De Facto Possession is Mandatory for Vesting under the Repeal Act — Allahabad High Court Restores Possession to Landholders as State Fails to Prove Actual Possession

“Mere Vesting Without Actual Possession is of No Consequence” —  Allahabad High Court  allowed a crucial writ petition filed by landholders whose land had been declared surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Ceiling Act), but whose possession was never actually taken by the State. Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Vipin Chandra Dixit held that, “mere vesting of land declared surplus under the Act without resuming de facto possession is of no consequence and the landholder is entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act.” 
 
The Court emphasized that the State could not produce any documentary evidence, panchnama, or memorandum of possession showing that the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest Bholanath had ever surrendered or been dispossessed of the land. The Bench further ruled, “The factual matrix of the present case is clearly in favour of the petitioners as the State has not been able to indicate in any manner as to how de facto possession was taken.” 

Tracing the background, the petitioners' father, Bholanath, was declared to be holding surplus land in 1983 under Section 8(4) of the Ceiling Act. Notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(3) were subsequently issued, but crucially, no evidence of physical possession being taken was produced. The Court held that, “the proceedings only reached up to Section 10(5) of the Ceiling Act, and no dispossession under Section 10(6) or voluntary surrender was ever effected.” 
 
The Court cited the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram [(2013) 4 SCC 280], reiterating, “The mere vesting of the land under Section 10(3) would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender or forceful dispossession.” 

The respondents argued that the land had been transferred to the Prayagraj Development Authority under a Government Order dated December 11, 1996, and later leased to a private developer. However, the Court was not convinced. It remarked, “Though the State has claimed de facto possession based on such transfer and lease deeds, it failed to produce any conclusive evidence of actual possession having been taken before the enforcement of the Repeal Act.” 

The Court also found that the revenue records (Khasra entries) continued to show the petitioners’ possession until at least 2016. It held, “the petitioners’ names in the Khasra of 1422 Fasli (2012) onwards indicate uninterrupted possession.” The State’s reliance on entries showing Prayagraj Development Authority’s name in later records was held insufficient without proof of lawful dispossession. 

Referring to M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar [2025 SCC OnLine SC 447], the Court declared, “Possession envisaged under Section 3 of the Repeal Act is de facto and not merely de jure. The High Court is not precluded from deciding disputed questions of fact where sufficient documentary evidence exists.” 

Finally, the Court directed, “The authorities are directed to carry out changes in the revenue records in favour of the petitioners within a period of eight weeks from today.” 
 

Date of Decision: April 2, 2025