Acquisition Lapses If Authority Inactive For Over 5 Years Excluding Stay; Bar On Subsequent Purchasers Inapplicable If Land Stood Released: Madhya Pradesh High Court

"Excluding that period also, the total period i.e. 6 years, 8 months and 2 days have lapsed before the new Land Acquisition Act, 2013 came into force and since the acquisition for the subject land has lapsed... the endeavour of the respondents in proposing to take possession by impugned letters... is required to be considered as highly unwarranted, arbitrary illegal and also colorable exercise of power in nature." Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench), in an authoritative ruling delivered on 15 October 2026, held that land acquisition proceedings stand lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 if the acquiring authority fails to assume physical possession and tender compensation for a cumulative period exceeding five years prior to 1 January 2014, even after excluding periods covered by interim court stays.

Justice Sandeep N. Bhatt ruled that an authority’s belated attempt to enforce an award passed over two decades earlier constitutes a "highly unwarranted, arbitrary illegal and also colorable exercise of power in nature." The bench further clarified that the general rule disbarring subsequent purchasers from assailing acquisitions does not apply where the land had already been formally released and exempted prior to the transfer.

The petitioners purchased parcels of land situated at Village Niranjanpur, Indore, which were initially sought to be acquired under Scheme No. 114 (Part-II) by the Indore Development Authority (IDA) pursuant to an award dated 27 November 1992. Following an agreement and resolution permitting private self-development, the IDA abandoned the acquisition, never took physical possession, and failed to deposit compensation for over 22 years while explicitly acknowledging the land's exclusion. However, in early 2015, the IDA abruptly requested the Collector to take physical possession and offered to tender compensation, leading the petitioners to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The primary questions before the court were whether the acquisition proceedings and the underlying scheme lapsed under Section 24(2) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 due to inaction for more than five years prior to 1 January 2014, computed after excluding all interim stay periods. The court was also called upon to determine whether the petitioners, as subsequent purchasers, were barred from asserting that the acquisition had lapsed and seeking protection against dispossession.

Computation of Five-Year Period Excluding Judicial Stay Under Section 24(2)

Examining the timeline of the acquisition, the High Court applied the principles enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129. The court noted that while computing the statutory five-year window of authority inaction under Section 24(2) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the periods during which interim stay orders operated must be strictly excluded.

After carefully computing every spell of interim protection granted across various writ petitions—including M.P. No. 747/1991, W.P. No. 1280/1995, and W.P. No. 1859/1998—the bench arrived at an undisputed conclusion that a substantial period remained entirely unencumbered by any judicial embargo.

Inaction Exceeding Five Years Renders Acquisition Lapsed

The court calculated that the uninhibited period between 26 June 1994 and 5 October 1995, between 30 September 1998 and 28 February 2000, and from 6 October 2010 up to 1 January 2014 totaled 6 years, 8 months, and 2 days of sheer administrative dormancy prior to the coming into force of the 2013 Act.

Because neither physical possession was taken nor compensation paid during this cumulative window of over six years, the bench held that the deemed lapse under Section 24(2) of the RFCTLARR Act was completely attracted. The court held that the IDA could not resurrect an abandoned proceeding after a lapse of more than 23 years.

Bar on Subsequent Purchasers Inapplicable to Released or Exempted Lands

Addressing the IDA's objection based on the Supreme Court judgments in Shiv Kumar v. Union of India (2019) 10 SCC 229, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil Jain (AIR 2023 SC 20), and U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124, the High Court distinguished the precedents on facts. The IDA had contended that subsequent purchasers have no locus standi to challenge acquisition proceedings or claim deemed lapsing.

The bench observed that the land in question had been specifically released from acquisition pursuant to the IDA’s Resolution No. 221 dated 30 November 1992 and an agreement permitting private development. The IDA had repeatedly admitted before judicial and administrative forums—including in its 2011 communication and replies to earlier writ petitions—that possession had never been taken and the land was excluded from Scheme No. 114 Part-II.

"All these events indicate that at the time of the purchase of the lands by the petitioners, the lands are exempted from acquisition and therefore, the contention raised on the basis of the judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case as it cannot be said that the petitioners have purchased the lands, which are acquired in the acquisition proceeding."

Belated Dispossession Violates Constitutional Right Under Article 300-A

The bench drew support from its previous decision in Pushpabai Kothari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (W.P. No. 31107 of 2023) and the Supreme Court's ruling in State of Haryana v. Aalamgit (2025) 6 SCC 397, reiterating that arbitrary attempts by the State to dispossess landowners decades after abandoning acquisition proceedings infringe upon the constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

Reaffirming the supervisory parameters of certiorari under Article 226 as articulated in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (1955) 1 SCR 1104, the court underscored that extraordinary writ jurisdiction must be exercised to arrest patent errors of law, absence of jurisdiction, and colorable exercises of statutory authority by development authorities.

Allowing the writ petition, the High Court quashed the IDA's impugned communications dated 29 March 2015 and 17 April 2015 addressed to the Collector for taking possession. The court formally declared that Scheme No. 114 Part-II stood lapsed insofar as it related to the petitioners' land, permanently restraining the respondents from dispossessing the petitioners or interfering with their peaceful ownership.

Date of Decision: 15 October 2026