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by Admin
07 May 2024 2:49 AM
In a significant judgment Delhi High Court upheld the eviction of tenants and subtenants from a property in Naya Bazar, Delhi-6, affirming the landlords’ bonafide requirement for residential and commercial purposes. Justice Jasmeet Singh dismissed the petitions filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which challenged the eviction orders passed by the Additional Rent Controller (ARC). The court found no error in the ARC’s judgment and reiterated that the landlords' genuine needs could not be doubted.
The property in question, comprising several rooms and halls across multiple floors, had been occupied by tenants and alleged subtenants for decades. The landlords sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, asserting that the property was essential for their residential needs and for expanding their transport businesses. They argued that one of the landlord’s sons, residing in a rented house in Greater Kailash-II, required suitable accommodation in the premises. Additionally, the premises’ location in a commercial hub made it ideal for transport operations.
The ARC allowed the eviction, dismissing the tenants' and subtenants' leave-to-defend applications. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the tenants filed revision petitions in the High Court.
Justice Jasmeet Singh emphasized the limited scope of the High Court’s revisional powers, which do not extend to reappreciating evidence unless the lower court’s findings are manifestly erroneous. The court stated:
“The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 25-B(8) is not so limited as is under Section 115 CPC nor so wide as that of an appellate court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts.”
The judgment highlighted that the revisional court's role is confined to ensuring procedural compliance and verifying whether the ARC's decision was in accordance with law.
The court upheld the ARC’s findings that the landlords had a genuine requirement for the premises. It rejected the tenants' argument that the landlords’ needs were exaggerated or could be met through alternative accommodations. Referring to settled legal principles, Justice Singh noted:
“When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises.”
The court further stated: “The landlords themselves are the best judges of their requirements. The tenants cannot dictate the utilization of the tenanted premises, nor can they substitute their judgment for that of the landlords.”
The court found that the landlords' son was incurring significant expenses on rented accommodation despite owning the premises, which reinforced their claim of genuine need.
The court meticulously examined the landlords’ dual requirement for the premises. On the residential front, it noted that the family required suitable accommodation for their dependents and frequent visitors. On the commercial side, the court emphasized that the landlords’ sons had planned to expand their transport businesses from the premises. Justice Singh observed:
“The petitioners are also doing business under the name and style of M/s. Mehra Sons and M/s. Bijli Carriers. Both the said businesses are related to plying of trucks for transporting goods from one place to another. The said business requires space and is functional at odd hours. For meeting the said requirements, premises in question are best suited.”
A key argument raised by the subtenants was that eviction under Section 14(1)(e) could not be directed against them. They claimed that they were independent tenants or that their status was not addressed properly in the eviction petition. The court, however, dismissed these arguments, clarifying that the definition of a tenant under the Act includes subtenants. Justice Singh remarked:
“The status of the persons in use or occupation of the tenanted premises, be it a tenant or a subtenant, is not relevant. The landlords are not seeking vacation of the tenanted premises on the ground that the tenant has inducted subtenants but are seeking vacation for bonafide residential and commercial needs.”
The court distinguished the present case from earlier judgments, such as Siri Pal Jain v. Brij Kishore, noting that the subtenants in this case were given an opportunity to contest through leave-to-defend applications.
Addressing the tenants' claims that the landlords had other accommodations, the court found no evidence to support these assertions. It observed:
“When the payee of rent or the subtenants have failed to show suitable alternate accommodation available to the landlords, the question of the landlords’ need being unfounded does not arise. The landlords have a right to use their premises in the manner they deem fit.”
The High Court dismissed the revision petitions, affirming the ARC’s eviction orders. Justice Jasmeet Singh concluded:
“The findings of the learned ARC are neither perverse nor contrary to law. The landlords have demonstrated a genuine and bonafide requirement for the premises, both for residential and commercial purposes, and have established the absence of suitable alternate accommodation.”
Date of Decision: November 27, 2024