A Single Message Can Ignite a Terror Conspiracy: Bombay High Court Refuses Bail to Vet Doctor Accused of Instigating Amravati Killing

“At bail stage, Court must see broad probabilities — not conduct a mini trial”, In a hard‑hitting judgment Bombay High Court refused to grant bail to Yusuf Khan, a veterinary doctor accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, holding that the material on record prima facie establishes his role in instigating, facilitating and participating in a criminal conspiracy culminating in a terrorist act.

A Division Bench of Justice A.S. Gadkari and Justice Shyam C. Chandak emphatically reiterated that courts considering bail under UAPA are bound by the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) and cannot test the evidence on admissibility or reliability at this stage.

“Once the accusation is found to be prima facie true on a cumulative assessment of material, the Court has no discretion to grant bail,” the Bench held.

From WhatsApp Post to Murder: “Instigation Was the First Spark”

The prosecution case arose from the brutal murder of Umesh Kolhe, a medical shop owner in Amravati, in June 2022. The killing was allegedly triggered by communal outrage following a controversial public statement by a political spokesperson, which led to heightened social tension.

The deceased had posted a message on a WhatsApp group supporting the controversial comment. The appellant, the only Muslim member of that group, took offence.

The Court noted that instead of merely disagreeing, the appellant took a screenshot of the deceased’s post, deliberately altered the saved mobile number to expose his identity, and circulated it along with a provocative and inflammatory message calling upon others to “teach him a lesson”.

The Bench observed: “The message was crafted in a manner that any individual or group reading it would be provoked to avenge the deceased. This was not a mere expression of dissent.”

The Court rejected the defence argument that the appellant only intended to damage the deceased’s business, holding that the language, circulation, and timing of the message clearly suggested intent to incite violence.

Section 14 Evidence Act: State of Mind and Intention Matter

Relying on Section 14 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Bench held that conduct, words, and surrounding circumstances are relevant to infer intention and state of mind, especially in conspiracy cases.

“If the intention was merely economic boycott, the message would have been confined to customers. Instead, it was broadcast indiscriminately to groups and individuals,” the Court noted.

The deliberate alteration of the deceased’s contact number before circulating the screenshot was found to be a calculated step to ‘unwrap’ the identity of the victim, thereby exposing him to retaliation.

Criminal Conspiracy: “Presence at Every Meeting Not Necessary”

A central argument of the appellant was that he was not present in later meetings where the murder was allegedly planned and executed.

Rejecting this, the Court held: “Conspiracy is seldom proved by direct evidence. Meeting of minds can be inferred from conduct, communications and circumstances.”

The Bench highlighted that: – The appellant met a key co‑accused immediately after circulating the instigating message
– 25 phone calls were exchanged between them before and after the murder
– The appellant’s mobile location placed him at earlier meetings discussing the communal issue

“He ignited the fire and then remained behind the curtain. Absence from the final act does not erase complicity,” the Court observed.

Terrorist Act Under UAPA: “Killing Was Part of a Wider Design”

The Court accepted the prosecution’s contention that the murder was not an isolated crime, but part of an organised plan to avenge a perceived insult to faith and to strike terror in society.

“Prima facie, a terrorist gang was formed with a common objective — to brutally kill the deceased and send a message of fear,” the Bench held, finding Sections 16, 18 and 20 of UAPA applicable.

Extra‑Judicial Confessions Not Sole Basis — Independent Material Exists

While acknowledging that extra‑judicial confessions of co‑accused are weak evidence, the Court clarified that even dehors such confessions, there existed sufficient independent circumstantial material linking the appellant to the conspiracy.

“Confessions merely lend corroboration. The case against the appellant stands even without them,” the Bench recorded.

Article 21 vs UAPA Bar: “Liberty Cannot Override Statutory Embargo”

On the argument of prolonged incarceration and delay in trial, the Court held that Article 21 considerations cannot eclipse the express bar under Section 43D(5) UAPA when accusations are prima facie true.

Distinguishing Vernon v. State of Maharashtra and Pancho v. State of Haryana, the Bench relied on NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali and Union of India v. Barakathullah, reiterating:

“At bail stage, courts must assess broad probabilities, presume prosecution material as it stands, and avoid detailed evaluation.”

Bail Denied, Appeal Dismissed

In conclusion, the Bombay High Court held that the accusations against Yusuf Khan pass the ‘prima facie true’ test, attracting the statutory bar on bail under UAPA.

“Such offences strike at the conscience of society and create an atmosphere of fear. This Court is not inclined to exercise discretion in favour of the appellant,” the Bench concluded.

The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the Special Judge rejecting bail was affirmed.

Date of Decision: 20.01.2026