Criminal Law – Murder – Political Rivalry – Conviction under Section 302 IPC – Members of rival political factions attacked the deceased with axes and sickles, causing fatal injuries – Multiple assailants involved in coordinated group assault – Medical evidence confirmed that injuries inflicted were sufficient to cause death – Trial court and High Court found accused guilty – Supreme Court upheld conviction based on cogent eyewitness testimony and corroborating medical evidence – Held: Common object to commit murder established – Conviction under Section 302 valid [Paras 1–3, 18–26, 45]

Criminal Procedure – Framing of Charge – Section 149 IPC – Non-mention of Section 149 in charge under Section 302 – Accused argued conviction under Section 302 IPC simpliciter illegal in absence of charge under Section 149 – Supreme Court held that charge framed contained all essential ingredients of Section 149 IPC though section number was not explicitly stated – No prejudice shown to accused – Held: Omission to mention Section 149 in charge is not fatal when ingredients are implicit and no miscarriage of justice caused [Paras 27–44]

Criminal Trial – Injured Eyewitness Testimony – Credibility – PW-1 and PW-3, both injured in attack, gave consistent account of assault – Testimonies corroborated by medical evidence and post-mortem reports – Omissions in FIR or inability to attribute specific injuries to each accused held natural in context of group assault – Held: Testimony of injured eyewitness carries high probative value – Conviction rightly based on their evidence [Paras 23–26]

Criminal Law – Constructive Liability – Section 149 IPC – Participation in unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons resulting in fatal group assault – Presence and active role in execution of common object sufficient for conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 – Prosecution not obliged to prove individual overt act by each accused – Held: Once common object is established and participation shown, individual liability follows [Paras 36, 44]

Criminal Procedure – Section 464 CrPC – Defect in Charge – Omission to mention Section 149 IPC in charge not fatal – No prejudice shown – Conviction sustained – Supreme Court reiterates that procedural errors do not invalidate trial unless failure of justice is demonstrated [Paras 42–44]

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 302, 307, and related charges upheld – No prejudice shown due to omission of Section 149 in charges – Conviction legally sustainable.

Judicial Discipline – Adverse Remarks Against Subordinate Judiciary – High Court, while remanding a civil case, made disparaging observations describing the trial judge’s approach as “hasty, slipshod and perfunctory” and directed that a copy of the order be placed in his service record – Held: Remarks unwarranted and contrary to principles of judicial restraint – Lower judiciary works under psychological pressure; errors of judgment cannot justify stigmatic remarks without opportunity of defence – Remarks expunged [Paras 7, 10–14].

Judicial Restraint – Principles – Courts must exercise moderation, humility, and restraint in criticism – As observed in A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, judicial restraint and discipline are essential for orderly administration of justice – Harsh or disparaging remarks are to be avoided unless indispensably necessary for the decision [Paras 10, 13].

Expunction of Remarks – Tests and Standards – Remarks may be expunged if: (i) wholly irrelevant or unjustifiable; (ii) retention would cause serious harm; and (iii) expunction will not affect reasons of the judgment – Further, before making adverse remarks, the person concerned should have opportunity to explain; the conduct must be in issue and remarks must be integral to the decision – Tested on these parameters, the High Court’s comments failed judicial scrutiny [Paras 12–13].

Service Law – Judicial Officer – Direction to place copy of High Court’s order containing adverse remarks in the officer’s personal file and before Inspecting Judge without giving opportunity—Held: Violative of fairness and likely to prejudice career prospects—Direction set aside [Paras 13–14].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Adverse remarks in para 10 of High Court’s order dated 06.07.2006 expunged – Directions to place copy in service record and before Inspecting Judge quashed – No costs [Para 14].

Civil Writ – PIL - Right to Education – Safe Learning Environment – Article 21A – Enforceability – In light of the Kumbakonam school fire tragedy which killed 93 children due to lack of fire safety and building code compliance, the Court emphasized that the right to education under Article 21A includes the right to study in a safe and secure environment – Held: Unsafe school buildings violate fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 21A – Education cannot be imparted in fear of structural collapse, fire hazards, or toxic exposure – States directed to enforce building safety norms as a constitutional obligation [Paras 1–6, 30–35, 38–40].

Fundamental Rights – Right to Life and Personal Liberty – Education in Unsafe Schools – Court reaffirmed that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to receive quality education in secure institutions – Exposure to hazardous infrastructure infringes on this right – Court traced constitutional and legislative history affirming the right to education as an enforceable and reciprocal duty on both State and parents under Articles 21A and 51A(k) [Paras 20–29].

State Obligation – Enforcement of Safety Standards – Building Codes – National Building Code, 2005 – Court mandated strict compliance with NBC Part IV (Fire & Life Safety) and BIS Code IS 14435:1997 across all private and public schools – Government directed to deny recognition to schools without structural stability and fire safety certification – Periodic audits and strict monitoring of compliance directed – Delinquent officials liable to disciplinary action for dereliction [Paras 35, 40].

School Infrastructure – Mandatory Fire Safety Measures – Detailed directions issued including:

Installation of ISI-marked fire extinguishers in all blocks

Fire safety training and regular mock drills for teachers and students

Separate kitchen facilities and fire-resistant construction materials

Structural safety audits by government-certified engineers

Emergency evacuation protocols and fire task forces in schools

Group insurance for students and building insurance against calamities [Para 35].

Judicial Oversight – PIL – Implementation Mechanism – Court accepted amicus curiae recommendations and consolidated safety standards from affidavits of 27 States – Directed States and UTs to file compliance affidavits confirming installation of fire extinguishing equipment within six months – Matter directed to be listed for monitoring [Paras 15–17, 36–42].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – All government and private schools across India directed to comply with National Building Code and fire safety standards – Mandatory installation of fire extinguishing equipment within six months – Recognition/affiliation to be granted only upon certification of compliance – Regular audits, structural evaluations and disciplinary action for non-compliance ordered – Compliance affidavits to be filed by Education Secretaries of each State/UT within one month.

Criminal Law – Murder – Appeal Against Acquittal – Standard of Review – Trial court acquitted appellants accused of stabbing deceased following a dispute over money—High Court reversed acquittal and convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and 4/25 Arms Act—Supreme Court held that the trial court’s view was plausible based on inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony, non-examination of material witness (Rajveer), and doubtful recovery of weapon—High Court failed to apply settled principles governing interference with acquittals—Held: When two views are possible, appellate court should not disturb acquittal unless trial court’s view is perverse or wholly unreasonable [Paras 7–10, 15–19].

Evidence – Interested Witnesses – Reliability – PW-1 (brother of deceased) and PW-2 (co-brother) found to be interested witnesses with inconsistent statements regarding direction of stab wound and presence at scene—Evidence of light from lantern and electric pole unsupported by seizure or record—Non-examination of key witness Rajveer, in whose shop lantern allegedly burned, rendered prosecution version doubtful—Trial court rightly held their presence and version unsafe for reliance—High Court erred in ignoring these material infirmities [Paras 10–13].

Criminal Procedure – Section 378 and 386 CrPC – Appellate Power Against Acquittal – Reiterated that presumption of innocence is strengthened by acquittal—Appellate court must assign “substantial and compelling reasons” to reverse acquittal—High Court failed to demonstrate such reasons—Findings in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan, and Kalyan Singh v. State of M.P. applied [Paras 16–19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s conviction order dated 27/05/2005 set aside – Judgment of acquittal restored – Appellant Mahtab Singh already on bail; bail bonds cancelled – Co-accused Jaipal to be released forthwith unless required in any other case [Para 20].

Civil Law – Collusive Decree – Finding of Fact – Interference by High Court – Appellants (daughters of Bhagwana) sought to set aside decree dated 24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No. 630/1980 alleging it was collusive – Trial Court decreed suit in their favour – First Appellate Court reversed finding, holding decree not collusive – High Court affirmed appellate judgment – Held: Finding that consent decree was not collusive is purely factual and supported by evidence – Bhagwana, original defendant, was alive and had supported the earlier decree; appellants had not asserted rights during trial – No interference warranted [Paras 5–9].

Registration Act – Section 17(2)(vi) – Compromise Decree – Scope of Exception – Exception under Section 17(2)(vi) excludes from registration “any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit” – Held: On plain reading, if a decree concerns property not forming part of the suit, registration is mandatory – If property dealt with is same as that in suit, no registration required [Para 11–12].

Statutory Interpretation – Conflict between Decisions – Section 17(2)(vi) Registration Act – Court noted inconsistency between Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major (1995) 5 SCC 709, which required examination of “pre-existing right”, and K. Raghunandan v. Ali Hussain Sabir (2008) 13 SCC 102, which confined registration requirement only to property outside the suit – Held: Section 17(2)(vi) does not refer to pre-existing rights – Bhoop Singh does not correctly interpret provision – Matter referred to Larger Bench for authoritative interpretation [Paras 13–17].

Interpretation of Statutes – Plain Meaning Rule – Court cannot add or read into a statute words not used by the legislature – Where statutory language is clear, no judicial modification permissible – Plain reading of Section 17(2)(vi) excludes reference to “pre-existing rights” [Para 15].

Service Law – Pension – Voluntary Retirement – Regulation 29(5) Pension Regulations, 1995 – Employees with 20+ years’ qualifying service who opted under VRS 2000 – Entitlement to notional addition of 5 years of service – Held: VRS 2000 provided pension as per existing Pension Regulations – Regulation 29 only applicable clause for voluntary retirement at relevant time – Contractual nature of VRS 2000 binds banks to grant benefit under Regulation 29(5) – Subsequent amendment to Regulation 28 with retrospective effect does not override vested contractual rights under Regulation 29 [Paras 1–4, 27–38, 53].

Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – VRS 2000 and Pension Regulations – VRS 2000 must be read in harmony with existing statutory pension regulations – Where scheme is silent or ambiguous, applicable regulation must be applied – Banks cannot deny Regulation 29(5) benefit by invoking later amendment to Regulation 28 meant for employees with 15–20 years of service – Amendment cannot affect employees with 20+ years who acted under pre-amendment law [Paras 33–38].

Contract Law – Interpretation – Contra Proferentem – Where contract terms are ambiguous and drafted by employer (banks), interpretation favouring employees to be adopted – Held: Banks bear risk of unclear drafting and cannot later exclude Regulation 29(5) benefits after inviting applications under pension-linked scheme [Para 32].

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Public Sector Banks – VRS 2000 as state action – Held: Even in contractual matters, public sector entities must act reasonably and fairly – Interpretation of VRS must meet test of non-arbitrariness – Denial of Regulation 29(5) benefit after inducing employees under VRS violates Article 14 [Paras 33–34].

Precedents – Distinction from Bank of Baroda Case – Bank of Baroda v. Ganpat Singh Deora distinguished – Held: Deora had only 13 years of service and was not eligible for pension – Present appeals concern employees with 20+ years – Hence, precedent not applicable [Paras 42–50].

Estoppel – Not Applicable – Banks’ plea of estoppel rejected – Held: Employees not resiling from VRS but seeking enforcement of promised pension benefits – No estoppel arises from accepting ex-gratia under VRS 2000 [Para 52].

Decision: Appeals by banks dismissed – Employees' appeals allowed – Banks directed to recalculate and pay pension by giving benefit of notional 5 years' service under Regulation 29(5) within one month – No interest payable on unpaid pension due to divergent High Court views and bona fide litigation [Paras 53–56].

Public Employment – Ad hoc Appointments – Legality – Appointments made without advertisement or requisition to Employment Exchange – Held: Such appointments are per se illegal and void being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution – Equality clause mandates opportunity for all eligible candidates to compete – No regularisation or reinstatement can be ordered in such cases [Paras 3, 13–16, 27–33].

Doctrine of Equality – Negative Equality – Claim for similar relief based on illegal orders passed in other cases – Held: Article 14 guarantees positive equality, not negative equality – Courts cannot perpetuate illegality by directing similar benefits merely because wrong orders were passed in other cases – Each case must stand on its own legal footing [Paras 34–35].

Regularisation – Scope – Regularisation of illegal appointees within months of appointment by same officer found to be a sham exercise – No rule or policy empowered such regularisation – Held: The so-called regularisation was void and mere continuation in service does not create a right to permanent appointment [Paras 31–33].

Judicial Review – Scope – High Court erred in granting reinstatement by relying upon earlier orders without examining legality of appointments – Division Bench wrongly refused to interfere merely because similar appeals were dismissed earlier – Such approach unsustainable in law [Paras 28–30, 36].

Administrative Law – Spoils System – Historical analysis of arbitrary appointments and its infiltration into Indian public service – Court deprecated spread of nepotism and backdoor entries undermining equality of opportunity and rule of law [Paras 17–22].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of the Single Judge and Division Bench set aside – Writ petition dismissed – Reinstatement and regularisation of respondents quashed [Para 37].

Criminal Law – Murder – Acquittal – Interference by Appellate Court – Appellant along with four co-accused charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for murder – Trial Court acquitted all accused holding prosecution failed to prove case beyond reasonable doubt – State appealed – High Court maintained acquittal of four accused but reversed acquittal of appellant and convicted him under Section 302 IPC – Held: High Court not justified in interfering – Trial Court’s approach proper and findings not perverse – In appeal against acquittal, interference permissible only when findings are manifestly illegal or perverse – FIR lodged against unknown persons as eye-witnesses did not disclose names of accused despite meeting informant before lodging report – Serious infirmity in prosecution case – Conviction unsustainable [Paras 2–3].

Criminal Procedure – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – Reappreciation of evidence by High Court cannot justify reversal of well-reasoned acquittal unless findings of Trial Court are wholly unreasonable or perverse – Acquittal restored [Paras 3–4].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment convicting appellant under Section 302 IPC set aside – Trial Court’s acquittal restored – Appellant discharged from bail bonds [Paras 4–5].

Juvenile Justice – Claim of Juvenility – Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act – Appellant convicted under Section 302/149 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment – Plea raised for the first time before the Supreme Court that the appellant was below 18 years of age on the date of offence (28.08.2002) – Held: In view of the proviso to Section 7A(1), claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case – Court competent to entertain the plea and determine the question of age [Paras 4, 7].

Evidence – Age Determination – Inquiry under Section 7A – Report from school showing date of birth as 15.12.1987 – Incident dated 28.08.2002 – Appellant about 15 years old at that time – Report found genuine and unchallenged by State – Held: Appellant was juvenile within meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act [Paras 8-10].

Sentence – Effect of Finding Juvenility – Section 15(1)(g) of the Juvenile Justice Act – Maximum period of confinement in special home limited to three years – Appellant having already undergone imprisonment beyond that period – Conviction sustained but sentence quashed – Appellant directed to be released forthwith unless required in any other case [Paras 10-12].

Precedents – Application – Followed Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal and Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar – Affirmed principle that plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage and that upon establishing juvenility, sentence must be set aside though conviction may stand [Paras 7, 11].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction upheld – Sentence set aside – Appellant directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.