Motor Accident Claims – Insurance Policy Cancellation – Insurer's Liability - Appeal allowed - The respondent Insurance Company argued non-liability for compensation, asserting policy cancellation following the dishonor of the premium cheque and informing the insured before the accident - Held: Insurer is liable to pay compensation if the cancellation notice did not reach the insured before the accident - In this case, no proof existed that the intimation of policy cancellation reached the insured before the accident, hence the insurer is liable to compensate - However, the insurer can recover the compensation paid from the vehicle owner through legal means [Paras 20, 27].

Jurisdiction of Tribunal - The Tribunal's decision to dismiss the claim due to lack of territorial jurisdiction was found erroneous, given that the insurance company had a local office within the court's jurisdiction - The dismissal was set aside, and the claimants were found entitled to compensation [Paras 18, 28].

Calculation of Compensation - The court calculated the "Just Compensation" considering the deceased’s income, age, and the applicable multiplier - General damages were added under the heads of Loss of Estate, Loss of Consortium, and Funeral Expenses, totaling Rs. 11,49,719/- with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing till deposit [Paras 29-31].

Decision: Appeal allowed - The impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal were set aside - The insurance company is directed to deposit the compensation amount along with interest with the Registrar General, High Court Calcutta, within six weeks - The insurance company is granted leave to recover the compensation paid from the vehicle owner through due process of law [Paras 32-35].

Motor Accident Claims – Determination of Compensation – The insurance company appealed against the award by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which granted compensation of Rs. 8,03,000/- to the claimants for the death of the deceased in a road accident – The appellant argued that the compensation exceeded the claimed amount and that deductions for personal expenses were improperly calculated – Held: While the Tribunal wrongly deducted 1/10th for personal expenses instead of 1/4th as per Pranay Sethi guidelines, the award remains just since the total compensation would otherwise have been higher due to a correct multiplier and general damages – No interference warranted in the absence of a cross-appeal by the claimants [Paras 3, 4, 6.1].

Just and Fair Compensation – Powers of Tribunal – The Motor Vehicles Act prioritizes ‘just and fair’ compensation for accident victims – The Tribunal awarded more than the claimed amount considering the just nature of the claim and the concept of ‘just compensation’ under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act – Held: Tribunals have the discretion to award compensation beyond the claimed amount to fulfill the principle of fair compensation, even if the claimed amount is lower [Para 5].

Multiplier and Deductions – Calculation Errors – The Tribunal applied a 17 multiplier instead of 18 and erroneously considered a 50% increase in prospective income instead of 40% – However, since no cross-appeal was filed by the claimants, enhancing the award would not be appropriate – Held: The calculation errors did not substantially affect the justice of the award, and no enhancement was made [Paras 4, 6.1].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal upheld – Insurance company directed to deposit the awarded amount with interest within six weeks if not already deposited [Para 8].

Arbitration Law – Section 34 Challenge – Application to set aside arbitral award – The court set aside the arbitral award, finding that the agreements were hit by Section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and hence incapable of being specifically enforced – The arbitrator had granted specific performance despite the fact that the lands were agricultural and the claimant was a non-agriculturist, requiring prior permission from the Collector – Held: Award was vitiated by patent illegality and in conflict with the public policy of India [Paras 64-70, 81-84].

Limitation – Article 54 of Limitation Act, 1963 – The claim for specific performance was held to be time-barred – The court rejected the arbitrator's finding that the cause of action arose upon publication of a public notice canceling the Power of Attorney – It held that the limitation period started from the expiry of six months stipulated in the agreement for obtaining non-agricultural permission – Held: The claim was barred by limitation [Paras 88-92].

Arbitrator's Independence and Impartiality – Section 12 of Arbitration Act, 1996 – Failure to disclose relationship – The court found justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator, who had close ties with the Director of the claimant company, possessing 51% stake – The arbitrator attended personal family functions and had a longstanding professional relationship with the Director – Held: Arbitrator failed to disclose these facts under Section 12, vitiating the award due to bias [Paras 93-103].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The civil court's order under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, setting aside the arbitral award, was upheld – The award was found to be vitiated by patent illegality, limitation bar, and violation of the principles of independence and impartiality in arbitration [Paras 104-105].

Civil Procedure – Written Statement – Order 8 Rule 1 of CPC – Revision petition filed challenging the acceptance of a written statement beyond the stipulated 90 days – Plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in allowing the written statement without a formal application for condonation of delay – Held: The court cannot extend time for filing the written statement on its own, and an application for condonation is mandatory – Written statement filed after 30 days requires a valid application explaining the delay, in accordance with judicial precedents such as Salem Advocate Bar Association and Kailash v. Nanhku [Paras 6, 10, 12].

Judicial Discretion – Condonation of Delay – Written Statement Filing – Defendant filed the written statement late without seeking condonation of delay – The trial court accepted the written statement without recording reasons – Held: The trial court’s acceptance of the written statement without a condonation application violates Order 8 Rule 1 of CPC, and the defendant must file an application explaining the delay [Paras 9, 10, 12].

Inherent Power of the Court – Article 227 of the Constitution – Plaintiff invoked Article 227 seeking judicial intervention against the trial court’s procedural lapses – Held: The inherent power of the Court under Article 227 allows rectification of procedural errors, and the trial court’s failure to follow due process in accepting the late written statement justifies interference [Paras 8, 11, 12].

Decision: Allowed – The order of the trial court dated 02.08.2023 accepting the written statement set aside – The respondent is granted liberty to file a written statement along with an application for condonation of delay – CRP(MD)No.1853 of 2024 closed as infructuous [Paras 13, 14].

Criminal Procedure – Acquittal – Victim's Right to Appeal – The petitioner, a de facto complainant, challenged the acquittal of the accused under various sections of the IPC, arguing that as a "victim" under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC, he had the right to appeal – The Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petitioner could not be termed a 'victim' – Held: The High Court observed that under Section 372 of the CrPC, a victim has the right to appeal against an acquittal – The petitioner, having alleged loss, injury, and damage caused by the accused, falls within the definition of 'victim' and therefore had the right to appeal – [Paras 7, 10, 18, 22].

Criminal Law – Trial Procedure – Non-Examination under Section 313 CrPC – The petitioner contended that the trial court erred in not examining the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC – The trial court acquitted the accused without recording their statements – Held: The High Court found that the trial court did not err, as there was no incriminating evidence against the accused that necessitated examination under Section 313 – Since the primary witnesses (PW1 and PW2) did not provide any evidence against the accused, the trial court's decision was upheld – [Paras 15, 16, 17].

Contempt of Court – Allegations Against Magistrate – The petitioner accused the trial magistrate of obtaining signatures on blank papers and of improper conduct – Held: The High Court found the allegations baseless and without substance – It was determined that such allegations could amount to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – The petitioner was directed to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against him – [Paras 28, 29, 31].

Decision: Criminal Revision dismissed – The High Court found no error in the trial court’s procedure or the acquittal of the accused – The petitioner was directed to show cause for allegations against the magistrate amounting to criminal contempt – [Paras 35, 37].

Section 295A of IPC – Outrage of Religious Feelings – Shouting ‘Jai Sriram’ in a Mosque – Not Outrageous – The petitioners were accused of entering a mosque and shouting ‘Jai Sriram’ with the intent of disrupting communal harmony. The court held that shouting ‘Jai Sriram’ does not constitute an insult or malicious act intended to outrage religious feelings under Section 295A of the IPC, particularly when there is no disruption of public order or deliberate insult to religious beliefs – Petitioners' actions did not meet the threshold for criminal offense under the said section [Paras 5-6].

Criminal Intimidation under Section 506 of IPC – Ingredients Not Established – The complaint alleged that the petitioners threatened the mosque members. However, the court found that the complaint did not specify any actionable threats or fear of harm that would amount to criminal intimidation under Section 506. The lack of specific allegations led the court to dismiss this charge [Paras 6-7].

Abuse of Process – Quashing of FIR – No Prima Facie Case – The court observed that none of the alleged acts committed by the petitioners met the essential ingredients required for the offenses under Sections 447, 295A, 505, or 506 IPC. Continuing the criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. – The petition was allowed, and the FIR and all related proceedings were quashed [Paras 7-8].

Decision:

The writ petition was allowed, and the entire proceedings in Crime No. 86 of 2023 pending before the II Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Puttur, Dakshina Kannada, were quashed.

Anticipatory Bail – Conditions Imposed – Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Freedom of Press – The petitioner, a journalist and managing editor of a YouTube news channel, was granted anticipatory bail with a condition that he should not publish news related to the death of Bishop K.P. Yohannan – Held: The condition restricting the petitioner’s journalistic freedom was unreasonable – The right to freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution cannot be curtailed as part of a bail condition unless justified under Article 19(2) – The Court deleted the condition restraining the petitioner from airing news on the subject, observing that such a condition amounts to a gag order, which is disproportionate and violates the petitioner’s fundamental rights [Paras 12-17].

Criminal Law – Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Complaint for dishonor of cheques under Section 138 of the NI Act – The petitioner, residing outside the territorial jurisdiction, argued that the Magistrate should have conducted an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC before issuing summons – Held: Under Section 145 of the NI Act, evidence of the complainant can be given by affidavit, which streamlines the trial process. The Magistrate’s role is to decide whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding. If evidence supports the complaint, an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC is not mandatory for public servants – Complaint supported by an affidavit is sufficient for issuing process [Paras 3c, 3e, 5a, 9].

Criminal Procedure – Section 202 CrPC – Applicability in NI Act Cases – Whether the amendment of Section 202 CrPC mandates an inquiry before issuing process to an accused residing beyond the jurisdiction of the Court – Held: Section 202 CrPC is not mandatory in complaints under Section 138 NI Act supported by an affidavit, especially when filed by a public servant – No infirmity found in the orders of the Magistrate or Sessions Judge rejecting the application for an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC [Paras 4, 4a, 4c, 9].

Decision: Criminal Revision Application Dismissed – The order passed by the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the Learned Chief Judge was affirmed – The court upheld the validity of the summons issued to the petitioner under Section 138 of the NI Act without a mandatory inquiry under Section 202 CrPC – The Magistrate had examined the complaint and accompanying affidavit, and therefore, no further inquiry was required before issuing process [Paras 3d, 5, 9].

Family Law – Maintenance – Revision Application – Compliance with Guidelines – The petitioner contended that the maintenance order awarded by the Family Court was harsh and not based on legal evidence – The trial court did not properly assess his financial capacity and failed to consider the fact that the petitioner is unemployed – The petitioner also claimed that the trial court ignored the fact that respondent No.1 is employed and earns ₹10,000 per month – Held: The High Court found that the Family Court did not comply with the guidelines set by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha, which requires parties to file affidavits disclosing their assets – Consequently, the maintenance order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Family Court for fresh consideration in compliance with the Supreme Court's directives [Paras 7, 13].

Interlocutory Orders – Maintainability of Revision – The respondents argued that the revision petition against the maintenance order was not maintainable, as it was an interlocutory order – Held: The High Court, referring to judgments from various High Courts, found that an order of maintenance is not an interlocutory order but an intermediate or quasi-final order that can be challenged through a revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 – It was established that orders affecting substantial rights of a party are not considered interlocutory and are subject to revision [Paras 16-18].

Decision: Revision petition allowed – The order dated 06.01.2023 by the Family Court is set aside – The matter is remanded to the Family Court for fresh decision after ensuring compliance with the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha – Parties directed to appear before the trial court on 30th September 2024 [Para 13].