No Proof of Age, No POCSO Offence: Madras High Court Acquits Accused, Warns Against Weaponisation of Special Law

“When the age of the victim is not proved through school certificate, birth certificate, or ossification test as mandated under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, conviction under the POCSO Act is legally unsustainable.” – Madras High Court

In a landmark judgment exposing the vulnerabilities of the criminal justice system to misuse of special laws, the Madras High Court set aside the conviction of a man accused of sexual assault under the POCSO Act, ruling that the prosecution failed to establish the most foundational requirement — the age of the alleged victim.

Justice G. Arul Murugan, while allowing the criminal appeal filed by the accused D. Bakkiyaraj, held that no conviction can be sustained under the POCSO Act without strict compliance with Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which outlines the mandatory steps for age determination.

The Court firmly stated:

“When none of the documents as prescribed under Section 94 of the JJ Act were produced to prove the age of the victim, the conviction under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act cannot be sustained.”

“Special Laws Cannot Be a Tool to Settle Personal Scores”: Court Finds POCSO Case Was Filed to Counter Accused’s Genuine Complaint

“Courts must be vigilant to ensure that provisions of special laws like the POCSO Act are not misused to neutralise genuine complaints or as instruments of retaliation.”

The prosecution had alleged that the accused trespassed into the victim’s house and attempted to sexually assault her. However, during trial, the victim herself (PW1) deposed that the incident occurred during a public altercation over money, in which the accused was also grievously injured by her brother.

The defence highlighted that the accused had lodged a police complaint on the same day against the victim’s relatives — a complaint that was later closed after the POCSO case was filed, suggesting a clear motive of retaliation.

Justice G. Arul Murugan noted:

“Only due to the grievous injuries sustained by the accused, PW1’s mother, brother and uncle, as an afterthought, lodged this complaint through PW1 by invoking the offences under the POCSO Act, probably to shield themselves.”

The Court added:

“The POCSO Act is a shield for protection, not a sword for vengeance. When false complaints are filed under the guise of protecting children, they undermine the credibility of real victims and the purpose of the statute itself.”

Introduction: Conviction Without Victim’s Age Verification Quashed

The High Court was hearing an appeal filed under Section 374(2) CrPC against the conviction and sentence imposed by the Principal Special Judge (POCSO Court), Salem, wherein the appellant was sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment under Sections 8 and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, along with concurrent imprisonment under Sections 448 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code.

The key issue before the Court was the failure of the prosecution to establish the age of the victim, a non-negotiable condition for invoking the provisions of the POCSO Act.

Court Applies Supreme Court’s Ruling in P. Yuvaprakas v. State: Age Must Be Proved Through Statutorily Recognised Documents

Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in P. Yuvaprakas v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846, the Madras High Court reiterated:

“Wherever a dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts must take recourse to Section 94 of the JJ Act. Only school certificates, municipal birth records, or ossification tests ordered by a competent authority can be relied upon.”

In this case, no school certificate, no birth certificate, and no ossification test had been submitted in court. Even the victim’s mother (PW2) turned hostile and did not testify to the age of the child.

The Court therefore concluded:

“In the absence of such evidence, the essential condition of minority is not proved. Without this, the charges under POCSO collapse.”

Victim’s Testimony Contradicted FIR—Neighbours and Mother Turned Hostile

Another striking observation made by the Court was that the prosecution’s story fell apart under cross-examination. The victim herself disowned the version in the FIR, testifying that the accused had punched her during a quarrel over money, not a sexual assault. She also admitted that the incident happened in the open, and not inside her house, thereby demolishing the trespass charge under Section 448 IPC.

Justice Arul Murugan held:

“When PW1 disowns the version in the FIR and contradicts herself on material particulars, and when all corroborating witnesses turn hostile, the very substratum of the prosecution case collapses.”

The Court also noted serious discrepancies in the evidence of the investigating officers (PW9 and PW10) on how the complaint was received and how the FIR was registered.

Injury Under Section 323 IPC Not Attributable to Accused—Court Refuses to Convict on Suspicion

Though the trial court had also convicted the appellant under Section 323 IPC, the High Court held that there was no clear, consistent or credible evidence to prove that the minor injury to the victim’s mouth was caused by the accused. Meanwhile, the accused had himself suffered serious head injuries in the same quarrel and was admitted in the hospital.

Rejecting the conviction under Section 323 IPC, the Court stated:

“It is not believable that the accused could have caused the simple injury to PW1 by punching her in the presence of her brother, mother, uncle and several others, when he himself was grievously injured during the quarrel.”

Appeal Allowed, Conviction Set Aside, Accused Acquitted

In allowing the appeal, the High Court ordered that the conviction and sentence passed in Spl. S.C. No. 2 of 2019 be set aside in entirety, holding that the prosecution failed to meet the basic evidentiary standards required under both general criminal law and the POCSO Act.

The Court concluded:

“The appellant is acquitted of all the charges. Fine amount, if any paid by the appellant, shall be refunded. Bail bond executed, if any, shall stand cancelled.”

Date of Decision: 14 October 2025