POCSO Act | Statutory Presumption Under Section 29 Is Not Absolute And Does Not Dispense With The Requirement Of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Supreme Court

"The presumptive provisions notwithstanding, the courts are not absolved from discharging their essential duty to analyse the evidence on record in light of the features emerging in a particular case." Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated September 17, 2026, held that statutory presumptions under Section 29 of the POCSO Act are rebuttable and do not permit the prosecution to bypass the fundamental requirement of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

A bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed that while the law mandates a shift in the evidentiary burden, such provisions cannot be used to mechanically accept a prosecution's case if the underlying evidence is riddled with inconsistencies and improbabilities.

The appellant-convict challenged a judgment of the Delhi High Court which had confirmed his conviction under Section 363 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The trial court had sentenced him to ten years of rigorous imprisonment based on the complaint of the victim’s mother, alleging a sexual assault on her two-and-a-half-year-old daughter. The appellant consistently maintained his innocence, arguing that the complaint was a result of an existing enmity between the families regarding a common water connection in their jhuggi cluster.

The primary question before the court was whether the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act shifts the burden of proof to such an extent that it excuses the prosecution from proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court was also called upon to determine whether the medical and ocular evidence produced by the prosecution was of "sterling quality" to sustain a conviction under the Act, given the significant contradictions in the testimonies.

Nature of Statutory Presumptions

The court clarified that Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, which raise presumptions of guilt and culpable mental state, constitute a departure from the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The bench noted that these provisions serve as an "additional weapon in the armoury of prosecution," but they are not absolute and are subject to rebuttal.

"The presumption of commission of offence or the presumption of culpability mental state are rebuttable presumptions. The truthfulness of the factum raised by way of statutory presumptions can be countered by the accused by leading evidence."

Requirement of Foundational Facts

The court emphasised that the presumption under Section 29 only comes into operation once the prosecution has established the basic and foundational facts constituting the offence. If the prosecution fails to establish these primary facts or if their version is inherently absurd or contradictory, the presumption does not take effect.

"A perusal of the above quoted provision does show that it is for the accused to prove the contrary... It cannot be countenanced that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute. It would come into operation only when the prosecution is first able to establish facts that would form the foundation for the presumption."

Evaluation of Prosecution Evidence

In the present case, the court found the testimony of the complainant (PW-5) and the private doctor (PW-1) to be plagued by manifest contradictions, particularly regarding the timing of the alleged medical examination and the presence of bloodstains. These discrepancies, when read with the FSL report which failed to detect any semen or male DNA, completely undermined the prosecution's theory of a penetrative sexual act.

"The various gaps in the testimony of PW-5, contradictions with evidence of other witnesses and the FSL and medical evidence revealing quite contrary, the prosecution story led by the evidence of PW-5 never remained intact but miserably descended to the stage of lack of proof."

Standards of Fair Trial

The bench reiterated that even in cases involving stringent statutes like the POCSO Act or the NDPS Act, the court must remain a sentinel of the accused's right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court must be "extra careful and cautious" and should not be overshadowed by presumptive provisions when the evidence demonstrates the improbability of the prosecution's narrative.

"The guilt of the accused has to be adjudged not by the fact that a vast number of people believe him to be guilty but whether his guilt has been established by the evidence brought on record."

Concluding that the prosecution failed to prove its case, the Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court. The court held that the appellant-accused had successfully rebutted the prosecution's case through a cogent defence and the demonstration of "evidential emptiness." The appellant was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released forthwith, unless his custody was required in any other matter.

Date of Decision: 17 September 2026