Quashing of FIR – Prima Facie Case Made Out – Petition Dismissed – The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR registered under Sections 354D, 509, 504, and 506(2) IPC, alleging that the complaint was a counterblast to an earlier case filed by him – The Court observed that the FIR detailed specific allegations, including stalking, obscene gestures, and threats of revenge using occult practices – Held: Since the FIR disclosed a cognizable offense, the Court refused to interfere at this stage and dismissed the petition [Paras 5.1-5.5].

Plea of Counterblast FIR – No Merit – The petitioner contended that the FIR was a retaliatory action due to an earlier complaint filed by him – The Court held that even if there were previous disputes, the allegations in the present case had to be independently examined – Held: Mere existence of prior litigation does not automatically render a subsequent FIR false [Paras 5.2-5.3].

Judicial Precedents on Quashing – FIR Cannot Be Quashed Based on Disputed Facts – The Court referred to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, which establish that quashing of FIRs should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases – Held: Since the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclosed a cognizable offense, the Court could not quash it at this stage [Paras 5.5-5.6].

Stage of Criminal Proceedings – Court Cannot Interfere Before Trial – The investigation had already resulted in the filing of a charge sheet, and trial proceedings were at an advanced stage – The Court reiterated that interference at this stage would be inappropriate – Held: Petitioner should contest the charges in trial; quashing petition dismissed [Para 6].
Decision: Petition dismissed – The Court refused to quash the FIR, holding that a prima facie case existed, and the petitioner should contest the allegations during trial – No interim relief granted.
 

Taxation Law – Income tax - Reassessment Notices – Limitation Period and Effect of TOLA – Section 149 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Petitioners challenged reassessment notices issued under Section 148 on the ground that they were beyond the permissible limitation period – Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693 held that the period from 20 March 2020 to 30 June 2021 must be excluded due to COVID-19 extensions under TOLA – Held: Assessing Officers must verify the surviving limitation period in light of Rajeev Bansal and Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8140 before proceeding with reassessments [Paras 18-24].

Faceless Reassessment – Jurisdiction of Assessing Officer – Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Petitioners argued that only the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) could issue reassessment notices and that jurisdictional AOs lacked authority – Court referred to T.K.S. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and held that faceless assessment does not oust the jurisdiction of the AO completely – Held: AO retains concurrent jurisdiction to initiate reassessment under Section 148, even after introduction of faceless assessment – Notices issued by AOs are valid [Paras 3, 85-90].

Approval for Reassessment – Compliance with Section 151 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Petitioners contended that approvals for reassessment post-01 April 2021 must be obtained from the Principal Commissioner, not the Joint Commissioner – Court followed Abhinav Jindal HUF v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6585 and held that approvals granted by Joint Commissioners post-01 April 2021 are invalid – Held: AOs must review approvals and quash reassessment notices where approvals were obtained from unauthorized officers [Paras 4, 30-41].

Search-Based Reassessment – Whether Sections 153A/153C Exclude Section 148 – Petitioners argued that if reassessment is based on material from a search, proceedings must follow Section 153A/153C and not Section 148 – Court referred to Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-7 v. Naveen Kumar Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8140 and held that AO can proceed under Section 147/148 if conditions for Section 153C are not met – Held: Reassessment based on search information is valid even if proceedings under Section 153C were not initiated [Paras 5-6, 38-61].

Issuance of Reassessment Notices Without Digital Identification Number (DIN) – CBDT Circular No. 19/2019 – Petitioners argued that notices issued without DIN were invalid – Court declined to examine this issue, noting that Commissioner of Income Tax v. Brandix Mauritius Holdings Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6481 had already ruled in favor of petitioners, but the matter was under appeal before the Supreme Court – Held: Issue of non-DIN notices left open for adjudication in pending cases [Paras 7-9].

Definition of “Information” Under Section 148 – Scope of Explanation 1 – Petitioners challenged the validity of information used to initiate reassessment under Explanation 1 to Section 148 – Court noted that a separate batch of writ petitions was considering this issue – Held: Issue left open for future adjudication [Para 9].

Binding Effect of Supreme Court’s Judgment in Rajeev Bansal – Computation of Surviving Time for Reassessment – Court directed AOs to determine the validity of reassessment notices in light of Rajeev Bansal – Held: If surviving time for issuing a notice expired before actual issuance, reassessment notice must be quashed – Petitioners allowed to submit written submissions within three weeks before AOs complete verification [Paras 25-31].

Decision: Reassessment notices upheld, subject to verification of surviving time limits – Assessing Officers directed to review individual cases within three weeks – Interim orders to continue until final orders are passed – Petitioners granted liberty to challenge adverse findings.

POCSO Act – Serious Nature of Allegations – Bail Rejected – The petitioner was accused of multiple offenses under the IPC and POCSO Act, including sexual assault, conspiracy, and intimidation – The prosecution argued that the victim had committed suicide under mysterious circumstances, further complicating the case – Held: Given the gravity of allegations and potential impact on trial proceedings, bail was denied [Paras 1-6].

Prior Criminal History – Impact on Bail Consideration – The petitioner was previously involved in multiple criminal cases, including cases registered under Sections 120B, 406, 420, and 498A IPC – The Court considered the petitioner’s past record as a relevant factor in denying bail – Held: Repeat involvement in serious offenses diminishes the credibility of the bail plea [Paras 7-9].

Supreme Court Precedents – Bail Not to be Granted Mid-Trial – The Court relied on X v. State of Rajasthan, SLP (Criminal) No. 13378/2024, where the Supreme Court emphasized that bail should not ordinarily be granted in serious offenses once trial has commenced – Held: Since trial was underway and prosecution witnesses were being examined, bail was not justified [Paras 10-12].

Bail Application Rejected – No Infringement of Speedy Trial Rights – The petitioner argued that he had been incarcerated since 15.06.2024, but the Court noted that trial was proceeding and had not been unduly delayed – Held: The right to a speedy trial had not been violated, and bail was denied at this stage [Paras 13-15].
 

Execution Proceedings – Lok Adalat Award – Maintainability of Execution Petition – Fresh Registered Lease Deed – Decree holder sought eviction by filing execution petition on the basis of Lok Adalat award – Judgment debtor contended that subsequent registered lease deed superseded compromise decree – Trial Court held execution petition not maintainable – Held: Though Lok Adalat award is deemed to be a decree, where parties enter into a fresh registered lease deed governing their rights, execution cannot be sought contrary to its terms – Remedy lies by filing a suit for eviction and not by execution – Order upheld [Paras 1–4, 17–19].

Section 47 CPC – Scope and Limits – Executing Court’s Jurisdiction – Objections raised by judgment debtor under Section 47 CPC regarding executability of decree – Held: Executing Court can examine whether decree has become inexecutable due to subsequent events – Executing Court cannot go behind decree but can determine questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction – Execution rightly dismissed as compromise decree stood worked out and superseded [Paras 10–16].

Lok Adalat Award – Nature and Enforceability – Section 21, Legal Services Authorities Act – Award of Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree and is executable – However, execution must conform to subsequent binding contracts entered into by parties – Award cannot be executed mechanically ignoring fresh registered lease deed – Finality of award does not override subsequent lawful agreements [Paras 11–13].

Lease Deed – Registered Document – Supersession of Compromise Decree – Section 92 Evidence Act – Fresh registered lease deed executed after Lok Adalat award – Oral or implied variation of registered document impermissible – Registered lease deed governs relationship of parties – Compromise decree stood extinguished upon execution of fresh lease deed – Execution petition not maintainable [Paras 13, 17–18].

Eviction – Due Process of Law – Execution vs. Suit for Eviction – Tenant in settled possession cannot be dispossessed except by due process of law – Where lease deed provides procedure for termination, eviction must be sought by filing a suit – Execution proceedings cannot be used as substitute for eviction suit – Trial Court correctly directed parties to follow due process [Paras 14, 18].

Decision: Civil Revision Petition dismissed – Order of Trial Court dismissing execution petition upheld – No costs – Miscellaneous applications closed.

Specific Performance – Time as Essence of Contract – Relief Denied – The suit agreement stipulated payment of the balance consideration by 31-10-1994 – The plaintiff failed to pay within the stipulated period and did not issue any notice expressing readiness and willingness – The trial court overlooked material evidence demonstrating the plaintiff’s inaction – Held: Time was of the essence of the contract, and the plaintiff’s failure to act diligently disentitled him to specific performance [Paras 16-19, 34].

Readiness and Willingness – Plaintiff’s Failure to Perform Obligations – Contract Terminated – Readiness requires financial capacity, and willingness requires consistent action – The plaintiff neither paid the balance amount nor took steps to finalize the transaction – The defendant’s legal notice dated 26-10-1994 demanding payment was ignored – Held: Plaintiff failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness, warranting dismissal of the suit for specific performance [Paras 20-22, 36].

Discretionary Relief in Specific Performance – Courts Must Consider Delay and Conduct – Relief in specific performance is discretionary, and courts must examine whether the plaintiff unreasonably delayed seeking enforcement – The plaintiff initiated legal proceedings years after the contractual deadline without justification – Held: Mere filing of a suit within the limitation period does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to relief – Courts must scrutinize laches and inequitable conduct [Paras 17, 31, 33].

Alternative Relief – Refund of Advance Consideration with Interest Ordered – The agreement was admitted, and the defendant received Rs.2,50,000/- as advance – Though the plaintiff did not seek a refund, courts can grant such relief under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act – Held: Defendant directed to refund Rs.2,50,000/- with 12% interest from 01-11-1994 till payment to ensure equitable relief [Paras 38-40].

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the trial court decreeing specific performance is set aside. The plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance of the agreement dated 30-05-1994. However, in the interest of justice, the first defendant is directed to refund Rs.2,50,000/- to the plaintiff along with 12% per annum interest from 01-11-1994 until payment. Each party shall bear their own costs.

Bail in Money Laundering Cases – Applicability of Section 45 of PMLA – The applicant was arrested for allegedly laundering ₹1.35 Crores from proceeds of crime linked to a COVID-19 food supply contract – Held: While Section 45 of PMLA imposes strict conditions for bail, prolonged incarceration without trial violates the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – Bail granted considering the delay in trial and absence of the applicant in the predicate offence FIR [Paras 15.3, 16.1, 22].

Presumption of Innocence – Need for Speedy Trial – The applicant has been in custody for over a year without commencement of trial – Held: If a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time, bail must be considered to prevent undue pre-trial detention – Prolonged imprisonment without conviction violates constitutional rights [Paras 21-22].

Existence of Scheduled Offence – Basis for Proceeds of Crime – The ED alleged that the accused received funds illegally obtained through underweight food supply – Held: Proceeds of crime under PMLA must arise from a scheduled offence, and without a chargesheet in the predicate offence, the money laundering case remains unsubstantiated – Prima facie, continued incarceration was unwarranted [Paras 16-17].

Procedural Lapses in Arrest – Section 19(1) PMLA – The applicant claimed that ED failed to record reasons for arrest in writing before detaining him – Held: While the prosecution contended that reasons were recorded internally, such documents were not furnished to the accused, raising concerns of procedural non-compliance – Courts must ensure strict adherence to statutory safeguards [Paras 13-14].

Decision: Bail granted subject to conditions. The applicant is directed to be released on bail upon execution of a PR bond of ₹1,00,000/- with one or two sureties. The applicant is permitted to provide sureties within a period of four weeks from release. He shall report to the Investigating Officer at the Enforcement Directorate once every month for the first three months. The applicant shall not tamper with evidence or influence witnesses in any manner. He shall not leave the State of Maharashtra without prior permission from the trial court. The applicant shall surrender his passport within one week after release. Any infraction of these conditions shall entitle the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail. Bail granted; application allowed.
 

Criminal Law – Circumstantial Evidence – Standard of Proof – The case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, requiring a complete chain of evidence pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused – The Court held that the chain was incomplete, as there was a time gap of nearly 9-10 hours between the accused being last seen with the deceased and the discovery of the body – Held: Circumstantial evidence must exclude all other hypotheses except guilt, which was not established in this case [Paras 31, 36].

Extra-Judicial Confession – Reliability – Weak Evidence – The prosecution relied on extra-judicial confessions made to PW15, PW17, and PW18 – The Court reiterated that extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and must be corroborated – Held: Confession made to interested parties (father and uncle of the complainant) and not corroborated by independent evidence cannot be the sole basis for conviction [Paras 32-34].

Last Seen Theory – Substantial Time Gap – Guilt Not Established – The prosecution relied on PW12's testimony, who allegedly saw the accused and deceased together at 10 PM, while the body was discovered at 8 AM the next day – The Court held that the 9-10 hour gap left room for the possibility of another person committing the crime – Held: ‘Last seen’ evidence must be closely linked in time to the crime for it to be reliable [Paras 35-36].

Motive – Weak or Non-existent – Crucial in Circumstantial Cases – The prosecution alleged that the accused committed the murder due to taunts by the deceased calling him "Budha" and "Lichar" – The Court found this motive far-fetched and unconvincing, especially as the supporting testimony of PW19 (Sudesh) was recorded after a year and lacked credibility – Held: Absence of strong motive further weakens the prosecution case in circumstantial evidence cases [Paras 37-38].

Recovery of Incriminating Articles – Highly Doubtful – The prosecution claimed that the accused recovered a piece of rope used for strangulation and the victim's wallet – The Court found the recovery suspicious and unreliable, as:
(i) It was unlikely the accused would retain such incriminating items.
(ii) The knife allegedly used in the crime was found at the scene but not linked to the accused.
(iii) The key prosecution witness for recovery (PW11) was a close relative of the deceased.
(iv) The investigating officers had been subject to departmental inquiries for irregularities in the case.
Held: Recovery evidence failed to strengthen the prosecution's case [Paras 38-39].

Forensic & Medical Evidence – Gaps in Investigation – The forensic report confirmed the presence of a stupefying substance (Lidocaine) in the deceased’s body, supporting the theory that he was drugged – However, the complainant (PW17) did not undergo medical examination, no samples were taken, and no stupefying substance was recovered from the accused – Held: Failure to collect and corroborate forensic evidence further weakens the case [Paras 41].

Fingerprints and Other Crucial Evidence Not Presented – The police lifted fingerprints from the car, where the prosecution claimed the murder occurred, but the fingerprint report was not exhibited in court – The Court held this omission suspicious and detrimental to the prosecution case – Held: Failure to present crucial forensic evidence raises doubts about the fairness of the investigation [Paras 40].

Lie Detector Test – Accused’s Refusal Not Evidence Against Him – The accused refused to undergo a lie detector test, but the Court held that such a refusal cannot be treated as evidence of guilt, as it is a constitutional right under Article 20(3) of the Constitution – Held: Lie detector tests cannot be used as substantive evidence and are merely investigative tools [Paras 42].

Decision: Conviction Set Aside – Guilt Not Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt – The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances, motive was weak, last seen theory was inconclusive, extra-judicial confessions were unreliable, and recoveries were doubtful – Held: Conviction and sentence set aside – Accused acquitted [Paras 43].
 

Property Law – Co-Sharer’s Rights – Mutation Does Not Confer Title – Held: Mutation No. 2116 Declared Illegal – Plaintiffs sought declaration of ownership and possession over 16 Kanals of land – Defendants claimed rights through Mutation No. 2116, which was based on a 1977 sale deed – Court held that mutation entries do not create or extinguish title and cannot grant ownership of specific Khasra Numbers without partition – Defendants had no valid claim [Paras 3-5, 13].

Co-Sharers – Alienation of Specific Khasra Numbers – Not Permissible Without Partition – Held: A co-sharer cannot alienate specific Khasra Numbers without partition – Sale by Ajaib Singh, a co-sharer, in 1977 did not grant exclusive rights to the defendants – Defendants' claim was contrary to settled law – Sale deed did not specify particular land parcels, and mutation based on such a sale is invalid [Paras 10-12].

Civil Procedure – Permanent Injunction – Protection of Possession of Co-Sharers – Held: Plaintiffs Entitled to Injunction – Defendants never took possession even after the 1977 sale deed – Trial Court found plaintiffs in settled possession – Admission by DW-1 Balbir Singh confirmed that defendants were never in possession – Court rightly restrained defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' possession [Paras 12, 13].

Decision – Second Appeal Dismissed – No Substantial Question of Law – Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the findings of the lower courts were correct and based on settled legal principles – No substantial question of law was involved – Appeal dismissed [Paras 12-13].

Civil Law - Summary Suit – Unconditional Leave to Defend Required When Defence is Plausible – The High Court ruled that under Order 37 CPC, if the defendant raises a triable issue or plausible defence, unconditional leave must be granted – The trial court erred in holding the defence plausible but improbable while imposing a 50% bank guarantee requirement, contrary to Supreme Court precedent [Paras 9-10].

Legal Principles – Failure to Follow Supreme Court Guidelines on Leave to Defend – The trial court ignored the well-settled law laid down in Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, (1976) 4 SCC 687, which categorically states that conditions of security can only be imposed if the defence is sham or illusory – The Court reiterated this principle, emphasizing that once a plausible defence is shown, the defendant must be granted unconditional leave [Paras 8-9].

Misapplication of Law – Conditional Leave with Bank Guarantee Held Invalid – The Court found that the trial court misapplied the law by requiring the defendant to furnish a 50% bank guarantee, despite accepting that the defence was plausible – Such a condition was arbitrary and legally unsustainable, leading to a failure of justice [Paras 10-11].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Petition Treated Under Article 227 – Since the trial court’s order resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to correct the error – The respondent’s preliminary objection on maintainability was rejected [Para 10].

Decision – Conditional Leave Set Aside – Defendant Granted Unconditional Leave to Defend – The High Court quashed the trial court’s condition requiring a bank guarantee and granted the defendant unconditional leave to defend the suit – Trial court directed to proceed further in accordance with law [Paras 11-12].