Common Object Need Not Be Pre-Formed – It Can Develop Instantly During the Incident: Allahabad High Court Upholds Murder Convictions in Group Assault Case

Moment Firing Began, Assembly Became Unlawful – In a powerful reaffirmation of principles governing unlawful assembly and vicarious liability under Indian criminal law, the Allahabad High Court dismissed multiple criminal appeals challenging the conviction of five men involved in a fatal group assault during a local election dispute. The Court, in Rakesh Singh & Others v. State of U.P., held that “the moment the accused persons had started indiscriminate firing at the injured persons, they had formed a common object and the assembly of the accused persons became an unlawful assembly.” The judgment, authored by Justice Anish Kumar Gupta, upheld the trial court’s 2016 ruling under Sections 147, 148, 149/302, and 149/307 of the IPC. 
The case arose from a violent incident on 17 May 1997, when fourteen men—armed with country-made pistols, single and double-barrel guns—opened indiscriminate fire after being confronted for drunken misbehavior outside the home of the informant, Narendra Pal Singh. The assault left two persons dead and five others injured, including the informant’s father, Fakire Singh, who succumbed to bullet injuries five days later. 
The incident was reported in a written complaint submitted at 1:00 A.M. on 18 May 1997—six-and-a-half hours after the firing. The police registered an FIR under multiple provisions of the IPC and the Arms Act. Following a full trial, the Additional Sessions Judge convicted the surviving accused. The High Court was now tasked with reviewing whether the convictions could be sustained in light of alleged evidentiary gaps and delay in filing the FIR. 
The appellants contended that the FIR’s delay was suspicious and indicative of afterthought. The Court, however, found the explanation credible, holding:  “The delay in registering the FIR has been sufficiently explained... The informant carried the injured in a tractor trolley across poor roads for nearly 10–12 kilometres, and arrangements and a written report were made promptly after the incident.” 
 

The Court noted that such delays are not uncommon in rural areas and cannot be a ground to discredit the prosecution when the surrounding facts are consistent. 

A central defence argument was the absence of a premeditated plan or any specific role attributed to the appellants. However, the High Court, relying on the testimonies of injured eyewitnesses and established precedents, concluded that: “The moment the accused persons had started the indiscriminate firing at the injured persons, they had formed a common object and the assembly of the accused persons became an unlawful assembly.” 
Referring to Charan Singh v. State of U.P., the Court emphasized that a common object need not be formed by prior agreement: “A common object may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly, and the other members may just join and adopt it.” 
The Court reiterated that mere presence in an unlawful assembly, coupled with armed participation and overt violence, is sufficient to establish liability under Section 149 IPC. 
The appellants attempted to discredit the case on the basis that no weapons were recovered from them and only two cartridges were found. The Court dismissed this argument, stating: “Non-recovery of weapons is not fatal to the prosecution’s case when consistent and credible testimony of injured eyewitnesses is corroborated by medical evidence.” 
The defence pointed to inconsistencies and contradictions in witness testimonies, particularly noting that some witnesses were declared hostile. However, the Court drew strength from the evidence of the injured witnesses PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3, observing: “There was not an iota of doubt regarding their testimonies… The injuries sustained by them were commensurate with the weapons used by the accused persons.” 
Even the hostile witnesses, the Court noted, did not deny the occurrence of the incident. 
Quoting directly from Charan Singh and Mizaji, the Court underscored the difference between “common intention” and “common object”, highlighting the constructive liability embedded in Section 149 IPC: 
“What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact... It may be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms carried by the members, and their behaviour at or near the scene of the incident.” 
The Court further reaffirmed: “An assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose comes into existence at the outset.” 
Thus, the conviction under Section 149 IPC was not only appropriate but legally compelled. 
In dismissing the appeals, the Allahabad High Court held that the prosecution had successfully proved the formation of an unlawful assembly with a common object to commit murder and attempted murder. The conduct, weapons carried, and coordinated violence by the accused showed collective intent and culpability: 
“There is no illegality in the impugned judgement and order passed by the trial court convicting the appellants… Thus, no interference is called for.” 
The appeals were accordingly dismissed. The Court also directed that appellants who were on bail be taken into custody to serve out their sentence. 
 
Date of Decision: 11 April 2025