Tenant Cannot Acquire Title Against True Owner: Andhra Pradesh High Court Dismisses Obstruction Plea  in Execution Proceedings

“Even if the appellant is a tenant, a tenant is always a tenant... He cannot acquire any title against a true owner or dictate terms to the landlord”— High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati rejecting a tenant's obstruction plea under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reaffirming the settled legal position that no tenant—actual or self-proclaimed—can assert title against the rightful owner or obstruct the execution of a lawful decree. The Court categorically held that once the issue of tenancy has been adjudicated and rejected in the suit proceedings, the same cannot be re-agitated during execution under the garb of an independent right.

The judgment reaffirms the boundaries of a tenant's legal position under the Transfer of Property Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, drawing a firm line against delaying tactics and obstructionist litigation that seek to defeat final court decrees.

“Once the Plea of Tenancy Is Rejected, It Cannot Be Reopened in Execution”—High Court Applies Estoppel and Bars Re-litigation

The dispute originated when the decree-holders, Allumolu Srinivas and Allumolu Mallikharjuna Rao, initiated execution proceedings to take possession of property in Tadepalligudem, which they had purchased via a registered sale deed dated 23.09.2011. While executing the decree in E.P. No. 5 of 2018 arising out of O.S. No. 71 of 2012, the appellant, Kollati Sai Kumar, filed an obstruction petition claiming he was a lawful tenant running a pan and cool drinks shop in the property and could not be evicted without due process.

However, the appellant had already appeared as DW-3 during the original trial, claimed tenancy, and had his plea squarely rejected by the trial court. The lower court had found there was neither an oral agreement nor documentary proof of tenancy and held that the possession of the decree-holders was not illegal. That finding had attained finality as the appellant had not challenged it through any appeal or cross-appeal. Despite that, the appellant sought to reassert his tenancy in execution.

Dismissing this attempt, Justice Venuthurmalli Gopala Krishna Rao noted, “Now the appellant cannot take the same plea that he is the tenant of the petition schedule property. Even if the appellant is a tenant, a tenant is always a tenant. He cannot acquire any title against a true owner. The tenant cannot dictate the terms to the owner or landlord.”

The Court made it clear that a tenant cannot use execution proceedings as a forum to re-litigate issues already decided. The plea of tenancy was squarely raised, examined, and disbelieved. That conclusion became conclusive between the parties.

“Execution Court Is Not a Forum to Re-try the Original Suit”—Tenant’s Obstruction Dismissed as Abuse of Process

Rejecting the second appeal at the admission stage itself, the High Court emphasized that Section 100 CPC mandates that only substantial questions of law warrant interference. The Court found that both the trial court and the appellate court had rendered concurrent findings of fact based on a fair evaluation of the evidence, and there was no perversity or legal error.

The appellant’s counsel tried to invoke precedents such as Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Ashan Devi v. Phulwasi Devi, but the Court clarified that those decisions apply where the objector in execution is a stranger to the suit. In this case, the appellant was not a stranger but had directly participated in the trial as DW-3. The Court stated, “The appellant engaged an Advocate, adduced evidence as DW-3, and the plea of oral tenancy was disbelieved by the trial court... Hence, he is estopped from raising the plea of tenancy again.”

The Court further reiterated that the executing court’s duty is to deliver possession in accordance with the decree and cannot be turned into a platform to resurrect failed defences. It cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, AIR 2021 SC 2161, stating, “It is well settled that in execution of a decree for possession of immovable property, the executing Court has to deliver physical possession to the decree-holder.”

“Substantial Questions of Law Must Exist—Frivolous Second Appeals Will Be Thrown Out at Admission”

The High Court stressed that a second appeal under Section 100 CPC is not a right that automatically flows from every aggrieved party. The appellant was required to show that a substantial question of law existed for the Court’s consideration. Justice Rao observed, “The questions raised in this Second Appeal are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law. The Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed at the stage of admission.”

Thus, the Court dismissed the second appeal, ensuring that the decree-holders could proceed with the execution and obtain possession as per their rightful claim under a registered sale deed and court decree.

“Tenant Cannot Use Execution as a Forum to Hijack Property Rights of Decree-Holder”: Final Seal on a Frivolous Obstruction

This decision serves as a strong precedent against the misuse of execution proceedings and reinforces the doctrine that a tenant—especially one who has already failed to prove tenancy—cannot raise obstructions under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC to delay the implementation of a valid and binding decree. The High Court has thus sent a clear message that legal finality must be respected and that courts will not entertain repeated and frivolous attempts to frustrate justice.

Date of Decision: 15.09.2025