accepted by the High Court — was that the appeal had been decided within 90 days of death of defendant No. 5, and therefore had not abated under Article 120 of the Limitation Act.

The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning:

“Notwithstanding this position, the fact remains that prior to the appeal being heard and thereafter decided, both the appellants... were no more. The judgment... was, thus, in favour of the parties who were no more alive.” — [Para 12]

Thus, the mere lapse of 90 days had no bearing where the right to continue the appeal itself had lapsed due to non-substitution, and the appellate court’s jurisdiction had ended upon the appellants’ death before hearing.

"Legal Representatives Took No Steps – Decree Holder Not at Fault"

The Supreme Court also pointed out that legal heirs of the deceased appellants never attempted to get themselves impleaded, either during the appeal or later during execution or Supreme Court proceedings.

“Even after the appellant filed the execution proceedings, no steps have been taken... Even before this Court, they have not chosen to contest the proceedings.” — [Para 15]

As a result, the onus was not on the decree-holder, and the abandonment of rights by legal heirs cannot prevent execution of a valid decree.

P. Chandrasekharan Case Distinguished – Not Applicable Where Death Occurred Before Hearing

The High Court had relied on P. Chandrasekharan & Ors. v. S. Kanakarajan [(2007) 5 SCC 669], but the Supreme Court distinguished it as inapplicable.

That case dealt with procedural defects and non-joinder of legal heirs, not a situation where the very appellants died before hearing, thereby nullifying the jurisdiction of the appellate court to proceed.

Execution Proceedings Restored – Only Trial Court Decree is Valid

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the executing court and the High Court, and restored the execution proceedings, holding that the decree dated 14.08.2006 passed by the trial court was valid and executable.

“The appellant would be entitled to seek execution of the decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No.181 of 2001.” — [Para 16]

No costs were awarded.

Date of Decision: November 6, 2025