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by sayum
29 December 2025 8:09 AM
“When a party has relinquished their share in a property through a registered family partition deed and subsequently allowed others to deal with the property exclusively, no claim for co-ownership or partition can be sustained after decades,” ruled the Madras High Court while setting aside a preliminary decree for partition.
Madras High Court (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction) allowed an appeal filed by two brothers against a trial court’s order that granted their sister a 1/12th share in ancestral properties. Justice R. Sakthivel held that the plaintiff had expressly relinquished her share in favour of the defendants under a registered family partition deed dated 25 September 1981, and her suit for partition filed in 2013 was not only barred by limitation but also unsustainable in law.
The ruling addressed pivotal legal issues on relinquishment under a partition deed, admissibility of documents under the Stamp Act, joint possession, and limitation in challenging settled arrangements, offering judicial clarity on the interplay between documentary evidence and presumptive claims in family property disputes.
“Ex-B.34 Is Not Just a Partition, But a Composite Deed of Relinquishment and Partition”: Registered Relinquishment Cannot Be Undone by Subsequent Pleas of 'Intention'
The plaintiff had claimed a 1/12th share in the family property, asserting that though the properties were allotted in the names of her brothers under the 1981 partition deed (Ex-B.34), she and her mother had only “postponed” the actual allotment of their shares and never intended to relinquish ownership.
The High Court rejected this plea as contradicted by the very terms of the partition deed, the conduct of parties for decades, and the evidentiary testimony of witnesses, including family elders who facilitated the arrangement.
Justice R. Sakthivel observed: “There is no evidence available on record to prove the contention of the plaintiff that she merely postponed her claim… and did not relinquish it in favour of the defendants.”
Referring to the recitals in Ex-B.34, the Court emphasized: “The plaintiff and her mother emphatically relinquished their shares in favour of the first and second defendants and hence, they cannot raise any claim for their shares in the future.”
“Stamp Duty Objection Cannot Be Raised After Admission of Document Without Protest”: Section 36 of Indian Stamp Act Applies with Full Force
One of the arguments raised by the plaintiff was that Ex-B.34 was not admissible as evidence of relinquishment as separate stamp duty for relinquishment was not paid and the document was stamped only as a partition deed.
Dismissing this technical objection, the Court applied Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which bars parties from questioning the admissibility of documents once they have been marked and admitted into evidence without objection.
The Court held: “Merely on the ground of deficit stamp duty, it cannot be said that Ex-B.34 is not valid qua relinquishment… The document was marked in open court through a witness without any objection from the plaintiff.”
Relying on Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana (AIR 1961 SC 1655) and Shyamal Kumar Roy v. Sushil Kumar Agarwal [(2006) 11 SCC 331], the Court reiterated that:
“Once a document has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not be called into question in the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped.”
“Joint Possession Cannot Be Presumed From Water or Electricity Bills in Defendant's Name”: Plaintiff’s Claim of Co-ownership Found Hollow
To prove continued joint possession, the plaintiff produced water and electricity bills in the name of the second defendant, claiming her husband had been living on the property and paying utility charges.
The Court rejected this argument as legally untenable and factually unsubstantiated, holding:
“The plaintiff or her husband could very well be permissive occupants… Payment of utility bills without ownership records does not establish joint possession.”
The Court noted that after the 1981 partition, the brothers had:
Mutated separate pattas
Entered into subsequent partitions in 1983 and 1986
Constructed individual houses
Executed registered sale deeds to third parties, including defendants 4 to 7
All of this was done without any protest from the plaintiff for over three decades.
“Suit for Partition Without Challenging Earlier Registered Deeds is Barred by Limitation”: Articles 58 and 59 Apply to Preclude Belated Claims
The Court also held that the plaintiff’s failure to challenge the registered documents—Ex-B.34 (1981), Ex-B.36 (1983), and Ex-B.3 (1986)—within the prescribed limitation period under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, rendered her suit time-barred.
Justice Sakthivel stated: “The plaintiff’s claim is barred by limitation… she cannot now seek partition in absence of challenge to earlier relinquishment and subsequent allotments.”
The Court added that even conduct, such as the plaintiff’s husband attesting a 1983 sale deed (Ex-B.35) reciting the exclusive ownership of defendants 1 and 2, supported the binding nature of the earlier arrangements.
“Trial Court Failed to Consider the Legal Effect of the Partition Deed and Basis of Share Calculation”: Preliminary Decree Set Aside
The High Court found serious flaws in the trial court’s reasoning, holding:
“There is no clue as to on what basis the Trial Court declared that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/12 share in the suit properties… The court failed to assess the legal character of the suit property and the implications of Ex-B.34.”
Since the partition suit was based on the assumption of continued co-ownership—which the Court found had been legally and voluntarily relinquished—the entire suit was held to be misconceived and unsustainable.
Setting aside the trial court’s decree, the Madras High Court concluded:
“The Appeal Suit stands allowed. The Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court are hereby set aside. The Original Suit is dismissed.”
While acknowledging the familial relationship between the parties, the Court made no order as to costs and upheld the principle that finality of family arrangements and partition deeds must be respected in law.
Date of Decision: 23 October 2025