Facts:

The case involved the murder of two individuals, with charges against 19 accused persons. Initially, the trial court acquitted all accused, giving them the benefit of the doubt due to a purported lack of evidence. Subsequently, the State and the complainant filed appeals and revisions challenging the acquittal.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's acquittal of all accused was based on a perverse and incorrect appreciation of evidence.

Whether the testimonies of eyewitnesses, including an injured witness, were reliable and corroborated by medical evidence.

Whether the High Court's decision to convict the accused was justified based on the evidence presented.

Held:

The trial court's reasoning for disbelieving the evidence of the injured witness (PW.5) was found to be perverse and incorrect. The Supreme Court observed that there was evidence indicating PW.5 was unconscious when admitted to the hospital, which the trial court had overlooked. (Para 22)

The absence of a certificate from the doctor regarding PW.5's state of consciousness was deemed inconsequential, as it was well established that such lapses do not undermine the prosecution's case. The High Court's reliance on PW.5's testimony and medical evidence was therefore justified. (Para 23)

The High Court appropriately considered the evidence of PW.5 and noted that his injuries were not disputed. The court found that the trial court's disregard of PW.5's testimony was unsustainable, as it was corroborated by medical evidence. (Para 24-25)

The testimonies of other eyewitnesses, such as PW.1 and PW.2, were also found reliable and consistent with the prosecution's case. The trial court's dismissal of their testimonies was unwarranted, and the High Court's reliance on them was deemed appropriate. (Para 26-27)

The trial court's criticism of certain witnesses' presence at the court on the day of the incident was rejected, as it did not undermine their credibility. The High Court's decision to convict the accused based on the eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence was upheld. (Para 28)

Despite the non-presentation of weapons to the doctors, the Supreme Court emphasized that this did not weaken the prosecution's case, given the clear medical evidence indicating homicidal injuries. (Para 30-31)

The Supreme Court affirmed that when evidence supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, acquittal should not be upheld. It reiterated that while it typically refrains from interfering with acquittals, it would do so if the acquittal appears perverse, illegal, or unjust. (Para 35-37)

Decision: In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court's decision to convict the accused based on the reliable eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence presented.

Facts:

Simplex Infrastructures Ltd., the Respondent, was awarded a construction contract by the Union of India, the Appellant.

Disputes arose, leading to arbitration proceedings, where the Arbitrator ruled in favor of Simplex Infrastructures Ltd.

The Union of India filed a petition to set aside the arbitral award before the District Court at Port Blair, which was held not maintainable.

Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. filed an execution proceeding in the High Court at Calcutta related to the arbitral award.

The District Court held that the petition filed by the Union of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not maintainable due to lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The Union of India filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act before the High Court at Calcutta, seeking to set aside the arbitral award, and also filed an application for condonation of delay.

The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay.

Issues:

Whether an intra-Court Letters Patent Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court at Calcutta can be maintained against an order passed by a Single Judge regarding condonation of delay in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The Court held that the remedy of appeal against the order of the Single Judge condoning the delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not available under Section 37 of the Act. The Act provides for a remedy of appeal only against orders setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34(1)(c). The decision of the Division Bench to entertain the Letters Patent Appeal was erroneous, as the order of the Single Judge fell within the ambit of the Act.

The Union of India was permitted to challenge the judgment of the Single Judge through appropriate legal recourse, but not through a Letters Patent Appeal. The appeals were allowed, and the Division Bench's judgment was set aside.

The Court granted liberty to Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. to challenge the judgment of the Single Judge separately.

Facts:

The appellant, Vaneet Mahajan, was the complainant in a case where he, along with his brother and an employee, was attacked by a group of individuals armed with deadly weapons. The attack was allegedly orchestrated by a cabinet minister in the Punjab government. The appellant suffered several injuries, including grievous ones, leading to the registration of a criminal case under various sections of the IPC, including Section 307.

Issues:

Whether the charges under Section 307 IPC were sustainable based on the evidence presented. Whether the High Court's decision to delete the charge under Section 307 IPC was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's conclusion that the intention to kill was conspicuously missing. It observed that the prosecution's case, as detailed in the FIR and supported by medical evidence, clearly indicated that the accused had attacked the victims with deadly weapons, targeting their heads and causing grievous injuries.

The Court cited precedent to emphasize that for an offense under Section 307 IPC, it is not necessary that the injury be on a fatal part of the body. It also highlighted that when several persons attack unarmed individuals with deadly weapons, it is reasonable to presume that they had the intention or knowledge that such attack could result in death.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and directed that the accused persons be tried for the offense under Section 307 IPC as well.

Facts:

Anant Singh @ Anant Kumar Singh, the appellant, was preventively detained under the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981, on 21.9.2016, for a maximum period of one year.

The appellant was alleged to be involved in 31 grave crimes, including murder, attempt to murder, and kidnapping, and had been in jail since 24.6.2015.

A previous preventive detention order dated 5.9.2016 was revoked due to lack of State Government approval within the specified time.

The subsequent detention order was passed on 21.9.2016 based on grounds prior to the revocation of the earlier order.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent detention order passed on 21.9.2016 is valid under Section 23(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981.

Whether the appellant's representation rights and procedural safeguards were violated under the Act.

Whether the detention order met the requirements of Section 12(1) of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the detention order dated 21.9.2016 was invalid due to non-compliance with Section 23(2) of the Act, as it was based on grounds that arose prior to the revocation of the earlier order.

The Court relied on the judgment in Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack (1969) 1 SCR 227, which established that revocation includes both valid and invalid orders, and fresh orders must be based on new grounds. This principle ensures that the detaining authority fully applies its mind and complies with statutory requirements.

Consequently, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant's appeal was allowed, resulting in the annulment of the detention order dated 21.9.2016. However, the Court clarified that its decision does not preclude the State Government from taking any other lawful action against the appellant.

Facts:

Anil Kumar Dadurao Dhekale (the appellant) sought eviction of the respondents from his property under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

The original tenant, Manilal Ishwarbhai Valand, defaulted on rent payments, leading to a notice from the appellant.

The appellant filed a Rent Suit No.499 of 1978 seeking possession of the property and arrears of rent.

The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the decision was overturned by the First Appellate Court.

The High Court affirmed the decision of the First Appellate Court.

Issues:

Whether there was default in payment of rent.

Whether the property had been sublet without permission.

Whether the defendants were entitled to continue the tenancy after the death of the original tenant.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a monthly tenancy, not an annual one as concluded by the lower courts. The respondents had defaulted on rent payments for more than six months, making them liable for eviction under Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Control Act.

The defendants were not entitled to continue the tenancy after the death of the original tenant, as they were not carrying on the same business as the tenant, as required by Section 5(11)(c) of the Act.

Evidence of subletting was found, and the findings of the lower courts on this matter were reversed.

The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the eviction order passed by the trial court was restored.

The respondents were directed to vacate the premises within two months.

Facts:

The case revolves around the interpretation of the Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules and the Andhra Pradesh Police Service Rules, specifically regarding eligibility for appointment as Inspector under the A.P. Police Service.

Issues:

The eligibility criteria for appointment as Inspector, particularly whether service rendered as Reserve Sub-Inspectors should be counted towards the total years of service required for eligibility.

Held:

The Court upheld the existing rules, which clearly specify that 6 completed years of service as Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) are required for appointment as Inspector under the A.P. Police Service.

The judgment clarified that service rendered as Reserve Sub-Inspectors does not count towards the total years of service required. It affirmed that seniority alone cannot override eligibility criteria for promotion and that eligibility conditions must be fulfilled before consideration for promotion.

The Court found no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the existing rules. Therefore, the appeals challenging the rules were dismissed.

Facts:

A lease agreement was executed between the appellant-landlord and respondents-tenants for a period of three years with specified rent. The landlord filed an eviction application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, alleging arrears of rent from a certain date.

The Rent Controller made a provisional assessment of the rent due, which the tenants failed to comply with. Consequently, the Rent Controller passed an eviction order. The tenants' appeal against this order was dismissed by the appellate authority, but the High Court, in a revision, set aside the eviction order based on its finding that the provisional assessment was flawed.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, specifically concerning provisional assessment of rent, the rights of tenants and landlords, and the consequences of non-compliance with provisional assessment orders.

Held:

The court clarified the provisions under Section 13(2)(i) of the Act, which provide a concession to the tenant, allowing them to be deemed to have duly paid or tendered rent within the prescribed time if they comply with certain conditions, including paying arrears of rent assessed by the Rent Controller. Failure to comply with a provisional assessment order would render the tenant liable to eviction.

The determination of provisional assessment by the Rent Controller forms the basis of the eviction order. Therefore, the tenant has the right to challenge the correctness of the provisional assessment even after the eviction order is passed.

The provisional assessment is based on a prima facie view formed by the Rent Controller and is subject to subsequent final adjudication. The deposit by the tenant, as per the final assessment order within the specified period, protects them from eviction.

The court emphasized the need to strike a balance between the rights of the tenant and the landlord in interpreting Section 13. If the tenant admits to rent being due for a certain period, the court should adopt an interpretation that does not allow the tenant to defeat the landlord's claim.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, thereby restoring the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller, and directed the respondents to pay costs to the appellant.

Referred Cases in the above Judgment:

Decided on : 11-04-2017

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Section 13(2)(i)

Rent and Eviction—Eviction Decree—Defaulting in payment of rent—Once Rent Controller has made a provisional assessment of arrears of rent, interest and costs, tenant must deposit amount so determined on first hearing of application for ejectment—A tenant who does so would be deemed to have duly paid or tendered rent within time prescribed by substantive provision of Section 13(2)(i)—A tenant failing to comply with terms of an order of provisional assessment, cannot thereafter avail of concession extended to a tenant and will be liable to suffer order of eviction—However, having suffered order of eviction, tenant is entitled to statutory remedy of appeal under Section 15(1)(b). [Sections 13 and 15 of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949]

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Sudhir Walia, Abhishek Atrey, Advocates, for the Appellant; Rajesh Sharma, Ms. Shalu Sharma, Advocates, for the Respondents

Cases Referred

Harjit Singh Uppal Vs. Anup Bansal, (2011) 11 SCC 672

Hope Plantations Ltd. Vs. Taluk Land Board, Peermade, (1999) 5 SCC 590

Narayan Dutt Tiwari Vs. Rohit Shekhar, (2012) 12 SCC 554

Rakesh Wadhawan Vs. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation, (2002) 5 SCC 440

Vinod Kumar Vs. Premlata, (2003) 11 SCC 397

Facts:

The Dental Council of India (DCI) conducted assessments of a dental college regarding its eligibility to start post-graduate courses.

The college's scheme for post-graduate courses was disapproved by the Government of India based on recommendations from the DCI.

The college approached the High Court seeking relief against the disapproval, and the High Court passed an interim order staying the decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in passing the interim order interfering with the admission process of the college.

Whether such interim orders should be passed in matters concerning educational institutions lacking approval.

Held:

The Court held that while it generally refrains from interfering with interim orders, the High Court's order in this case was unsustainable. Despite this, the Court decided to strike a balance by allowing admitted students to continue their courses but adjusting their seats from the next academic session. Additionally, the college was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs before the Registry of the Court within eight weeks. The costs imposed on the college were not to be recovered from the students.

The Court emphasized the need to avoid chaos and uncertainty in the admission process and cautioned against institutions attempting to manipulate the system. The appeal stands disposed of in above terms.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the determination of tariff for the supply of power from power projects governed by Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) between State Government Utilities and power generating companies. The dispute arose due to a change in Indonesian law, which increased the export price of coal from Indonesia to the international market.

Issues:

Whether the change in Indonesian law constituted a valid ground for relief under force majeure or change in law provisions.

The interpretation of regulatory powers under Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003, concerning tariff determination.

The scope and applicability of clauses within the PPAs regarding force majeure events and changes in law.

Held:

The court held that the PPAs did not treat changes in the cost of fuel as force majeure events. Therefore, the unexpected rise in the price of coal did not exempt the generating companies from fulfilling their contractual obligations.

While a change in Indonesian law did not qualify as a change in law under the guidelines, a change in Indian law did. Consequently, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) was directed to reconsider the matter for those power generators falling within Clause 13 of the PPA.

The court clarified that CERC's regulatory functions, especially concerning tariff determination, should be exercised in accordance with guidelines issued by the Central Government. However, CERC could utilize its general regulatory powers under certain circumstances where guidelines were not applicable.

The term "composite scheme" in the context of the Electricity Act was interpreted to mean a scheme for the generation and sale of electricity in more than one state. The expression "any law" in the PPAs referred only to Indian laws, not laws of other countries.

Decision: The court set aside the tribunal's judgment and directed CERC to reconsider the matter in light of the findings, particularly regarding the impact of changes in Indian law on compensatory tariffs for power generators falling within Clause 13 of the PPAs.