Medical Termination of Pregnancy – Rape Survivor Beyond 24 Weeks – Termination Allowed – Risk to Life Established – Petitioner, father of 13-year-old minor rape survivor suffering from Sickle Cell Anaemia and Epilepsy, sought termination beyond statutory limit – Medical Board concluded continuation of pregnancy posed life-threatening risks – Court held pregnancy termination legally permissible under Sections 3(2B) and 5 of MTP Act – Relief granted [Paras 1–10, 34–35].

Right to Bodily Autonomy – Constitutional Protection under Article 21 – Reproductive Choice Recognized – Court reaffirmed that reproductive autonomy is integral to personal liberty under Article 21 – Emphasized importance of decisional autonomy, dignity, and privacy, particularly in cases of rape and disability – Held: Medical termination is a fundamental right in such circumstances [Paras 12–16].

Judicial Oversight – Procedural Delay Criticized – SOP Ordered – Court observed that hospitals unnecessarily required judicial orders despite statutory clarity – Directed State to formulate and implement a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to guide medical practitioners in similar cases and avoid future delay – Six-month timeframe fixed [Paras 20–24, 33, 36].

Minor Victim – Parental Consent Sufficient – Protection of Interests – Recognized that in the case of minors, guardians have the legal and moral responsibility to make decisions in their best interests – Mental anguish and physical burden of childbirth at age 13 held unacceptable – Court found guardians acting in child's best interest [Paras 13, 18–19].

Decision:

Writ Petition allowed – Medical termination of pregnancy permitted and to be carried out without delay – State directed to formulate a comprehensive SOP within six months to guide hospitals and prevent undue judicial interventions in future cases – Interim orders, if any, vacated [Paras 34–37].

Criminal Law - POCSO Act – Disclosure of Minor Victim’s Identity – Media Responsibility – The petitioner, an editor of a news channel, was accused of revealing the identity of a minor victim and her family in a sexual offence case—Held: Publication of victim’s identity violates Section 23 of the POCSO Act—Media houses have an obligation to protect the identity of child victims—Allegations justified investigation [Paras 4-7].

Jurisdiction of Special Court – Power to Direct FIR Registration – The petitioner argued that the Special Court erred in directing the police to register an FIR instead of taking cognizance itself—Held: The Special Court can either take cognizance or direct investigation if it deems necessary—No illegality in the Special Court’s decision to refer the matter to the police [Paras 8-10].

Criminal Procedure – Whether Direct Complaint Before Special Court was Maintainable – The petitioner contended that the complainant should have approached the police first under Section 154 CrPC—Held: The POCSO Act contains overriding provisions that allow direct complaints to the Special Court—Court’s direction to register FIR upheld [Paras 11-13].

Final Decision – Criminal revision petition dismissed – Investigation to proceed—Police directed to complete the investigation and file a final report within two months—Special Court to expedite trial [Paras 14-16].

Judicial Review – Scope in Academic Matters – Examination Answer Keys – Limited Interference – The Appellants challenged the final answer key issued by the Haryana Public Service Commission (HPSC) for the PGT (Chemistry) screening test, contending errors in evaluation – The High Court held that judicial intervention in academic matters is permissible only in cases of manifest error or arbitrariness – Reliance placed on the Expert Committee’s report, which found no merit in the objections raised – Held: Courts should not substitute their judgment for that of subject experts unless there is clear malafide, arbitrariness, or irrationality in the evaluation process [Paras 5-11, 25-26].

Expert Committee Report – Finality of Evaluations – The court examined the Expert Committee’s report, which justified the revised answer key and rejected objections raised against certain questions – Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the answer key was patently incorrect or that the Committee’s findings were arbitrary – Held: The court cannot re-evaluate academic decisions made by expert bodies unless gross errors are evident – The examination process should be accorded finality to prevent undue litigation and uncertainty in public recruitment processes [Paras 9-12, 23-24].

Precedents on Answer Key Challenges – Courts must exercise restraint – Appellants relied on past judgments where re-evaluation was permitted due to demonstrable errors – The High Court distinguished these cases, noting that the present challenge lacked clear evidence of error – Cited Supreme Court decisions affirming that courts should not interfere with academic evaluations unless the key answers are demonstrably wrong and beyond reasonable debate – Held: The court reiterated that the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to establish an error, which was not met in this case [Paras 12-15, 18-21].

Relief Denied – No Fundamental Error Found – The court found no compelling reason to interfere with the expert assessment or HPSC’s decision – Appeal dismissed – No costs imposed – Directed that the Expert Committee’s report be returned in a sealed cover to the HPSC [Paras 26-28].
 

Taxation Law – Deemed Dealer under MVAT Act – Whether Stressed Assets Stabilization Fund is Liable – The Appellant, a trust set up by the Central Government to recover non-performing assets of IDBI, challenged its classification as a deemed dealer under the MVAT Act – The Tribunal upheld the determination order, ruling that the Appellant falls within the definition of a "dealer" under Section 2(8) – Held: The Explanation to Section 2(8) deems certain entities as dealers, overriding the requirement of carrying on business – As the Appellant was constituted by the Central Government for recovery and sale of stressed assets, it falls within the category of a deemed dealer – Tax liability confirmed [Paras 19-28].

Article 285 – Immunity of Union Property from State Taxation – Whether Applicable – The Appellant argued that it was exempt from taxation under Article 285 as it was acting as an instrumentality of the Central Government – Held: While Article 285 prohibits taxation of Union property, the trust itself, though government-created, engages in commercial transactions, making it subject to state taxation – Exemption not applicable [Paras 11-13].

Prospective Effect of Determination Order – Discretionary Power under Section 56(2) – The Appellant contended that it was under a bona fide impression that it was not liable for tax and had not collected tax from purchasers – Sought relief through prospective effect to avoid hardship – Held: Section 56(2) allows for prospective application of orders, but in this case, the Tribunal found no justification for relief – The Appellant, being a financial institution dealing in sales, was expected to be aware of tax liabilities – Denial of prospective effect upheld [Paras 16-18].

Nature of Transactions – Sale of Movable vs. Immovable Property – The Appellant claimed that it only sold immovable properties and thus should not be liable under MVAT – The Tribunal ruled that whether an asset is movable or immovable is to be determined at the field level – Held: Movable property sold in the course of stressed asset recovery is subject to VAT – The Appellant’s sale transactions included movable goods, making them taxable under MVAT [Paras 14-15].

Final Decision – Appeals dismissed – The Tribunal’s orders upholding the tax liability and denying prospective effect confirmed – The Appellant held liable for VAT on transactions of movable property sales [Paras 29-32].

Taxation Law - Tax Evasion – Undervaluation of Goods – Section 129 of the IGST/CGST Act – Goods in transit can be seized if transported in contravention of the Act or Rules – The petitioners contended that their goods were lawfully transported with valid tax invoices and without an e-way bill, as the value was below ₹50,000 – The Court held that undervaluation of goods with intent to evade tax amounts to a violation of the GST Act – Authorities are empowered to detain and seize goods under Section 129 – Held: The seizure was justified as the documents were found to be manipulated and the petitioners failed to prove the genuine movement of goods from Assam/West Bengal to Delhi [Paras 14-17, 26-28].

Burden of Proof – Requirement to Prove Genuine Movement of Goods – The petitioners failed to provide toll receipts, vehicle details, or other supporting evidence establishing that the goods originated from Assam/West Bengal – The Court emphasized that under GST law, the burden of proof lies on the dealer to demonstrate the legitimacy of the transaction – Held: Failure to establish actual movement of goods rendered the accompanying tax invoices unreliable, justifying detention and penalty [Paras 22-26].

E-Way Bill Exemption – Misuse to Evade Tax – Rule 138 of CGST Rules – The petitioners claimed that since the value of goods was below ₹50,000, an e-way bill was not required – The Court found that the deliberate undervaluation of goods to avoid generating an e-way bill was a fraudulent practice – Held: The exemption under Rule 138 cannot be misused to suppress the true value of goods and evade tax obligations [Paras 37-39].

Reliability of Driver’s Statement – Importance of Initial Interrogation – The truck driver’s statement indicated that the goods were loaded from Kanpur instead of Assam/West Bengal, contradicting the accompanying documents – The Court held that initial statements given at the time of detention carry greater evidentiary value – Held: The driver’s statement reinforced the finding that the goods were falsely documented as originating from Assam/West Bengal, supporting the tax authority’s action [Paras 29-31].

Judicial Precedents – Seizure Valid for Undervaluation – The Court relied on previous rulings that upheld seizure of goods for undervaluation when done with an intent to evade tax – It noted that misdeclaring value to avoid tax obligations constitutes a violation of GST laws – Held: The present case aligned with past judgments where tax authorities were justified in detaining goods on suspicion of tax evasion through undervaluation [Paras 42-45].

Decision: Writ petitions dismissed – The Court found no merit in the petitions challenging the seizure orders. Seizure and penalty upheld – The Court confirmed that the authorities were justified in seizing the goods and imposing penalties under Section 129 of the GST Act. Deliberate undervaluation amounts to tax evasion – The Court ruled that misrepresenting the value of goods to circumvent e-way bill requirements constitutes an attempt to evade tax. Failure to establish genuine movement – The petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the actual transportation of goods from Assam/West Bengal, rendering their claims untenable.

Criminal Procedure – Applicability of BNSS to Pending Cases – Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS – Held: The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, governs pending proceedings initiated before the enactment of BNSS – Since the investigation was initiated prior to the enforcement of BNSS, the Cr.P.C. remains applicable, and Section 349 of the BNSS cannot be invoked – Order directing compliance with BNSS quashed [Paras 1, 8].

Collection of Voice Samples – Power of Magistrate – No Explicit Provision in Cr.P.C. – Judicial Interpretation – Held: Section 311-A of the Cr.P.C. provides for collection of specimen signatures and handwriting but does not explicitly authorize the recording of voice samples – In Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court ruled that a Magistrate may be empowered to order a person to provide a voice sample through judicial interpretation until explicit statutory provisions are introduced – However, this power stems from Article 142, which is exclusive to the Supreme Court and does not extend to subordinate courts – Magistrate’s order for voice sample collection under BNSS not tenable in law [Paras 9-10].

Self-Incrimination – Protection Under Article 20(3) – Constitutional Safeguards – Held: Compelling an individual to provide a voice sample may have implications for self-incrimination – The Supreme Court in Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961) clarified that Article 20(3) applies only to testimonial evidence that is self-incriminatory – Issue of whether witnesses can be compelled to provide evidence that may later implicate them remains unresolved and is pending before a larger Bench – Consequently, the petitioner’s voice sample collection should abide by the decision of the larger Bench [Paras 10-13].

Decision – Magistrate’s Order Quashed – Larger Bench’s Decision Awaited – Held: Since the issue of whether a Magistrate can compel a witness to provide a voice sample is pending before a larger Bench, judicial propriety demands that the petitioner’s case abide by that decision – The impugned order directing compliance with Section 349 of the BNSS is quashed – Petition disposed of accordingly [Paras 13-16].

Civil Law - Ad Interim Injunction – Denial by Trial Court – Legality – Held: The Trial Court erred in refusing ad interim injunction on the premise that lis pendens provides adequate protection – The court failed to assess whether the sale was vitiated due to fraud and misrepresentation by a single shebait claiming exclusive ownership – Injunction granted to prevent further alienation of the property pending trial [Paras 9, 25-31].

Debuttar Property – Transfer by Sole Shebait – Legality – Held: A single shebait cannot unilaterally transfer debuttar property without the consent of other shebaits – The transfer was unauthorized and void ab initio – Prima facie case established for challenging the sale deed executed in 2015 [Paras 5-7, 47-48].

Section 34 of Indian Trusts Act – Applicability to Religious Endowments – Held: Section 34 does not apply to debuttar properties as per the savings clause in Section 1 – Order obtained under Section 34 permitting transfer of the property was a nullity in law and could not validate the impugned sale deed [Paras 6, 50-53].

Limitation – Suit to Set Aside Transfer of Religious Endowment Property – Article 94 of Limitation Act – Held: The suit, filed in 2023, is within the 12-year limitation period under Article 94 – The period begins from the date of knowledge of transfer, which occurred in 2019 – Fraud vitiates all proceedings, and the limitation bar does not apply in cases involving fraudulent transactions [Paras 32-38].

Lis Pendens – Effect on Injunction – Held: The doctrine of lis pendens does not bar the grant of injunctions – Injunction may still be granted to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and protect the plaintiff’s rights – Refusal to grant injunction solely based on lis pendens is erroneous [Paras 9, 30, 58].

Non-Joinder of Co-Shebaits – Whether Suit Maintainable – Held: The suit is not barred due to non-joinder of co-shebaits, as the relief sought benefits all shebaits and the deity – Worshippers and co-shebaits have standing to challenge fraudulent transactions affecting the debuttar estate [Paras 67-69].

Res Judicata – Whether Prior Litigation Operates as a Bar – Held: A previous suit dismissed for default does not bar a fresh suit on a different cause of action – The present suit, challenging the validity of a sale deed, is maintainable despite prior litigation involving related parties [Paras 59-63].

Decision – Injunction Granted – Held: The Trial Court’s order refusing ad interim injunction is set aside – Defendants are restrained from transferring or alienating the property pending final adjudication of the suit – Balance of convenience and irreparable injury favor the plaintiffs [Paras 74-75].

Civil - Partition Suit – Challenge to Prior Partition – No Partition by Metes and Bounds Proven – The original plaintiffs sought partition and separate possession, while the defendants opposed the suit, claiming a prior partition in 1974 and exclusive ownership based on tenancy rights – The First Appellate Court held that there was no legally recognized partition and that the suit lands were joint family properties inherited from the common ancestor, Waman – Held: Mutation entries alone do not prove partition by metes and bounds—Defendants failed to prove independent ownership—Plaintiffs entitled to partition and separate possession [Paras 10-16].

Tenancy Rights – Joint Family Property – Purchase Certificate under Tenancy Act – The defendants contended that Gat No. 70A was self-acquired as it was purchased under tenancy laws – The plaintiffs argued that the tenancy continued in the name of the joint family and that the land was ancestral – The First Appellate Court ruled that Waman was the original tenant, and after his death, the tenancy continued on behalf of the joint family – Held: Mere issuance of a certificate under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act in the defendant’s name does not confer exclusive ownership; tenancy continued for the benefit of all legal heirs [Paras 13-15].

Hindu Succession Act – Determination of Legal Heirs – Rights of Step-Sons – The First Appellate Court incorrectly allotted a one-third share to the plaintiffs – The court reconsidered the shares under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act – Held: Defendant No. 1, being the stepson of plaintiff No. 2, is not entitled to inherit from her share—Plaintiffs entitled to a greater share than determined by the lower court—Share determination modified [Paras 28-31].

Exclusion of Land – Alleged Consent-Based Transfer – The First Appellate Court excluded 2 anas 4 paise land, reasoning that it was sold by Defendant No. 1 to Defendant No. 2 (maternal sister) – Plaintiffs contended there was no valid transfer – Held: Defendant No. 2 is not a legal heir under Hindu law—No valid sale deed produced—Exclusion of land from partition decree set aside [Paras 25-27].

Final Decision – The Second Appeal filed by the defendants dismissed – The Cross Objection filed by the plaintiffs allowed – Judgment and decree of partition confirmed with modifications regarding share determination and exclusion of land [Paras 32-34].
 

Criminal Procedure – Power of Magistrate Under Section 156(3) CrPC – Order for FIR Quashed – The trial Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint, recorded the complainant’s preliminary statement under Section 200 CrPC, and directed an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC – Despite this, the Magistrate later ordered registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC – Held: Once a Magistrate has taken cognizance and initiated proceedings under Chapter XV of CrPC, reverting to the pre-cognizance stage under Section 156(3) CrPC is impermissible – Impugned order directing FIR registration is unsustainable in law [Paras 8-11].

Jurisdiction of Magistrate – Cognizance and Inquiry Cannot be Reversed – Procedural Error Invalidates FIR – The Magistrate's actions in directing a police inquiry and subsequently ordering FIR registration contradict CrPC provisions – Held: Once cognizance is taken, the Magistrate must proceed with a private complaint under Chapter XV CrPC and cannot switch to ordering an FIR under Section 156(3) – Precedent in Mohd. Aijaz v. Sajad Ahmad Dar, CRMC No. 285/2017, applied – FIR quashed as a consequence of the illegal order [Paras 10-12].

Final Decision – FIR Quashed – Complaint to be Treated as Private Complaint – High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order dated 29.03.2022 and quashed FIR No. 37/2022 – Directed that the trial Magistrate proceed with the complaint as a private complaint under Chapter XV of CrPC – Case diary for FIR No. 113/2022 to be produced in CRM(M) No. 874/2022 on the next hearing date [Paras 12-14].