Cognizance Before Condoning Delay Not Permissible Under NI Act: Supreme Court Quashes 138 Complaint Filed Late By Two Days

“Satisfaction of the Court on delay must precede cognizance, not follow it”—  In a judgment that reaffirms procedural safeguards under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Supreme Court on January 6, 2026, ruled that a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act without first condoning any delay in its filing. The bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe held that the Magistrate's act of taking cognizance of a time-barred complaint before condoning the delay is not a mere irregularity but a jurisdictional defect, which vitiates the entire proceedings.

Supreme  Court allowed the criminal appeal under Article 136, setting aside the Karnataka High Court’s refusal to quash the proceedings and quashing the very complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act for being time-barred at the time of cognizance.

Supreme Court: “Cognizance taken before condoning delay is contrary to law and not a curable irregularity”

The crux of the matter was a delay of two days in filing the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The complainant, Shobha S. Aradhya, had issued legal notice on August 13, 2013, after the cheque for ₹5,40,000 issued by the appellant bounced for insufficient funds on July 17, 2013. Upon non-payment, the complaint was filed on October 9, 2013, missing the one-month limitation period by two days. Crucially, on the same day, the Magistrate took cognizance without even noticing the delay or having any application for condonation before him.

Later, in 2014, the Magistrate’s successor took note of the delay and directed that the issue of limitation be contested at trial. Only in 2018, nearly five years later, did the Magistrate actually entertain and allow an application for condonation of delay, accepting the complainant’s medical excuse of suffering from viral fever.

However, the Supreme Court found this entire approach impermissible in law. "It is manifest from the clear and unambiguous language of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act that the power conferred upon the Court to take cognisance of a belated complaint is subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within time," the Court observed.

High Court’s view rejected: Cognizance before condonation not a “curable irregularity”

The Karnataka High Court had treated the procedural misstep as a mere "curable irregularity," reasoning that once the Magistrate later condoned the delay, the earlier cognizance stood validated. The High Court noted that since the matter had already been pending for over 11 years, there was no need to interfere on such a minor issue.

However, the Supreme Court decisively rejected this rationale. "The approach of the High Court in treating this crucial aspect as a mere interchangeable exercise... is not in keeping with the mandate of the proviso,” held the Bench.

Referring to Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, a three-judge bench precedent, the Supreme Court reiterated that cognizance under Section 142 is not permissible unless the complaint is filed within the statutory period, or the delay is condoned beforehand. The ruling emphasized that the legislative scheme under the NI Act grants the benefit of limitation protection to the accused and the Magistrate must satisfy himself as to the cause for delay before issuing process.

Complainant’s misleading averment also criticized

The Court also highlighted that the complainant herself contributed to the procedural lapse by falsely stating in her complaint that it was filed within time. The Bench remarked, “We may note that the respondent was herself responsible for this imbroglio as she had made a categorical statement in her complaint that it was filed within time, when it was not.”

The Apex Court also dismissed arguments made on behalf of the complainant that earlier orders allowing cognizance or issuing summons had not been challenged in time, holding that such jurisdictional error cannot be cured by procedural delay or waiver.

“Ordinarily, a proceeding instituted with limitation-linked delay does not actually figure as a regular matter... until that delay is condoned”

In a significant observation on statutory interpretation and procedural rigor, the Court likened the NI Act’s limitation safeguard to provisions under the Civil Procedure Code. It stated:
“Ordinarily, a proceeding instituted with limitation-linked delay before a Court of law does not actually figure as a regular matter on its file until that delay is condoned. For example, Order XLI Rules 3A and 5(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, make this position amply clear in the context of belated presentation of civil appeals.”

Hence, the logic that a later condonation validates a prior unlawful cognizance was roundly rejected by the Court.

Complaint Quashed in Entirety – Strict Compliance With Section 142(1)(b) Mandated

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal filed by S. Nagesh and quashed the complaint in CC No. 1439 of 2014 filed by the respondent. The Supreme Court made it clear that courts must not bypass the statutory safeguard given to the accused under the NI Act.

“We have no hesitation in holding that the learned Magistrate erred in taking cognisance of the respondent’s complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act, even before the delay of two days in its presentation was condoned,” the judgment concluded.

Date of Decision: January 6, 2026