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by sayum
20 June 2026 6:57 AM
"It is a settled principle of law that the initial burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff to establish its claim by adducing acceptable oral and documentary evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed merely on the weakness of the defence or on the failure of the defendant to produce certain records," Madras High Court, in a judgment, held that a plaintiff seeking recovery in a commercial dispute must independently discharge the initial burden of proof and cannot rely on the defendant's failure to produce evidence.
A bench of Dr. Justice A.D. Maria Clete, while modifying a trial court decree, observed that shifting the burden of proof to the defendant without the plaintiff first establishing foundational facts is legally unsustainable. The court emphasized that in matters involving technical or pharmaceutical issues, assumptions and surmises cannot substitute for expert evidence.
The dispute arose from multiple agreements between Troikaa Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (Plaintiff) and the Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation (Defendant) for the supply of drugs between 1994 and 1998. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a refund of security deposits, payment for supplied medicines, and reprocessing charges for returned injections, alleging that the defendant had wrongfully withheld payments and arbitrarily returned stocks. The trial court had partially decreed the suit for Rs. 11,80,330/-, leading both parties to prefer cross-appeals before the High Court.
The primary questions before the court were whether the suit was hit by misjoinder of causes of action under the Code of Civil Procedure and whether the claims were barred by limitation. The court was also called upon to determine the validity of claims regarding reprocessing charges and whether the award of 12% interest on a commercial transaction was legally sustainable.
Court Explains Permissibility Of Joinder Of Causes Of Action Under Order II Rule 3 CPC
The defendant had contended that the suit was bad for misjoinder as each tender agreement constituted a separate contract. However, the High Court noted that the mere existence of separate agreements does not automatically bar the joinder of causes of action when the parties remain the same.
The bench observed that the transactions arose out of a continuous course of yearly tender arrangements and the defense raised was substantially common across all claims. The court held that under Order II Rule 3 of the CPC, such joinder is permissible to ensure that disputes between the same parties are conveniently tried together without causing prejudice.
Right To Refund Of Security Deposit Arises Only Upon Expiry Of Tender Period
Regarding the plea of limitation, the court noted that the right to seek a refund of the Earnest Money Deposit and Security Deposit arises only after the expiry of the contractual period. Since the tender period ended in 1998 and the suit was filed in 1999, the claim was well within the prescribed three-year period.
The court further clarified that for claims regarding returned medicines, the cause of action arises only on the date the goods are actually returned. Consequently, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the claims were time-barred.
Defendant Must Prove Discharge Of Liability Once Supply Of Goods Is Established
The High Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant was liable to pay for the medicines supplied. It noted that the plaintiff had established the supply through invoices and statements of accounts, while the defendant had offered only a "bald denial."
The bench held that once the supply of medicines is established by the plaintiff, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that payment had already been made or that the liability had otherwise been discharged. Since the defendant failed to provide any evidence of payment, it was held liable for the outstanding amounts.
Court Sets Aside Decree For Reprocessing Charges Citing Erroneous Shifting Of Burden Of Proof
A significant portion of the judgment addressed the trial court's grant of Rs. 1,65,852/- towards reprocessing charges for Dopamine injections. The plaintiff claimed these were returned as "overstock," while the defendant alleged they were "defective."
The High Court found that the plaintiff had produced no documentary evidence or expert testimony to prove that the medicines were returned solely due to excess ordering. The bench remarked that the trial court's inference—that the medicines could not have been defective if they were later reprocessed—was based on mere conjectures and surmises.
"The Appellate Court is of the considered view that the finding of the trial Court granting a sum of Rs.1,65,852/- towards reprocessing charges suffers from lack of evidence and erroneous shifting of the burden of proof upon the defendant."
Absence Of Contractual Clause Bars Claim For Interest On Delayed Payments
The court examined the plaintiff's claim for interest on delayed payments and the refund of liquidated damages. It noted that the plaintiff’s own witness had admitted during cross-examination that the tender agreements contained no stipulation for the payment of interest.
The bench held that in the absence of a specific contractual provision entitling the plaintiff to such interest, the claim could not be sustained. Similarly, as the contract authorized the defendant to deduct liquidated damages for delays in supply—which the plaintiff admitted had occurred—the court refused to order a refund of those deductions.
12% Interest Valid For Commercial Transactions Under Section 34 CPC
The defendant challenged the trial court’s award of 12% interest as excessive. The High Court, however, upheld the rate, noting that the transaction was clearly commercial in nature, thereby attracting the proviso to Section 34 of the CPC.
The court observed that in commercial matters, courts frequently uphold interest rates between 9% and 12%, especially when funds have been withheld for long periods. It further noted that the awarded rate was moderate compared to the statutory interest contemplated under the MSMED Act for delayed payments to small-scale industries.
The High Court modified the trial court's decree by setting aside the amount awarded for reprocessing charges while confirming the rest of the findings. The final decretal amount was reduced to Rs. 10,14,478/-. The court concluded that while the plaintiff was entitled to the value of goods and deposits, it failed to meet the evidentiary standard required for consequential damages like reprocessing costs.
Date of Decision: 11 June 2026