Section 29A A&C Act | Jurisdiction Does Not Flow From Judicial Hierarchy, But From Statute: Supreme Court

“It is a misconception to assume that the High Court keeps a watch on arbitral proceedings like Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’”, In a decision with wide ramifications for arbitration law in India, the Supreme Court on January 29, 2026, has firmly settled the jurisdictional ambiguity surrounding Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court categorically held that applications for extension of time to make an arbitral award must lie before the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e), regardless of whether the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the High Court under Section 11 or by agreement of the parties.

The Bench comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice R. Mahadevan rejected the notion that the mode of appointment of an arbitrator alters the forum before which such an extension can be sought.

“Jurisdiction flows solely from the statute and not from notions of institutional superiority. Interpretation based on perceptions of court hierarchy is fundamentally opposed to the rule of law,” the Court observed, emphasizing that ‘Court’ must carry its statutory meaning unless the context “expressly” requires otherwise.

Supreme Court Strikes Down “Artificial Duality” in Arbitration Jurisdiction: Commercial Court Regains Authority under Section 29A

The judgment arose from a long-standing family dispute within the Chowgule family, which had been referred to arbitration pursuant to a Memorandum of Family Settlement. When the arbitrator resigned mid-way, a fresh appointment was made by the High Court under Section 11(6). Subsequently, the Commercial Court granted an extension under Section 29A. The order was challenged, and the Bombay High Court held that since the appointment had been made by the High Court, only the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a Section 29A(4) application.

The Supreme Court, however, reversed the High Court’s ruling, observing that the Division Bench and the Single Judge had erred in interpreting jurisdiction through the lens of the appointment authority, which is limited and non-continuing.

“The referral Court becomes functus officio once appointment has been made. It has no role or function as a sub judice sentinel. It is a misconception to assume that the High Court keeps a watch on the conduct of arbitral proceedings or on making of the arbitral award like Orwell’s ‘Big Brother is watching you’,” the Court sternly remarked.

The Court held that the Commercial Court — being the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction — was indeed competent to entertain and decide the extension application under Section 29A(4). The judgment restores the Commercial Court’s order dated 02.01.2024, which had extended the time for the arbitral tribunal to pass an award.

Section 11 Appointment Does Not Confer Continuing Jurisdiction: Clarifies SC

Dissecting the erroneous approach adopted by multiple High Courts across the country, the Supreme Court critically analyzed the two competing interpretations of the term “Court” under Section 29A. While one stream had faithfully applied Section 2(1)(e), the other attempted a “contextual interpretation” to retain the matter before the High Court based on the perceived anomaly of a lower court exercising authority over an arbitrator appointed by a superior court.

This “contextual interpretation” was rejected outright by the Supreme Court:

“Interpretation based on perception of status, hierarchy or conflict of powers is fundamentally flawed. Law — and law alone — is the source of power. The definition of ‘Court’ under Section 2(1)(e) must govern unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.”

The Court clarified that appointment under Section 11 is a standalone, special jurisdiction conferred on the Chief Justice (or his designate), and does not result in the High Court becoming the supervisory court for arbitral proceedings. The judgment reaffirms that once the appointment is made, the appointing court becomes functus officio.

Section 42 Does Not Save Jurisdiction of High Court Where Section 11 Application Was Made: Clarifies Supreme Court

The Court also addressed the potential argument under Section 42, which mandates that once a court has been approached under the Act, all subsequent applications should lie before that same court. This provision had been invoked by some High Courts to retain jurisdiction over Section 29A proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court held this to be legally unsustainable, clarifying that Section 11 applications are not made before a “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e), but rather before the Chief Justice or their designate, and hence, Section 42 does not apply.

“The Chief Justice or his delegate is not a ‘Court’ under Section 2(1)(e). Applications made under Section 11 do not trigger Section 42 jurisdiction,” the Court noted, citing its earlier Constitution Bench rulings in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.

Civil Courts Can Also Substitute Arbitrators Appointed by High Court Under Section 11

Another concern dismissed by the Court was whether a civil court could substitute an arbitrator originally appointed by the High Court. The Court unequivocally stated that Section 29A(6) vests such power in the “Court” defined under Section 2(1)(e), and no statutory anomaly arises merely because the arbitrator was initially appointed by a higher judicial forum.

“The power of substitution is statutorily vested in the Court under Section 2(1)(e). Appointment under Section 11 does not alter statutory curial jurisdiction,” the Court held.

Supreme Court Restores Certainty in Arbitration Law – Strengthens Legislative Intent

Allowing the appeal and restoring the Commercial Court’s jurisdiction, the Court also emphasized the legislative objective behind introducing Section 29A — to bring timeliness and efficiency into the arbitral process, not to create forum conflicts or jurisdictional uncertainty.

“Law has been made clear by the legislature. There is no room for judicial invention or interpretation based on perceived institutional conflicts. Arbitration is meant to be swift, cost-effective and minimally court-controlled. This objective must not be defeated by expansive readings of judicial power,” the judgment concludes.

Date of Decision: January 29, 2026