Succession Opened Prior to 1956—Daughter Has No Right to Inherit Father’s Property Under Mitakshara Law: Chhattisgarh High Court

“When a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law died before 1956, his separate property would devolve entirely upon his son. A female child could claim a right in such property only in the absence of a male child.” - Chhattisgarh High Court

On 13 October 2025, the Chhattisgarh High Court, in Smt. Ragmania (since deceased) through L.R. Kariman Das v. Jagmet & Others, dismissed a second appeal filed by the legal heir of a married daughter who sought a share in her father's property nearly five decades after his death. Delivering a comprehensive verdict on the applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Court clarified that the Act cannot retroactively reopen succession that had already opened under the Mitakshara law prior to its commencement. The ruling underscores a fundamental principle of Hindu personal law—that succession is governed by the law in force at the time of the deceased’s death.

The Court concluded that since the plaintiff’s father, Sudhinram, died in 1950–51, long before the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, the claim of the daughter could not be sustained under the post-1956 statutory regime. The property had already devolved under the rules of Mitakshara Hindu law, which expressly excluded daughters from inheritance when a male heir was present.

“Succession Having Opened in 1950–51, No Right Accrued to the Daughter Even Under the 2005 Amendment”

The appeal arose from a suit for declaration and partition filed in 2005 by Smt. Ragmania, a married daughter, claiming rights in the ancestral property jointly held by her father and uncle. According to her, the property was ancestral and her brother’s descendants had unlawfully mutated their names. Both the trial court and the first appellate court dismissed her claim, finding that the father had died well before 1956 and thus, succession was governed by traditional Mitakshara principles. The High Court, hearing the second appeal, had framed three substantial questions of law focused on whether the Hindu Succession Act, particularly its 2005 amendment, could be applied retroactively.

The Court found no merit in the appellant’s argument that the 2005 amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act gave her a right by birth in the ancestral property. It was categorically held that such rights are only available when the succession opens after the Act’s commencement.

In the words of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas, “The plaintiff to claim that she is entitled to inherit the suit property in view of Section 6 as amended in the year 2005 should first plead and prove that the parties are governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.” He observed that not only was there no such pleading, but even the oral and documentary evidence confirmed the father had died well before the Act came into force.

The Court relied on the unequivocal position laid down in Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur, (2020) 14 SCC 436, where the Supreme Court stated, “If succession opened under the old Hindu law, i.e., prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the parties would be governed by Mitakshara law.” In such cases, daughters were not entitled to inherit their father's separate or ancestral property if a son existed.

“Inheritance Under Mitakshara Law Is By Birth For Sons, Not For Daughters—Posthumous Statutes Do Not Alter Pre-1956 Succession”

The Court observed that the death of Sudhinram in 1950–51 had conclusively opened succession, and that event fixed the applicable personal law. The nature of inheritance under Mitakshara law meant that the son, Baigadas, acquired the property by survivorship and inheritance. The daughter could not assert a right that did not exist under the prevailing law at the time of her father’s death.

Quoting extensively from Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad, (2018) 7 SCC 646, the judgment reaffirmed, “The essential feature of ancestral property, according to Mitakshara Law, is that the sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons acquire an interest and the rights attached to such property at the moment of their birth.”

The Court was particularly emphatic in noting that “even the self-acquired property of a male devolved exclusively upon his male issue under Mitakshara law,” and that “only in the absence of such male issue did it pass to other heirs.” Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim, based on the 2005 amendment and later interpretations of Section 6, could not be entertained.

“No Evidence of Widow’s Possession—Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act Inapplicable”

Another argument raised by the plaintiff was that the widow of the deceased father had possessed the property, and thus her limited interest would have transformed into full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court decisively rejected this, noting that there was no evidence to support the claim of such possession.

“It is well settled that the limited estate of a widow could ripen into absolute ownership only if she was in possession of the property after the death of her husband,” the Court noted. “In absence of possession, the limited estate could not convert into an absolute right.”

The Court also observed that the plaintiff had failed to show that her mother (Sudhinram’s widow) was ever in possession or that she survived beyond 1956, which would have been the minimum requirement for Section 14 to be attracted.

“The 1929 Hindu Law Amendment Did Not Confer Rights On Daughters—It Merely Ranked Certain Female Heirs Below Male Lineage”

The judgment also considered the applicability of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, which had introduced certain female relatives into the order of succession. The Court held that the 1929 Act had a very limited scope, and merely ranked “son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, sister, and sister’s son” after the paternal grandfather and before the paternal uncle. It did not override Mitakshara rules of male-line succession.

Citing Arunachala Gounder v. Ponnusamy, (2022) 11 SCC 520, the Court observed, “The Act of 1929 was the earliest statutory legislation which brought Hindu females into the scheme of inheritance… without making any modifications in the fundamental concepts underlying the textual Hindu Law relating to inheritance.”

In essence, daughters were not elevated to equal status as sons in inheritance under the 1929 Act. Their rights, if any, were conditional, and arose only in the absence of male heirs.

“Mutation in Defendant’s Name Valid—Will Executed By Plaintiff Had No Legal Effect”

The Court further held that the mutation made in favour of defendant No.1 was legally sound, as the property had validly devolved upon Baigadas, who in turn transferred the rights to his daughter. As the plaintiff had no title or share in the property under law, the Will executed by her in favour of her legal heir Kariman Das was inconsequential.

The Court remarked that “she can only execute ½ of the share in the property,” if she had any such share at all. But since her entitlement had already failed, the Will transferred nothing and could not be relied upon to create rights in the suit land.

“Mitakshara Law Prevails Where Succession Opened Prior to 1956—Appeal Dismissed”

Summing up the legal position, Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas concluded:

“When a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law died before 1956, his separate property would completely devolve upon his son. A female child could claim a right in such property only in the absence of a male child. The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 did not affect the son’s absolute right to inherit his father’s property.”

Accordingly, the second appeal was dismissed, and all substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the respondents. The Court found no error in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, and no costs were awarded.

Date of Decision: 13 October 2025