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Life Sentence Is Not A Time-Bound Punishment — It Means Incarceration For The Whole Of Natural Life: Andhra Pradesh High Court

24 June 2025 12:52 PM

By: sayum


Remission Under Prison Rules Does Not Create a Vested Right, Nor Does It Diminish the Rigour of a Judicially Imposed Life Sentence - In a landmark pronouncement Andhra Pradesh High Court rejected a plea seeking release of a convict who had served over 25 years in prison after his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The Division Bench of Justices R. Raghunandan Rao and Maheswara Rao Kuncheam reaffirmed that a sentence of life imprisonment, especially following commutation from death, signifies incarceration till the end of the convict’s natural life, and not just 14 or 20 years as commonly misconceived.

The Court declared unequivocally: “A sentence of imprisonment for life, would ordinarily mean incarceration of the prisoner for the rest of his natural life.

This judgment has far-reaching implications on how life imprisonment, remission, and parole are perceived and administered in India, particularly in cases involving heinous crimes.

The writ petitioner S. Swapna, daughter of S. Chalapathi Rao, approached the High Court contending that her father, convicted in a 1993 bus burning incident that killed 23 innocent passengers including a minor, had undergone over 25 years of imprisonment and was therefore entitled to release either through remission or parole. Initially sentenced to death in 1995, the convict's sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment by the President under Article 72 of the Constitution.

The petitioner pleaded that Rule 320(A) of the A.P. Prison Rules, 1979, made him eligible for release upon completion of 20 years. She cited her father’s good conduct and claimed that denial of his release was arbitrary and unlawful.

Legal Issues and Observations by the Court: The principal issue before the Court was whether the life sentence imposed on the convict could be construed to mean a fixed term—20 or 25 years—and whether remission under prison rules created an enforceable right.

Referring to a catena of precedents including Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, the Court clarified: “Section 57 IPC is only for the purpose of calculation of fractions of terms of punishment and does not limit a life sentence to 20 years.”

The Court emphasized: “Neither Rule 320(A) nor any other provision of the A.P. Prison Rules automatically entitles a life convict to release upon completion of 20 years of incarceration.”

The Bench distinguished between admissibility and entitlement, holding that: “Remission under the prison rules is merely a consideration, not a compulsion. There is no vested or indefeasible right to be released after 14 or 20 years unless a formal remission is granted under Section 432 CrPC.”

On the question of parole, the Court observed that the denial was based on valid administrative concerns including threat perception and lack of escort.

“Unless mala fides or manifest arbitrariness is shown, the Court cannot substitute its own view for that of the parole authorities.”

The Government Order G.O.Ms.No.8 (Home) dated 25.01.2018, which excludes convicts involved in offences against children and those whose death sentences have been commuted, was also held to apply: “The GO itself excludes persons in the category of the petitioner’s father, and thus, no rights flow from that executive order.”

The High Court reviewed the effect of death sentence commutation and held that it carries a clear judicial implication that the convict must serve the entire duration of his natural life in custody, unless a specific and lawful remission order is passed. The Court cited the recent 7-Judge Bench judgment in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, which reaffirmed the distinction between remission as an executive discretion and a judicially imposed sentence.

The Bench strongly rebuked the argument that a convict sentenced to life following a commuted death sentence was entitled to automatic release. The Court stated: “There is no provision of law whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without any formal remission by the appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one for a definite period.”

On the larger question of when High Courts can interfere with such decisions, the Bench stressed: “The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not ousted by Section 432 or 433A CrPC, but should be exercised only in rare and exceptional cases of manifest illegality or injustice.”

The Andhra Pradesh High Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition, holding that a life sentence means incarceration till death, and neither remission under Rule 320(A) of the A.P. Prison Rules nor executive orders for special occasion releases (like Republic Day) could override a judicially imposed or commuted sentence, especially in cases involving heinous crimes.

“Remission is a privilege, not a right, and must be earned under the law—not assumed after a passage of years.”

This decision is a resounding affirmation of the principle that heinous crimes leading to life sentences, particularly when commuted from capital punishment, require that such convicts remain incarcerated for life unless due legal processes dictate otherwise.

Date of Decision: April 9, 2025

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