Taxation Law – VAT Assessment – Quashing of Order – The petitioners, comprising two Luxembourgian companies and an Indian company, challenged a VAT assessment order dated 14 March 2022, issued under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax (MVAT) Act, for FY 2013-2014 – The petitioners argued that the assessment was made without serving any show-cause notice or granting an opportunity of being heard, violating the principles of natural justice – Further, the order, served 15 months later, contained glaring errors, including references to hearings and facts inconsistent with the petitioners' case – The High Court found that the assessment order was backdated and issued beyond the statutory limitation period of eight years under Section 23(4) of the MVAT Act – Held: The assessment order is quashed for breach of natural justice, non-application of mind, and legal mala fides – No remand ordered, as this would unfairly extend the limitation period for the respondents [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12].

Failure of Natural Justice – Assessment Order Passed Without Show Cause Notice or Opportunity of Hearing – Set Aside – The Petitioners were not served with a show cause notice nor granted an opportunity of hearing as required under Section 23(4) of the MVAT Act. Held: The failure to serve notice and allow an opportunity to be heard before making the assessment order violates the principles of natural justice, warranting the setting aside of the order [Paras 17-20].

Limitation – Backdating of Assessment Order – The Court found evidence suggesting that the assessment order dated 14 March 2022 was backdated to make it appear issued within the statutory period. The reference to a hearing on 23 May 2023 in an order allegedly dated 14 March 2022 was deemed a clear manipulation. Held: The impugned assessment order was made beyond the statutory limitation period and thus is void [Paras 23-24].

Non-Application of Mind – Glaring Errors in Assessment Order – The assessment order contained factual errors, including incorrect descriptions of parties and transactions, indicating non-application of mind. Held: The impugned assessment order is vitiated and unsustainable [Paras 25-27].

Remand Not Warranted – Inappropriate to Extend Statutory Period – The Court declined to remand the matter for fresh adjudication, reasoning that it would unfairly extend the statutory period for the assessment and reward the authorities for their illegalities [Paras 28-34].

Decision: The writ petition is allowed. The impugned assessment order dated 14 March 2022 is quashed and set aside for breach of natural justice, non-application of mind, and legal mala fides. The Respondents are directed to pay costs assessed at Rs. 50,000 to the Petitioners within two months. The rule is made absolute [Paras 35-37].

Civil Procedure – Judgment on Admissions – Order XII Rule 6 of CPC – The petitioners, plaintiffs in the suit for permanent injunction, sought a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 based on alleged admissions made by the defendants regarding possession of the suit property – The trial court rejected the application, holding that the admissions were not unconditional – Held: For an order under Order XII Rule 6, admissions must be clear, unequivocal, and unconditional – In this case, the defendants' admission regarding the existence of structures on the property was coupled with a denial of the legality of the plaintiffs' possession – Therefore, no unambiguous admission of possession existed – Petition dismissed [Paras 14-25].

Possession of Suit Property – Conditional Admissions – The court found that although the defendants acknowledged certain facts, including the presence of structures, they disputed the legality of the plaintiffs' possession, claiming it was illegal – As the admissions were not clear or unqualified, they could not form the basis for a summary judgment under Order XII Rule 6 – Plaintiffs required to prove their possession through trial [Paras 24-25].

Decision:

Civil revision petition dismissed – No judgment on admissions granted – Petitioners required to prove possession in the trial court – No order as to costs.

Jurisdiction of Lokayukta – Scope under Section 8(1) of the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act – The Lokayukta's power to investigate pertains to administrative actions involving public servants. However, in this case, the dispute regarding the sugarcane supply payments between the petitioners and respondent No.1, rooted in an inheritance issue, was already pending in civil and cooperative courts. The direction by the Lokayukta to withhold payment to the petitioners and instead make payments to the respondent was deemed to be beyond the Lokayukta's jurisdiction – Held: The Lokayukta lacked the authority to decide on such civil disputes, and the direction was made without adhering to the principles of natural justice, thereby warranting its quashing [Paras 9-15].

Natural Justice – Non-Impleadment of Petitioners in Lokayukta Proceedings – Petitioners were not impleaded in the Lokayukta’s proceedings that led to a direction against them. The court held that such a consequential order affecting their rights could not have been passed without hearing the petitioners – Held: Violation of natural justice and fair play [Paras 16-19].

Decision: Order Quashed – Civil Courts to Decide Dispute – While quashing the Lokayukta’s directions, the court clarified that the rights and entitlements of the parties in the underlying civil dispute remain open for determination by the civil and cooperative courts. The decision was limited to the issue of jurisdiction and procedural fairness, without touching on the merits of the inheritance dispute [Paras 20-23].

Anticipatory Bail – Allegations of Conspiracy and Forgery – Business Dispute – Petitioners granted anticipatory bail – Accusations against petitioners of conspiracy, forgery, and extortion arising from disputed business transactions related to reconstitution of a partnership firm and sale of property – The Court found the allegations to primarily stem from a civil dispute over commercial transactions already pending before civil courts – No specific overt act of criminal intimidation or coercion was attributed to the petitioners to justify custodial interrogation – Delay of over three years in lodging the FIR weighed in favor of bail – Petitioners granted bail subject to conditions [Paras 14, 21, 22].

Civil Dispute Given Criminal Color – Bail Granted – The Court held that the dispute, though framed as a criminal offense, appeared to be of a civil nature involving business disagreements – Civil remedies had already been sought in ongoing civil litigation – It was emphasized that mere delay in initiating criminal proceedings post-political change in the state raised doubts about the genuineness of the complaint [Paras 15-18, 21].

Right to Personal Liberty – Pre-Arrest Bail Granted – The petitioners had no prior convictions or history of fleeing from justice – Court considered the personal liberty of the accused, balancing it with the need for proper investigation – In the absence of any requirement for custodial interrogation, bail was granted [Paras 22-24].

Decision: Both Criminal Petition Nos. 4287 and 4338 of 2024 were allowed. Petitioners were granted anticipatory bail upon execution of a personal bond and were ordered to cooperate with the investigation, subject to conditions set by the Court.

Arbitration – Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Appeal against Interim Injunction – Non-compete Clause – Post-Termination Restraint - appellant challenged an interim injunction granted by the Single Judge under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which restrained the appellant from sourcing products from a third-party Indian supplier (RKFL) pursuant to the non-compete clause in a Master Supply Agreement (MSA) with the respondent – Held: The non-compete clause in the MSA cannot operate post-termination as it results in a restraint of trade prohibited by Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – The court observed that such a clause may be valid during the term of the agreement but not after its termination, as it would unlawfully restrict the appellant's right to trade – The injunction was set aside [Paras 10-14].

Contract Law – Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Restraint of Trade – Validity of Non-compete Clauses - non-compete clause in the MSA restricted the appellant from sourcing products from other Indian suppliers even after the MSA was terminated – Held: Post-termination restraint on trade by way of a non-compete clause is void under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – The court reaffirmed that such clauses can only operate during the term of the contract, not beyond it [Paras 11-14].

New Legal Plea in Appeal – Pure Question of Law – Admissibility - appellant raised the plea of invalidity of the non-compete clause based on Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, for the first time in the appeal – Held: Since this was a pure question of law that required no factual adjudication, it could be raised in appeal even though it had not been argued before the Single Judge – The court accepted the new plea as it was based on the interpretation of the MSA and well-established legal principles [Paras 8-9].

Decision: The Commercial Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 08/08/2023, passed by the Single Judge, is set aside. The Arbitration Petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, stands dismissed. No order as to costs. The judgment will take effect after four weeks from the date of the decision.

Negotiable Instruments Act - Validity of Single Complaint for Multiple Cheques – The petitioners challenged the validity of a single complaint for the dishonor of 36 cheques, arguing that this violates Section 219 Cr.P.C., which restricts trial for multiple offences to a maximum of three instances of the same kind within a 12-month period. The Court held that, given that all cheques were issued as part of a single transaction, presented together, and returned with a single notice, the complaint fell within the “same transaction” provision under Section 220 Cr.P.C. This ruling aligned with principles established in Manjula v. Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd., supporting the validity of filing a single complaint when the transaction forms a unified series of acts [Paras 24, 28, 37].

Section 138 NI Act - Dishonor Due to “Account Blocked” Status – Addressing whether account blockage by the Income Tax Department and Enforcement Directorate precludes prosecution under Section 138, the Court applied the Supreme Court's rationale in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, which treats “account blocked” as analogous to “insufficient funds,” thus allowing the complaint to proceed. This interpretation follows the genus-species framework, where “account blocked” serves as a species within the general genus of dishonor scenarios under Section 138 [Paras 31, 32, 38].

Sufficiency of Funds - Rejection of Defense Based on Claimed Account Balance – The petitioners asserted that their account had sufficient funds which were merely blocked by regulatory orders. The Court dismissed this defense, establishing that the account showed a debit status, and no funds were available to honor the cheques, satisfying Section 138’s conditions for dishonor. The decision aligns with the principles set out in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. and Laxmi Dyechem regarding adequacy of funds as central under Section 138 [Paras 34, 38].

Decision – Petition Dismissed – The Court ruled that the single complaint for all dishonored cheques was legally sustainable, and the account blockage did not exempt the petitioners from liability under Section 138. Consequently, the criminal original petition and connected miscellaneous petitions were dismissed as devoid of merit [Paras 37, 39].
 

Family Law – Appealability of Interim Custody and Visitation Orders – Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act – The appellant challenged an order passed by the Family Court granting the respondent temporary custody and visitation rights over the minor child, arguing that the order was not interlocutory and therefore appealable under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act – Held: Orders regarding interim custody and visitation rights under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 significantly impact the welfare of the minor child and cannot be treated as mere procedural or interlocutory orders – Such orders have a direct bearing on the rights of the parties and are appealable under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act – The decision in Colonel Ramesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, holding that no appeal lies against interim custody orders, was held incorrect [Paras 9-35].

Nature of Orders Under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act – Orders passed under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 grant temporary custody and can affect the child’s welfare and parents' rights – These are adjudicatory in nature and cannot be termed as interlocutory for the purposes of appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, which provides an overriding appellate remedy for family matters – Appeal allowed to proceed [Paras 26-30].

Principles of Finality in Interlocutory Orders – Distinction Between Procedural and Substantive Orders – The court emphasized that interlocutory orders for procedural matters are different from substantive orders affecting valuable rights – Orders impacting child custody and visitation fall within the category of substantive decisions that should be appealable, despite being interim in nature – Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania principles applied [Paras 29-34].

Decision: The reference to the Full Bench is answered in favor of the appellant – Orders under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 regarding interim custody and visitation are appealable under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 – The appeal is restored for consideration by the appropriate Bench [Paras 35-37].

Criminal Law – Application Under Section 91 CrPC – Timing of Application – Respondents sought production of request letters sent by CBI to the Ministry of Home Affairs for call interception before charges were framed – Held: The accused cannot invoke Section 91 CrPC at the pre-charge stage for production of documents – The Supreme Court has held that Section 91 can be invoked by the accused only after the stage of framing of charges and when necessary for defense – Petition allowed, orders directing production of documents set aside [Paras 1, 25-30].

Interception of Phone Calls – Privilege and Confidentiality – Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act – CBI asserted that its request letters for interception of calls were privileged communications under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act – Held: The CBI’s communications seeking permission for interception were confidential and privileged, and cannot be disclosed at the pre-charge stage – The respondents may apply for such documents at a later stage, subject to court review – Petition allowed [Paras 25-30].

Right to Privacy – Interception of Phone Calls – Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act – The respondents’ argument of privacy violation was rejected – Held: The interception orders were issued as per Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, and reviewed by the competent authority without adverse findings – The right to privacy is not absolute and is subject to lawful restrictions – No violation of privacy found [Paras 25-30].

Decision:

The petition is allowed – The impugned orders dated 20.12.2022 and 16.01.2023 are set aside – Respondents are at liberty to file an application under Section 91 CrPC at the appropriate stage – The CBI is directed to preserve the request letters/communications sent to MHA – No order as to costs [Paras 25-30].

Delay Condonation – Liberal Approach – Sufficient Cause – The petitioners sought condonation of a delay of 443 days in filing applications to set aside the default order dismissing their objections to attachment in execution proceedings – The Court held: The cause shown, supported by medical certificates of the petitioner's husband and the petitioner herself, constituted sufficient cause – Courts should adopt a liberal approach in condonation matters, as the refusal to condone delay would deprive the petitioners of a chance to be heard on merits, which would cause injustice – The delay was condoned on payment of costs [Paras 15-19, 22].

Failure to Adduce Evidence – Importance of Substantial Justice – The petitioners failed to appear and adduce evidence in the claim petition due to medical reasons – The Court observed that while the Executing Court took a technical view, sufficient cause was shown – Courts must prioritize substantial justice over technicalities, particularly when no negligence or malafides were proven against the petitioners [Paras 20-24].

Decision – The civil revision petitions and appeals were allowed – The delay in filing the application to set aside the default order dated 26.04.2018 was condoned – The default order was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the Executing Court for fresh adjudication – Costs of Rs. 10,000 were imposed, payable to the respondent/decree holder [Paras 25-27].