Prevention Of Corruption Act | Mere Recovery Of Tainted Money Without Proof Of Demand Cannot Sustain Conviction: Supreme Court

"The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act does not arise in the first place, since it presupposes proof of acceptance or obtainment by the accused, which, for the reasons above, remains unproved." Supreme Court, in a judgment dated September 16, 2026, has emphatically held that the mere recovery of tainted currency notes from an accused or an intermediary is insufficient to sustain a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, unless the prosecution independently establishes the foundational fact of a demand for illegal gratification. A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for legal proof.

Strict Standards For Establishing Corruption Offences

The court underscored that the jurisprudence governing corruption cases is built on the fundamental premise that criminality does not arise merely because money changes hands. The prosecution bears the primary burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the public servant demanded, accepted, or obtained gratification as a motive or reward for an official act.

Necessity Of Proof Of Demand Antecedent To Presumption - Court Reaffirms Indispensable Nature Of Proof Of Demand

The bench referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), reiterating that proof of demand remains the gravamen of the offence. The court clarified that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its primary burden. The presumption operates only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts, and where the prosecution fails to do so, the presumption does not arise.

Evidence Of Intermediary Requires Independent Corroboration

"An accomplice who has participated in the crime and subsequently secured pardon possesses a powerful incentive to minimise his own culpability and shift responsibility onto others."

Addressing the reliance on approver testimony, the court noted that evidence of intermediaries—who were originally arrayed as accused and subsequently granted pardon—must be subjected to careful scrutiny. While such evidence is admissible, it is ordinarily unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars by independent witnesses or circumstances, as stipulated by Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

Nexus Between Accused And Intermediary Must Be Proved - Nexus Cannot Be Presumed Based Merely On Hierarchy

The court emphasized that in cases involving intermediaries, the nexus between the public servant and the conduit must be proved by reliable evidence and cannot be presumed merely because the intermediary was a subordinate. The prosecution must establish that the intermediary was acting under the specific authority, direction, or for the benefit of the accused. The court found that in the present case, the "strange detour" of bribe money—where the accused allegedly accepted money only to return it to the intermediary for delivery elsewhere—lacked logic and cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s narrative.

Trap Proceedings Must Be Logically Consistent - Abrupt Conclusion Of Trap Procedures Raises Doubts

Critically, the court observed that the investigating agency’s decision to conclude the trap at the point of recovery from the intermediary, rather than allowing the chain to reach the appellant, constituted a "serious lacuna." The court held that the evidence was consistent only up to the handover to the intermediary. Beyond that, the lack of cogent evidence demonstrating that the money reached or was intended to reach the appellant meant the chain of proof remained incomplete.

Absence Of Documentary Evidence And Alibi - Contemporaneous Records Contradict Prosecution Theory

Regarding the second transaction, the court noted the absence of any independent evidence or recovery, relying solely on the word of interested witnesses. Crucially, the appellant’s own monthly diary, which provided an unrefuted alibi, contradicted the timeline alleged by the prosecution. The court held that this discrepancy, when combined with the lack of documentary records such as call logs or duty rosters, rendered the prosecution's case fundamentally infirm.

Acquittal Of The Appellant

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed both criminal appeals, holding that the charges against the appellant could not be sustained under the stringent standards of proof required by law. The court set aside the convictions and ordered the discharge of bail bonds, emphasizing that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to invoke the presumption of guilt.

Date of Decision: 16 September 2026