Landowners Can File Second Section 28-A Application Based On High Court Award Even After Accepting Reference Court Compensation: Supreme Court

"The term ‘Court’ used in Section 28-A would include under its ambit the High Court and this Court as well; any interpretation to the contrary would militate against the very objective of the Act, making Section 28-A of the Act redundant." Supreme Court held that a second application for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is maintainable if it is based on an enhanced award passed by an appellate court, such as a High Court or the Supreme Court.

A bench of Justice M. M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that the doctrine of merger ensures that once an appellate court modifies a compensation award, the original Reference Court award ceases to exist and is subsumed by the superior court's decree. The Court emphasized that the beneficial nature of the Act requires ensuring parity among all similarly placed landowners, regardless of whether they initially sought a judicial reference.

The appellants were landowners whose property in Mavanoor Village was acquired for the Hubballi-Ankola Broad Gauge Line in 2002. While they did not initially seek a reference under Section 18, they filed for re-determination under Section 28-A after the Reference Court enhanced compensation for other owners; later, they filed a second application when the High Court further increased the amount. The Karnataka High Court had rejected this second plea, leading to the present appeal.

The primary questions before the court were whether the expression “Court” under Section 28-A is restricted only to the Reference Court or includes appellate courts, and whether the acceptance of compensation based on a Reference Court’s award bars a subsequent application based on an appellate decree. The court was also called upon to determine the validity of the “one application” rule in the context of successive judicial enhancements at different levels of the hierarchy.

In analyzing the statutory framework, the Supreme Court noted that while Section 3(d) defines ‘Court’ as a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, this definition must be read contextually for the purposes of Section 28-A. The bench reasoned that since Section 54 of the Act treats appeals to the High Court and Supreme Court as continuations of the proceedings "before the Court," these appellate forums naturally fall within the ambit of Section 28-A. The Court held that a restrictive interpretation would frustrate the legislature's intent to provide equal compensation to inarticulate and poor landowners who may not have the resources to litigate through multiple levels. "If the object of the Act is to ensure equality between similarly placed landowners, redetermination cannot be done partially qua an award of the Reference Court alone as against that of the High Court or this Court."

The bench placed significant reliance on the doctrine of merger to resolve the issue of successive applications. It observed that in the Indian judicial hierarchy, once an appellate forum renders a decision, the decree of the lower court merges into the superior decree, leaving only one operative order in existence. Therefore, any re-determination of market value must eventually align with the final judicial pronouncement on the matter to avoid incongruity. The Court clarified that the rule established in Pradeep Kumari (1995), which limited landowners to "one application," was intended to prevent multiple applications based on different awards from the same Reference Court, not to bar an application following an appellate enhancement. "Neither the law nor the Act recognizes the existence of two awards emanating from the same proceedings, simultaneously."

The Court also addressed a conflict in judicial precedents, specifically the 2018 ruling in Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, which had held that Section 28-A is restricted to Reference Court awards. The bench declared Ramsingbhai to be per incuriam, noting that it failed to consider the binding three-judge bench decision in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari and overlooked the doctrine of merger. The Supreme Court reiterated that beneficial legislation must be interpreted liberally to extend benefits rather than curtail them, especially for those landowners who are often disadvantaged by procedural technicalities. "The aforesaid decision [Ramsingbhai], not having considered the aforesaid material aspects, cannot be termed as a binding precedent."

Furthermore, the Court criticized the conduct of the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) in this case for deciding the appellants' first application while knowing that appeals for further enhancement were still pending before the High Court. Citing Babua Ram (1995), the bench noted that the Collector should ideally stay proceedings on Section 28-A applications until the final outcome of appellate litigation to ensure that the eventual re-determination is based on the final market value. The Court held that the fact that landowners had already received money based on the Reference Court’s award does not act as an estoppel or waiver against their right to seek parity with the final appellate award. "The benefit of an enhanced compensation received by a landowner, consequent to the final award passed by the appellate forum, would also extend to similarly placed landowners who seek redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act."

In its conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the Karnataka High Court's judgment and quashed the Collector's order of rejection. The Court directed the respondents to re-determine the compensation for the appellants based on the High Court’s 2013 award within eight weeks. By allowing the appeals, the Court reaffirmed that the core objective of Section 28-A is to eliminate discrimination in compensation between affluent litigants and those who rely on the statutory mechanism for parity.

Date of Decision: 25 March 2026