Licensee Has No Right After License Is Revoked; Mere Existence in HUF Does Not Vest Ownership: Delhi High Court

“It is settled law that a licensee is estopped from questioning the title of the owner.” - In a detailed and decisive ruling delivered on January 12, 2026, Justice Mini Pushkarna of the Delhi High Court dismissed two connected Regular First Appeals filed by the legal representatives of late Kalyan Dass, challenging the decree passed by the Trial Court in favor of Praveen Chawla, who had sued for possession, mesne profits, and permanent injunction in respect of property No. B-25A, Vijay Nagar, Delhi.

At the heart of the case was the legal character of the appellant's possession—whether he was in occupation as a co-owner of Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) property, or merely a licensee under an agreement executed in 1996. The High Court held that the appellant’s possession was by virtue of a revocable license, not as an owner, and his claim of HUF ownership was unsubstantiated by law or evidence.

“A Will does not come into effect during the lifetime of the testator; the licensee cannot claim rights after revocation.”

The Court began by observing that the respondent, Praveen Chawla, had “proved absolute ownership” of the suit property through a chain of valid title documents, including a Perpetual Lease Deed (1971) and a Conveyance Deed (1999), both registered, uncontested and standing in his name. Crucially, the Court held that the initial allotment card of 1950 only conferred tenancy rights and not ownership, and it was only after full compliance and payment to the government that proprietary rights were created.

Rejecting the appellant’s case that the property was HUF property allocated during partition-era migration, the Court said: “The burden lies upon the person who alleges the existence of the Hindu Undivided Family to prove the same.” Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam (2020) 6 SCC 387, the Court reiterated that the existence of a joint family does not by itself raise a presumption of joint family property unless a nucleus is proved, which the appellant failed to do.

Oral Partition Claim Dismissed as “Bald Averment”: No Documentary Evidence, No Nucleus

The appellant had claimed that there had been an oral partition, supported by an agreement and will allegedly executed in 1996 by the respondent in his favour. However, the Court found this contention fundamentally flawed. The Agreement of 24.09.1996, while allowing the appellant to reside in the front portion of the property, explicitly recognised the respondent as the sole owner and stated that the legal heirs of the appellant would have no rights in the property post his demise.

The Court held: “The Agreement dated 24th September 1996 was a bare license under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, and it was revocable.”

The Will of the same date—also executed by the respondent—was similarly dismissed as conferring no legal rights, since (a) a Will only takes effect upon the death of the testator, and (b) the beneficiary (appellant) had predeceased the respondent, and (c) the Will was revoked in 2009.

The Court held that admission of the Will by the appellant and his son amounted to an admission of respondent’s ownership: “It is res integra that a will would be executed only by the owner of a property.”

“License Once Revoked, Possession Becomes Unauthorised”: Delhi HC Applies Classic Law on Licenses

On the status of the 1996 Agreement, the Court undertook a detailed analysis of the jurisprudence under the Indian Easements Act and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pradeep Oil Corporation v. MCD (2011) 5 SCC 270 and Yazdani International v. Auroglobal (2014) 2 SCC 657.

It held that the agreement did not create any interest in the property: “A license does not transfer any interest in the property and the grantor of the license can revoke the same at his will.” The Court rejected the appellant’s claim that the license was irrevocable due to long-standing possession or the absence of a revocation clause.

Even the so-called evidence of occupation—ration card, water bill, MCD license, house tax receipts—were dismissed as inadequate to establish any title. “Mere possession or even municipal recognition cannot override registered title documents or convert a license into ownership,” the Court said.

Interested Witnesses Discarded: Relationship With Respondent Admittedly Strained

The appellant had relied upon the testimonies of the respondent’s estranged siblings (DW-3 and DW-4) to support the claim of family settlement. The Court discarded these testimonies, finding them contradictory and influenced. It quoted Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam (2023) 19 SCC 672 to reiterate that related or interested witnesses require "heightened scrutiny", especially when they have admitted strained relations.

Moreover, the Court noted that these very witnesses had earlier executed Release Deeds relinquishing their rights in favor of the respondent, and had admitted that the suit property had devolved upon the respondent after the demise of their father and mother.

Limitation Plea Rejected: Cause of Action Arose Only in 2009-10 After Revocation

Rejecting the appellant’s contention that the suit was time-barred under Articles 59 and 65 of the Limitation Act, the Court clarified that the cause of action arose only in 2009, when the Will was cancelled, and in May 2010 when the license was formally revoked by legal notice.

The suit was filed within months thereafter and was clearly within the period of limitation.

Section 29 of Displaced Persons Act Not Applicable: Suit Property Not Evacuee Property

The Court also categorically rejected the invocation of Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, holding that the property was not evacuee property, and that neither the appellant nor his predecessors were tenants or allottees under the Act. The Court cited the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Jagmohan Lal v. Harkishan Lal (1994 SCC OnLine Del 171).

Mesne Profits Beyond ₹5000/Month Denied: No Evidence on Prevailing Market Rent

While the Trial Court had awarded damages at the rate of ₹5000 per month with interest @ 12% per annum from June 1, 2010, till delivery of possession, the respondent sought enhancement on grounds that the appellant had been earning commercial rent from the property located in prime North Delhi.

However, the High Court refused to enhance mesne profits in the absence of any documentary or comparative rent evidence. It relied on Sarvinder Singh v. Vipul Tandon MANU/DE/5067/2025 to reiterate that “mere guesswork cannot substitute for evidence when mesne profits are claimed.” The respondent was granted liberty to initiate separate proceedings for enhanced mesne profits.

The appeals were dismissed in entirety. The High Court affirmed the Trial Court’s finding that the respondent is the absolute and sole owner of the suit property. The appellants (legal heirs of Kalyan Dass) were directed to hand over possession forthwith.

The deposited decretal amount with interest is to be released to the respondent, and pending applications were disposed of.

Date of Decision: January 12, 2026