Arbitration – Extension of Arbitrator’s Mandate – Application Filed Post-Termination – Consideration of Section 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Court holds that it retains the power to extend the mandate even if the application is filed after the statutory timeline for expiry of the mandate – Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Berger Paints India Limited distinguished – Mandate extended by six months with direction to avoid unnecessary adjournments [Paras 1-88].

Precedent – Binding Nature – Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Berger Paints India Limited not binding due to Supreme Court stay – Court emphasizes independence in adjudication when Supreme Court stay is in place – Decisions from Delhi and Bombay High Courts on similar issues considered persuasive [Paras 3-16].

Court’s Discretion – Section 29-A(4) and (5) – Language allows for extension of mandate before or after termination – No statutory prohibition against post-termination application – Judicial discretion and sufficient cause paramount in extension decisions [Paras 18-38].

Legislative Intent – Comparison with Other Statutes – Absence of negative provisions in Section 29-A indicates flexibility – Legislative intent to facilitate arbitration, not to curtail it – Statutes with strict timelines highlighted for contrast [Paras 51-58].

Law Commission’s Recommendations – 176^th Report – Comparison with 2016 Amendment – Suspension versus termination and revival – Emphasis on court’s power to extend mandate reflecting legislative intent to avoid arbitral deadlocks [Paras 39-49].

Purpose of Section 29-A – Encourage Arbitration – Facilitate speedy dispute resolution without excessive court intervention – Flexibility provided to ensure justice and avoid arbitral proceedings becoming cul-de-sacs due to procedural delays [Paras 59-77].

Decision:

Petition allowed. Mandate of the arbitrator extended for six months from the date of judgment. Arbitral proceedings to conclude within the extended period without unnecessary adjournments. No order as to costs. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, to be issued upon compliance with due formalities [Paras 87-88].

Entertainment Tax – Refund – Petitioner, a performance arts centre, sought refund of entertainment tax paid on unsold tickets for a music concert conducted within the jurisdiction of the Maradu Municipality – Petitioner remitted the entire tax amount but sold only a portion of the tickets, requesting refund for unsold tickets – Municipality refused refund, appropriating amount to Chairperson’s Distress Relief Fund – High Court held petitioner entitled to refund under Section 3 of the 1961 Act and Rule 19 of the 1962 Rules – Impugned communications quashed, directing Municipality to refund tax after deducting committed donation to Distress Relief Fund [Paras 1-6].

Statutory Interpretation – Section 3 of the 1961 Act – Definition of ‘admission’ and ‘admission to entertainment’ interpreted – Entertainment tax leviable only on tickets actually sold – Unused, unspoiled stamps to be refunded per Rule 19 – Full Bench precedent in Municipal Council, Kottayam v. K. Mahadeva Iyer followed [Paras 5-6].

Constitutional Law – Article 265 – Levy and collection of tax must be authorized by law – Appropriation of tax paid on unsold tickets to Distress Relief Fund without statutory basis violates Article 265 – High Court emphasized authority of law in tax matters [Paras 5-6].

Decision:

Writ Petition Allowed – High Court directed Maradu Municipality to refund the entertainment tax paid on unsold tickets in accordance with Rule 19 of the 1962 Rules, after deducting the amount committed to the Distress Relief Fund. Exts. P4, P6, and P8 communications quashed.

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of Proceedings – Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of final report and proceedings in case of extortion and intimidation – Allegation that accused took illicit photographs of complainant and used them to extort money and gold – Accused contends innocence and challenges sufficiency of evidence – Prosecution relies on statements and material evidence suggesting prima facie case – High Court holds that evidence warrants trial, and innocence claims to be tested during trial – Petition dismissed [Paras 1-10].

Extortion and Intimidation – Prima Facie Case – Accused allegedly took illicit photographs and used them to blackmail complainant for money and gold – High Court finds sufficient material to support charges and justify trial – Highlights that detailed examination of evidence required at trial stage, not in quashment proceedings [Paras 5-9].

Decision – Criminal Miscellaneous Case dismissed – High Court emphasizes need for trial to properly assess evidence and allegations – Registry directed to forward copy of order to jurisdictional court for further steps [Para 10].
 

Pension Reduction – Misconduct and Thoroughly Satisfactory Service – Appellant challenged the decision to withhold 10% of his pension for two years – Contention that his service was overall satisfactory despite one alleged instance of irregularity – High Court emphasized the need to evaluate entire service record for such decisions – Found State’s action based on a single instance without grave misconduct determination – Orders withholding pension set aside [Paras 1-57].

Applicability of Rule 139 and Rule 43(b) of Jharkhand Pension Rules – Rule 43(b) requires finding of grave misconduct in departmental or judicial proceedings for pension reduction – Rule 139 allows reduction if service is not thoroughly satisfactory but must be applied considering entire service record, not isolated incidents – Case precedent affirms these principles [Paras 17-50].

Judicial Review – High Court examined statutory provisions and case law to determine the validity of the penalty imposed on the appellant – Emphasized procedural compliance and substantive review of the entire service record rather than isolated incidents – Quashed the order of penalty for being based on insufficient grounds and lacking a comprehensive review of the appellant’s service history [Paras 51-57].

Rule 43(b) – Limitation and Procedural Safeguards – Stipulates initiation of departmental proceedings within four years from the date of occurrence of alleged misconduct – In this case, initiation after nine years was procedurally flawed – Emphasized necessity of adherence to procedural timelines for disciplinary actions [Paras 20-31].

Rule 139 – Assessment of Service Record – Distinguished between procedural requirements of Rule 43(b) and the broader evaluative criteria under Rule 139 – Rule 139(c) enables the State to revise pension orders based on unsatisfactory service or grave misconduct but must provide the pensioner a reasonable opportunity to be heard – Court found procedural deficiencies in invoking Rule 139 without thorough evaluation [Paras 32-47].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Held – Orders by authorities under Rule 139 quashed due to procedural and substantive inadequacies – High Court directed restoration of withheld pension amounts – Emphasized that statutory provisions must be strictly followed, and decisions must be based on a comprehensive review of the service record [Paras 51-57].

Jurisdiction – Execution of Decrees – The executing court in Bhubaneswar rightly upheld the execution of the decree transferred from the Nagpur Court – Section 39 of CPC empowers the court to transfer decrees for execution – No irregularity found in the transfer process – The application under Section 47 CPC questioning the decree’s enforceability dismissed as non-maintainable [Paras 4, 9].

Execution of Decrees – Jurisdiction – The Court emphasized that under Sections 37, 38, and 39 of the CPC, the decree from Nagpur was rightly transferred to Bhubaneswar for execution. The provisions allow a decree to be executed by a court to which it is sent for execution if the property or the judgment debtor is within its jurisdiction. The transfer was deemed valid and the challenge by the appellant was found without basis [Paras 7-8, 9.3].

Section 47 CPC – Limitations of Executing Court – The executing court is limited to executing the decree as it stands and cannot delve into questions of its validity or correctness unless it is a nullity. The Court found that issues regarding fraud or irregularities in obtaining the decree should have been raised in the original suit, not during execution [Paras 8, 9.1-9.3].

Condonation of Delay – Insufficient Grounds – The Court found no satisfactory explanation for the 346 days delay in filing the civil revision petition. The reasons provided by the petitioner were vague and lacked substantial proof, leading to the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act [Paras 10, 10.1-10.2].

Principles of Execution – The judgment referenced several key rulings emphasizing the principle that an executing court cannot question the validity of the decree. The Supreme Court’s stance in Rahul S Shah v. Jitendra Kumar Gandhi was reiterated, underlining that the process of execution should not be turned into a protracted re-trial [Paras 8.2, 8.6].

Fraud Allegation – Not Proved – Allegations of fraud in obtaining the decree were deemed unsubstantiated. The Court stressed that claims of fraud must be supported by clear evidence and cannot be entertained in the execution stage unless already proven [Paras 9.1-9.3].

Enforcement of Decrees – Practical Challenges – The Court acknowledged the difficulties decree-holders face in executing decrees, as highlighted by the Supreme Court in multiple rulings. It stressed the need for efficient and timely execution to uphold the integrity of the judicial process [Paras 8, 8.2].

Decision – Civil Revision Petition and Interlocutory Application dismissed – The order by the executing court stands affirmed – No costs imposed [Para 11].

Service Law – Age of Superannuation – The respondent, holding the post of Research Assistant, claimed to fall under the category of "Teachers" and sought retirement age of 65 years. The appellant-University contended that the respondent does not qualify as a "Teacher" and should retire at 60 years. The court upheld the respondent's claim, emphasizing his duties akin to teaching, and defined "Teachers" under Section 2(n) of the Jamia Millia Islamia Act, 1988 to include such roles [Paras 1-28].

Judicial Scrutiny – Review of Designation and Duties – The court reviewed the duties performed by the respondent, which included classroom teaching, course designing, setting question papers, and other academic responsibilities typically assigned to teachers. The court relied on internal communications, recommendations, and previous court judgments to conclude that the respondent’s role fell under the definition of "Teacher" [Paras 29-34].

Decision – Reinstatement with Back Wages – The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Single Judge’s decision to quash the Office Order dated 04.09.2018, which fixed the respondent’s retirement age at 60 years. The respondent was ordered to be reinstated at the age of 65 years with 50% back wages from 31.12.2019 until reinstatement, along with other consequential benefits [Paras 35].

Commercial Recovery – Application for Leave to Defend – Defendant sought leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII CPC – Condonation of delay in refiling application also requested – Leave to defend application dismissed due to unexplained delay and lack of substantial defence – Defendant’s defence deemed frivolous and vexatious – Court emphasized strict adherence to timelines under Order XXXVII [Paras 1-26].

Leave to Defend – Principles for Grant – Court reiterated principles for granting leave to defend: substantial defence entitles unconditional leave, whereas sham or illusory defence results in dismissal – Reference to Supreme Court judgments on conditional leave when triable issues exist with doubts on good faith [Paras 35-37].

Interest Claim in Summary Suit – Reiterated that interest can be claimed in summary suits even if not specified in the agreement – Court allowed interest but reduced the rate from 15% to 9% per annum to secure justice [Paras 47-48].

Decision: Application for leave to defend dismissed – Suit decreed in favor of plaintiffs – Defendant directed to pay the principal amounts with interest at 9% per annum from the date of payment till the date of institution of the suit – Plaintiffs also entitled to pendent lite and future interest at the same rate [Paras 49-56].

Criminal Law – Double Jeopardy – Section 300 Cr.P.C. – Petitioner was previously tried and acquitted by a Special Court in Delhi for charges under UAPA, IPC, and the Passport Act. Subsequently, he faced trial in Bengaluru for similar charges. The petitioner filed for discharge under Section 300 of Cr.P.C. to avoid being tried again on the same facts. The Special Court dismissed the application, leading to the present writ petition.

Scope of Section 300 Cr.P.C. – Acquittal and Subsequent Trials – The court examined the applicability of Section 300 of Cr.P.C. and found that the facts of the cases tried in Delhi and Bengaluru, though similar, were not identical. The petitioner’s involvement in separate incidents constituted different offences. The court concluded that Section 300 did not apply because the charges stemmed from distinct events, despite some overlapping witnesses [Paras 2-21].

Interpretation of Legal Provisions – The judgment analyzed Section 300 Cr.P.C. alongside Section 221 Cr.P.C., clarifying the conditions under which a person acquitted or convicted cannot be retried. The court reiterated that Section 300(1) protects against double jeopardy only when the subsequent charges are based on the same facts and not merely similar or overlapping evidence [Paras 7-16].

Decision – Writ Petition Dismissed – The court upheld the Special Court’s decision, finding no merit in the petitioner’s claim under Section 300 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner's discharge was denied, allowing the trial in Bengaluru to proceed [Paras 18-21].

Criminal Procedure – Non-Bailable Warrants – Issuance of Non-Bailable Warrants (NBWs) – The issuance of NBWs against the petitioner was challenged. The court found that the NBWs were issued hastily and without following the proper legal procedure. It emphasized the need for proper judicial scrutiny and application of mind before issuing NBWs, as such warrants impact personal liberty. The court held that the initial action was not in consonance with the law, and all subsequent proceedings, including the issuance of NBWs and process under Section 82 CrPC, were deemed illegal and unsustainable [Paras 1-27].

Criminal Procedure – Process Under Section 82 CrPC – Judicial Requirements – The court highlighted the necessity for courts to record reasons to believe that an accused is absconding or concealing himself before issuing a proclamation under Section 82 CrPC. The absence of such reasons in the impugned orders indicated non-application of mind by the Magistrate, rendering the orders unsustainable. The court reiterated that proper procedural safeguards must be followed to ensure the fairness of the judicial process [Paras 18-23, 24-26].

Anticipatory Bail – Right to Seek Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner’s right to seek anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC was upheld. The court observed that the right to anticipatory bail is a statutory right designed to protect individual liberty. The court criticized the investigating officer's actions, which appeared to collude with the complainant to hastily procure NBWs, thus undermining the petitioner’s right to anticipatory bail. The court granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner, subject to conditions ensuring his cooperation with the investigation [Paras 28-50].

Issuance of NBWs and Summons – Proper Sequence – The court emphasized that the process to compel appearance should follow the sequence outlined in the CrPC: summons first, then bailable warrants, and NBWs as a last resort. This sequence reflects the legislative intent to protect personal liberty by ensuring that less intrusive measures are exhausted before resorting to NBWs. The court underscored that NBWs should not be issued for aiding the investigation but only for ensuring the presence of the accused in court [Paras 19-21].

Abuse of Process of Court – Exercise of Inherent Powers – The court exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the impugned orders and subsequent proceedings, citing abuse of process of court. The court noted that if the initial action is illegal, all subsequent actions based on it are also illegal. The court highlighted its duty to ensure substantial justice and prevent misuse of judicial processes [Paras 28-33].

Decision: The petition was allowed. The orders dated 06.02.2024 (issuance of NBWs), 14.02.2024 (process under Section 82 CrPC), 31.05.2024 (declaring petitioner absconder), and 28.06.2024 (attachment warrants) were quashed. The petitioner was granted anticipatory bail with conditions to join the investigation, not to tamper with evidence, and to furnish a personal bond [Paras 32-50].