Contempt Jurisdiction Is Sui Generis; Mere Possibility Of Punishment Does Not Convert It Into 'Criminal Jurisdiction' To Bar Intra-Court Appeal: Supreme Court

"Contempt jurisdiction being sui generis, in our considered view, any attempt to compartmentalise it into rigid procedural categories for the purpose of determining the availability of an intra-court appeal must be eschewed." Supreme Court, in an order dated October 14, 2026, held that contempt proceedings, while being quasi-criminal in nature, do not automatically fall within the definition of 'criminal jurisdiction' so as to bar an intra-court appeal. A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu observed that the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the court, rather than the mere possibility of punishment, is the determining factor for the maintainability of an appeal.

Contempt jurisdiction remains distinct from ordinary criminal proceedings

The court underscored that the power to punish for contempt flows from Article 215 of the Constitution. Because contempt is a unique jurisdiction, the court cautioned against mechanically applying the 'criminal jurisdiction' label to every order passed in contempt petitions. The bench noted that while civil contempt proceedings may involve punitive consequences, this does not transmute their fundamental character.

Focus on the substance of the jurisdiction exercised

The core legal test, as reiterated by the court, is what jurisdiction the High Court was actually exercising when it passed the impugned order. If a Single Judge, while dealing with a contempt application, travels beyond the core issue of compliance and adjudicates on the merits of the underlying dispute, that order determines substantive rights and may be subject to an intra-court appeal.

Need for expansive interpretation of right to appeal

The bench critically examined the decision in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana, specifically questioning the premise that any writ jurisdiction dealing with a criminal substratum must be labeled 'criminal jurisdiction'. The court expressed strong reservations, noting that such a restrictive view could curtail access to justice, which is a facet of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

"Access to justice is a facet of Articles 14 and 21"

The court observed that the classification of a writ petition as 'civil' or 'criminal' is primarily a matter of administrative convenience for roster purposes. Elevating this to a substantive division of constitutional power, the court warned, creates an artificial asymmetry where citizens might be denied an appellate remedy simply due to the nature of the original dispute.

Reference to a larger bench on maintainability issues

Due to the fundamental disagreement with the broad application of the Ram Kishan Fauji ratio, the bench deemed it proper to refer the issue to a larger bench. The specific terms of reference include whether Ram Kishan Fauji correctly interprets the Letters Patent regarding intra-court appeals and whether its ratio effectively negates access to justice by creating a rigid, non-constitutional division within Article 226.

"The determinative question is not whether contempt entails punitive consequences, but what jurisdiction the Court was actually exercising when it passed the order impugned."

In the present case, the appellant challenged an order of the High Court that rejected a compliance affidavit and issued directions. Finding that the questions of maintainability and the scope of the Single Judge's power were significant, the court granted the appellant liberty to pursue a Special Appeal. The contempt proceedings before the Single Judge were stayed for two months to facilitate this process.

Date of Decision: 14 October 2026