Facts:

Appellants are defendants in a civil suit filed by the respondent for declaration, partition, and recovery of possession.

Concurrent proceedings include the respondent's application for a Succession Certificate under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Trial Court decreed the suit, declaring the respondent as the sole heir, and granted the Succession Certificate. Appellate Court overturned the decision.

The High Court held that the decision on the grant of the Succession Certificate operates as res judicata in the civil suit.

Issues:

Whether a decision on the grant of Succession Certificate bars the same issue in a subsequent civil suit?

Applicability of res judicata principles to Succession Certificate proceedings.

Held:

The general principle of res judicata requires an issue to be directly and substantially in question in the earlier suit. Mere incidental findings do not fall within the ambit of res judicata. (Pawan Kumar Gupta Vs. Rochiram Nagdeo referred)( Para 7)

Decision on the grant of Succession Certificate is not a final adjudication. It is a determination of prima facie title and does not conclusively settle the rights between parties. The effect is limited to providing indemnity to the debtor.( Para 11)

Section 387 of the Indian Succession Act clarifies that decisions under Part X of the Act, including Section 372, do not bar the same question being raised in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties.( Para 13)

Explanation VIII to Section 11, which extends the scope of res judicata, does not apply to decisions made in Succession Certificate proceedings. The protective umbrella of Section 387 prevents such decisions from falling within the field of Explanation VIII.( Para 15)

A decision made in a proceeding under Section 372 for the grant of Succession Certificate does not bar parties from raising the same issue in a subsequent suit. The High Court erred in applying the principle of res judicata.( Para 17)

Conclusion: The judgment sets aside the High Court order and remands the case for reconsideration of the second appeal on its merits.

Facts:

The murder of a Gram Sarpanch, with six individuals convicted for various offenses, including criminal conspiracy. The High Court acquitted most of them, convicting only two for the offense under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code.

Issues:

Credibility of the FIR based on the non-examination of the scribe.

Reappreciation of evidence and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

False implication and reliability of eyewitness accounts.

The discrepancy in the involvement of the accused in the murder.

Held:

The Division Bench pointed out errors in the High Court's decision, stating that the assailants cannot escape conviction under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34, if not Section 149 of the IPC. The court expressed the need for a reappraisal of evidence in the interest of justice.

Decision: The appeal filed by A1 and A3 was allowed, and their conviction and sentence were set aside. They were acquitted. The remaining appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

Dasarath Singh, an auto-rickshaw driver, was allegedly murdered during the commission of a felony - the stealing of the auto-rickshaw by some unknown passengers. The auto-rickshaw was reported stolen, and the driver's body was recovered, but the vehicle was never found. The insurance company compensated the owner for the loss of the auto-rickshaw.

Issues:

Whether the death of Dasarath Singh was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, allowing the claimants (wife and children) to seek compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Held:

The Court analyzed the circumstances and concluded that the murder of Dasarath Singh was accidental, occurring in the process of committing the theft of the auto-rickshaw. The stealing of the vehicle was the object of the felony, and the murder was incidental to the act of stealing. (Para 14)

The Court rejected the contention that murder, by definition, cannot be an accident. It distinguished between intentional felonious acts leading to murder and accidental murder, emphasizing the proximity of cause. In this case, the murder was accidental. (Para 11)

The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision that the claimants were entitled to compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. (Para 19)

Regarding the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, the Court referred to a precedent (Shankarayya case) and held that the Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal without obtaining leave from the tribunal. (Para 20)

Facts:

Respondent 'B' was promoted as Inspector on an officiating basis with a condition not to claim seniority until duly selected.

Another officer ('R'), junior to 'B', was promoted as Inspector and subsequently as Dy. S.P.

'B' filed a writ petition claiming seniority from the date of his officiating promotions, which the High Court allowed.

'B' also claimed promotion to Dy. S.P. from the date 'R' was promoted, which was granted by the High Court.

Another officer ('K') filed a writ petition claiming promotion to Inspector, asserting that his junior ('B') was promoted.

Issues:

Validity of granting seniority and promotion to 'B' based on his officiating promotion.

Non-joinder of parties and the effect on the claim for seniority.

The concept of equality in the context of promotions and seniority.

Held:

The High Court erred in granting seniority and promotion to 'B' based on his officiating promotion, which was ad hoc and not in accordance with the rules.

Non-joinder of parties, especially the seniors affected by the relief claimed, should normally result in the dismissal of the petition unless specific reasons justify non-impleadment.

The concept of equality is positive and cannot be enforced in a negative manner. Illegally granted benefits cannot be claimed by others based on equality.

The judgments of the High Court were set aside, and promotions of 'B' were not disturbed in the interest of justice.

Despite setting aside the judgments, promotions of 'B' cannot be the basis for similar rights for others.

Delay in filing the appeal was condoned, considering the need for substantial justice and the potential impact on various individuals.

Facts:

The case involves a batch of eight appeals where the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board is the Appellant. The central issues are whether the High Court, under Article 226, can award compensation for deaths caused by electrocution due to the improper maintenance of electric wires. Additionally, the judgment examines whether the High Court can appoint an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to determine compensation and subsequently make the arbitrator's award a rule of the court.

Issues:

Can the High Court, under Article 226, award compensation for deaths caused by electrocution due to the negligence of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board?

Can the High Court appoint an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to decide the quantum of compensation and make the award a rule of the court?

Held:

The court, referring to precedent in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) and Others Vs. Smt. Sukamani Das and Another, emphasized that when disputed questions of fact are involved, a petition under Article 226 is not a suitable remedy. The court stated that negligence needs to be established first by the claimant in cases of tort.

The court acknowledged that not every case of tortuous liability requires a civil suit. When negligence is evident and there is an infringement of Article 21, the High Court can proceed under Article 226.

The court addressed the second question, stating that the High Court's reference to an arbitrator must comply with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court clarified that the Act does not allow for the court's intervention in referring a matter to arbitration. The award made under the Act is considered a decree and should be enforced accordingly.

Disputed questions of fact arose in the present case, and the High Court's intervention in entertaining writ petitions and referring the matter to arbitration was deemed improper. The court held that the High Court could not have proceeded to have the matter adjudicated by an arbitrator in violation of the provisions of the new Act.

The court restrained the Appellant from recovering any amount from the Respondents, which had been paid to them based on the High Court's judgments.

Facts:

Mesrs. Kolay Biscuits Company Private Limited created a mortgage in favor of Union Bank of India in 1965.

The company was declared a sick unit under the Sick Industrial Companies Act in 1991.

The factory was closed down in 1980.

The bank filed a title mortgage suit for recovery.

Company was ordered to be wound up in 1991, and the official liquidator was appointed.

Auction sale of the company's assets was initiated.

Issues:

Adequacy of the auction price.

Duty of the court in confirming sales.

Handling of valuation reports.

Whether the property could be sold as a going concern.

Held:

The Court found that the attention of the Company Judge was not focused on the fact that the company had been closed since 1980.

The Court criticized the non-application of mind to material facts and unjustified reliance on statements without proper verification.

The Court emphasized the duty of the court to disclose valuation reports to secured creditors and other interested parties.

It was observed that the valuation report was not reliable, and the court did not apply its mind to its content.

The Court held that the sale of the company as a going concern was without a proper basis and unjustified.

The Division Bench's sympathy for workers without proper verification was deemed inappropriate.

Non-disclosure of the valuation report to creditors before auction was considered unjustifiable.

The Court highlighted the duty to ensure properties are sold at a reasonable price, considering market value.

The auction sale was set aside, and the Official Liquidator was directed to recover possession and refund the amount deposited by the auction purchaser.

The Court directed the Official Liquidator to resell the property after obtaining a fresh valuation report and giving a copy to secured creditors.

Facts:

The case involves the promotion of Junior Engineers to Assistant Engineers in Telecommunication circles in India.

Prior to 1966, promotions were made based on executive instructions outlined in paragraph 206 of the Post and Telegraph Manual Volume IV.

The recruitment rules of 1966 came into force, changing the promotion criteria to be in accordance with a qualifying departmental examination.

Discrepancies arose regarding the preparation of eligibility lists, specifically concerning the interpretation of paragraph 206 of the Post and Telegraph Manual and the recruitment rules.

The judgment refers to various applications, interventions, and contempt petitions filed by different parties.

Issues:

Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the recruitment rules and instructions for the promotion of Junior Engineers to Assistant Engineers.

Conflict between the judgment of the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition No. 3384-86/1986.

Reversion of Parmanand Lal based on the orders of different tribunals.

Held:

The Court reaffirms the decision in Civil Appeal No. 4339 of 1995, stating that eligibility lists must be prepared according to the year of recruitment and not the year of confirmation.

Emphasizes that statutory recruitment rules prevail over administrative instructions, and the procedure outlined in the recruitment rules must be followed.

Acknowledges that individuals who have already benefited from previous judgments, such as Parmanand Lal, will not be affected by the decision.

Drops contempt proceedings against Departmental Authorities due to bona fide difficulties but directs them to proceed in accordance with the law and the court's observations within six months.

Facts:

The appellant availed an overdraft facility from the respondent bank by pledging shares. Subsequently, the appellant requested the bank to sell a portion of the pledged shares to clear the overdraft. However, the bank delayed the sale, resulting in a decline in share prices and financial loss for the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the grant of an overdraft facility by a bank constitutes 'service' under the Consumer Protection Act?

Whether the delay in disposing of pledged shares amounts to a 'deficiency' in service?

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim compensation?

Held:

Grant of overdraft facilities by a bank qualifies as 'service' under the Consumer Protection Act, as the bank charges interest for providing such facilities.

The delay in disposing of pledged shares, causing financial loss to the customer, constitutes a 'deficiency' in service by the bank.

The appellant is entitled to claim compensation for the loss incurred, along with interest.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's decision dismissing the claim is set aside.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for partition of a dwelling house in Indore.

Two portions of the house belonged to an undivided family; one portion was sold to a stranger (non-applicant No. 3), and the other portion was bought in a court auction by the appellant.

A preliminary decree was passed in appeal for partition, followed by a final decree.

Execution proceedings were initiated by respondent No. 1, and a Commissioner was appointed for partition.

Issues:

The crucial question was the maintainability of the application under Section 4 of the Partition Act filed by respondent No. 1, the decree-holder.

Held:

The appellant, a stranger purchaser, had not filed any application for separating his share throughout the proceedings.

The conditions for the applicability of Section 4, as laid down in a previous decision, were not met, particularly the requirement that the stranger transferee must sue for partition.

The absence of an application from the appellant for separating his share rendered respondent No. 1's application under Section 4 not maintainable.

The decision of the Trial Court, treating the application as not maintainable, was upheld.