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by sayum
26 August 2026 6:42 AM
“Training does not form part of selection; classification based on administrative phases violates Article 14”, In latest judgement High Court of Judicature at Allahabad delivered a critical judgment in The State of U.P. and 3 Others v. Vinay and 3 Others, reaffirming the principle that uniform selection demands uniform benefits. The Division Bench comprising Justice Saumitra Dayal Singh and Justice Swarupama Chaturvedi dismissed a batch of Special Appeals filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, upholding the judgment of the single-judge that had directed pay protection and consequential benefits to ex-servicemen constables selected under the 2018 U.P. Police recruitment.
The Court held that once a candidate is selected through a common recruitment process, differential treatment in terms of pay or benefits on the basis of phased training is constitutionally impermissible and violative of Article 14. The judgment is significant for service law jurisprudence, particularly in matters of ex-servicemen re-employment and administrative classification post-selection.
Training Delays Due to COVID Not Justification for “Hostile Discrimination”, Rules Court
The dispute arose from the direct recruitment process conducted in 2018 by the Uttar Pradesh Police, wherein a large number of ex-servicemen, including the respondents, were selected for constable positions. Due to Covid-19 restrictions and infrastructural constraints, the selected candidates were sent for training in four staggered batches starting from August 2020 to May 2022.
The first batch of selected ex-servicemen trainees, trained in August 2020, were extended the benefit of pay protection, recognizing their prior military service. However, subsequent batches were denied the same benefit, with the State contending that separate batches constituted distinct appointments, and therefore, different entitlements could apply.
Rejecting this argument, the Court categorically held: "We are of the considered view that the training to be conducted in phases was necessitated solely by the infrastructural limitations faced by the appellant State and exigencies arising from the Covid-19 pandemic and not due to any intelligible differentia amongst the candidates in the select list."
The Bench made it clear that external administrative delays cannot form the basis for classification within a homogeneous group that underwent the same selection process.
Select List Cannot Be Fragmented By State’s Administrative Convenience
In a firm rejection of the State’s submission that phased training created distinct categories, the Court emphasized that training under Rule 19 of the 2015 Service Rules is a post-appointment process, not a continuation of selection. Citing Rule 18, the Bench noted that appointment letters are issued before training is conducted, and therefore, all candidates once selected are formally appointed, regardless of when their training starts.
The Court noted: “The scheme of the Rules clearly demonstrates that the appointment letter precedes the training, and therefore, the training cannot be treated as a part of the selection process.”
This interpretation directly demolished the State’s argument that training completion dates could justify withholding benefits.
The Court also stressed that no statutory rule authorized the State to fragment the select list and deprive some candidates of pay protection. It reiterated the established position of law laid down in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Assn. v. State of Maharashtra (1990) 2 SCC 715, stating:
“Candidates forming part of the same recruitment notification and selection process constitute a single class for the purpose of service benefits.”
The Bench further underscored that such arbitrary distinctions lack any rational nexus with the object of recruitment and fall foul of Article 14:
“Administrative exigency, even when bona fide, cannot be elevated to a constitutionally permissible differentia under Article 14... such classification results in impermissible discrimination.”
No Justification for Arbitrary Discrimination Among Equals
Dismissing the State’s reliance on Rule 19 and the Government Order dated 23.12.2020 (which denied pay protection to post-2020 appointees), the High Court reinforced that administrative circulars cannot override constitutional guarantees. It pointedly remarked that the first batch’s benefit of pay protection could not be denied to the later batches merely because their training started later due to State limitations.
Referring to the landmark precedent of Anwar Ali Sarkar, the Court quoted:
“Classification must rest upon an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.”
Since all respondents were part of the same 2018 selection, the Court found no justifiable basis to distinguish between them in service benefits.
The Bench thus concluded: “The benefit of pay protection and the corresponding pay structure, extended by the State to the first batch, cannot be withheld from candidates of the second, third, and fourth batches who were part of the same recruitment process and placed in the same selection list.”
The High Court’s judgment delivers a resounding message: Equality under law cannot be compromised by administrative convenience or unforeseen exigencies like pandemics. The judgment upholds the rights of ex-servicemen and reinforces the principle that once selected through a uniform process, all candidates are entitled to uniform benefits.
By affirming the learned single-judge’s directive to extend pay protection and consequential benefits to all affected candidates, the Court has ensured that the State does not arbitrarily divide equals into unequals under the guise of administrative phases.
The State is directed to ensure compliance within 12 weeks, thereby restoring parity and dignity to those who served in the Armed Forces and sought to continue their service in police uniform.
Date of Decision: 15 December 2025
