Appellate Authority Under Executive Policy Is 'Persona Designata', Cannot Invoke Limitation Act To Condone Delay: Punjab & Haryana High Court

"Evidently, the Appellate Authority under the aforesaid Policy is not a Court but a persona designata. Since the Appellate Authority under the policy is a creature of the policy itself, accordingly, the Appellate Authority can act only in terms of the power vested in it under the said policy," Punjab and Haryana High Court, in a significant ruling, held that an Appellate Authority constituted under a government policy acts as a persona designata and lacks the jurisdiction to condone delays in filing appeals under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless specifically empowered by the policy.

A bench of Justice Harsh Bunger observed that such authorities are creatures of the specific policy and cannot exercise the inherent powers of a civil court.

The case originated from a group of 28 writ petitions filed by occupiers of shops in Palika Bazar, Panipat, who sought the transfer of ownership under the 'Haryana Disposal of Rented/Leased Government Properties Policy'. Their applications were rejected by the Municipal Corporation because the building was declared unsafe for human habitation and slated for redevelopment. When the petitioners challenged these rejections, the Appellate Authority dismissed their appeals for being filed beyond the prescribed one-month limitation period.

The primary question before the Court was whether the Appellate Authority under the policy was competent to entertain an appeal filed after the expiry of the one-month limitation period. The Court was also called upon to determine if the "Relaxation" clause within the policy could be extended to condone delays in filing appeals.

Appellate Authority Lacks Status Of A Court

The Court emphasized that the Limitation Act, 1963, specifically applies only to proceedings before courts and does not extend to quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities unless the governing statute provides otherwise. The bench noted that the Director General, Urban Local Bodies, Haryana, acting as the Appellate Authority under the state policy, is a persona designata and not a court.

Justice Bunger observed that since the authority is a creature of the executive policy itself, its powers are strictly confined to the provisions contained therein. The Court highlighted that the policy in question did not contain any provision authorizing the Appellate Authority to entertain appeals beyond the prescribed period or to condone delays.

Section 5 Of Limitation Act Not Inherent To Statutory Bodies

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Sakuru v. Tanaji (1985), the Court reiterated that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply only to proceedings in 'courts' and not to appeals or applications before bodies such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executing authorities. The bench noted that even if such bodies are vested with certain powers under the CPC or CrPC, they do not automatically acquire the status of a court.

The judgment further cited the precedent set in Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi (2010), where the Apex Court held that if a statute does not expressly confer the power to condone delay, the authority cannot exercise such power by invoking the Limitation Act. The Court found that the one-month window provided in the 2021 Policy was a rigid boundary that the Appellate Authority could not overstep.

Strict Interpretation Of Limitation For State Litigants

Addressing the issue of delay, the Court referred to the recent Supreme Court judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024). The bench noted that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity, and a party seeking condonation must explain the circumstances that prevented them from filing within the prescribed limitation period.

The Court observed that any event occurring after the expiry of the limitation period is of no consequence if the party failed to establish a sufficient cause that arose during the actual limitation period. In the present case, the petitioners had failed to provide a satisfactory reason for the 265-day delay in filing their appeals before the Director General.

Scope Of Relaxation Clause Limited To Substantive Provisions

The petitioners had argued that Clause 12 of the policy, which allows the government to grant "relaxations," should be used to condone the delay in filing the appeal. However, the Court rejected this contention, clarifying that such relaxation clauses are typically intended for substantive eligibility criteria or targeted categories of property/persons.

The bench held that by no stretch of imagination could a general relaxation clause be applied to override the procedural timelines for filing appeals set out in Clause 8(b) of the policy. The Court found no merit in the argument that the executive's power to relax policy terms could be used to bypass the finality of an order that was not challenged in time.

Dismissal Of Writ Petitions

Concluding the matter, the High Court affirmed the orders passed by the Appellate Authority, holding that the appeals were rightly dismissed for being time-barred. The Court noted that the building in question had been declared dilapidated and unsafe by the Public Works Department, further justifying the initial rejection of the transfer claims.

The Court dismissed the entire bunch of 28 writ petitions, clarifying that the absence of a specific enabling provision for condonation of delay in an executive policy leaves the Appellate Authority with no option but to reject appeals filed beyond the prescribed timeframe.

Date of Decision: 28 April 2026