Substitution Cannot Be Defeated by Technical Delay – No Separate Abatement Application Required If Relief Is Implied: Allahabad High Court

“The law does not insist on procedural rigidity—when sufficient cause is shown, courts are bound to lean in favour of substantial justice over technicalities.” In a significant pronouncement reinforcing a liberal and justice-oriented approach to substitution proceedings, the Allahabad High Court upheld a trial court’s order allowing delay condonation and substitution of legal heirs after the death of the sole defendant during the pendency of a civil suit.

Justice Manish Kumar Nigam held that filing of a separate application to set aside abatement is not mandatory where the substitution application itself implies a request for revival, and that delay condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be granted even if the application is filed subsequently, provided sufficient cause is shown.

Rejecting the revision filed by the legal heirs of the deceased defendant, the Court observed:
“A prayer for substitution—though not explicitly seeking to set aside abatement—carries an implied request for revival of the suit. Courts must not adopt a hyper-technical approach where the intention to proceed is evident and cause is bona fide.”

“Delay Condonation Application Need Not Precede or Accompany Substitution Application”: Procedural Sequencing Not Fatal When Justice Demands Flexibility

The sole defendant in a suit for mandatory injunction passed away on 12.10.2022, and the plaintiff, through a power of attorney holder, moved an application for substitution under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC on 16.03.2023, along with an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC for amendment. An application to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed later, on 16.10.2023, in response to objections from the heirs of the deceased.

The revisionists argued that since the delay condonation application was not filed simultaneously, the substitution was not legally maintainable. The Court decisively dismissed this technical argument, referring to its earlier ruling in Surendra Mani v. State of U.P., and ruled:
“A formal delay condonation application is not mandatory if the record satisfies the judicial conscience that sufficient cause existed for delay. Substitution cannot be thwarted merely due to the sequence of filings.”

The Court emphasized that the duty of the court is to protect the litigant from procedural traps, particularly when the intention to pursue the matter is clearly demonstrated, and delay is neither mala fide nor deliberate.

“Abatement Not Automatic Bar – Implied Revival Permissible Through Substitution Application Itself”: Technical Pleas Dismissed

The revisionists further argued that since 90 days had lapsed after the defendant’s death, the suit had automatically abated under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, and in the absence of a specific application to set aside abatement, the substitution ought to have been rejected.

Rejecting this contention, the Court invoked the ratio laid down in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini, where the Supreme Court held that an application for substitution inherently carries a request to revive the suit, even if not expressly stated. The High Court reiterated:
“A too technical or pedantic approach is not called for. Courts must adopt a justice-oriented lens—if the substitution is allowed, abatement is deemed to have been set aside.”

The judgment further clarified that limitation for setting aside abatement is 60 days from the date of abatement, and in the present case, even that extended period had not expired when the delay application was filed.

“Court Is Empowered to Evaluate Sufficient Cause Independently in Revisional Jurisdiction”: Objection to Reasoning in Trial Court Order Not Enough

The revisionists also assailed the trial court’s order on the ground that it did not deal in detail with their objections and failed to record reasons for allowing substitution. The High Court dismissed this argument, holding that mere lack of elaborate reasoning does not warrant interference under Section 115 CPC, unless failure of justice or irreparable injury is established.

Citing its own ruling in Dr. Sakeel Ahmed v. Smt. Sabiha Khatoon, the Court emphasized:
“Even where the lower court’s order is unreasoned, unless there is manifest injustice or prejudice, revisional interference is unwarranted.”

The Court went further to examine the delay condonation application itself, and found that the explanation offered—that the plaintiff’s power of attorney holder was out of station—was satisfactory, especially since no element of bad faith or deliberate delay was established.

“Substitution Matters Demand Realistic and Equitable Approach – Procedural Formalities Must Not Frustrate Substantial Justice”

The Court referred to Order XXII Rule 10A CPC, inserted by the 1976 Amendment, which imposes a duty upon the counsel of the deceased party to inform the Court about the death, and noted that this statutory change is meant to prevent avoidable dismissals due to procedural default.

Relying on the precedent in Ishwari v. D.D.C., the Court observed:
“The intention of the legislature is manifest—substitution matters should not be defeated by mere delay or technical lapses. Courts must act with realism and a commitment to equitable justice.”

“Substitution Properly Allowed – Delay Justifiably Condoned – No Interference Warranted in Revision”: Court Affirms Trial Court Order

Upholding the trial court’s order dated 12.12.2024, which allowed the substitution, amendment, and condonation of delay, the High Court concluded that no jurisdictional error or procedural illegality had occurred.

“In the present case, I am of the view that the substitution application has been correctly allowed and the delay has correctly been condoned by the trial court.”
With this finding, the revision was dismissed, and no order as to costs was passed.

In this significant ruling, the Allahabad High Court has reaffirmed the principle of liberal interpretation in substitution matters, laying down that procedural formalities must not override substantive justice, especially in cases involving delay in bringing legal heirs on record.

The judgment is a clear message that litigants should not be penalized for procedural imperfections when their intentions are bona fide and the cause is just. By rejecting hyper-technical arguments and upholding the trial court’s discretion, the Court has fortified the principle that access to justice must not be impeded by formalism.

Date of Decision: November 20, 2025