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by sayum
02 March 2026 2:32 PM
“Statutory Deeming Settlement Cannot Be Defeated by Subsequent Purchase”, In a significant ruling on land regularisation and statutory protection for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe occupants, the Supreme Court affirming the Allahabad High Court’s judgment dated 07.09.2007.
The Bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice R. Mahadevan held that Section 123(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 creates a “legal fiction” coupled with a non-obstante clause, which deems land to be settled with eligible SC/ST house owners who were in possession before the statutory cut-off date of 30.06.1985. The Court ruled that such statutory settlement cannot be defeated by a purchaser relying on title or a declaration under Section 143 converting the land to non-agricultural use.
The Civil Appeal and the Special Leave Petitions were accordingly dismissed.
Purchase vs. Possession of Agricultural Labourers
The dispute concerned Plot No. 2362, measuring 1 bigha 14 biswas in Shamli, District Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh.
The land was originally held by Khazan Singh, who had successfully resisted eviction proceedings in the 1960s and 1970s and was recognised as tenure holder. Around 1976–1977, members of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community occupied the land and constructed houses.
After Khazan Singh’s death, his grandsons sold the land to the appellants by registered sale deed dated 10.08.1984. Shortly thereafter, on 11.10.1984, the appellants obtained a declaration under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, converting the land from agricultural to residential/abadi use.
In 1988, proceedings were initiated under Section 123 of the Act for regularisation of the SC/ST occupants’ possession. On 20.06.1989, the Sub-Divisional Officer directed that the names of the occupants be recorded in the revenue records, based on a Tehsildar’s report confirming that houses existed on the land prior to 30.06.1985.
The appellants challenged this action before the High Court, but the writ petition was dismissed. The matter reached the Supreme Court.
“Declaration Under Section 143 Does Not Exclude Section 123”: Limited Effect of Conversion
The appellants argued that once a declaration under Section 143 was obtained, the provisions of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act ceased to apply and revenue authorities lost jurisdiction.
Rejecting this contention, the High Court had held, and the Supreme Court agreed, that a declaration under Section 143 excludes only Chapter VIII of the Act and shifts matters of succession to personal law. It does not exclude Chapter VII, which contains Section 123, nor does it remove the land from the definition of “land” under Section 3(14).
The private respondents were not even parties to the Section 143 proceedings, rendering the declaration non-binding upon them.
The Supreme Court observed that the decisions relied upon by the appellants were “nowhere near the point of fact or point in law under consideration.”
“Nature of Possession Is Immaterial”: Deeming Provision Protects Even Trespassers If Eligible
The crucial finding related to possession. The Tehsildar’s report confirmed that Respondent Nos. 3 to 45 had constructed houses prior to 30.06.1985. Significantly, the appellants themselves admitted in their writ petition and civil suits that the respondents had been in “forceful possession” since 1976–1977.
The High Court had held that for purposes of Section 123(2):
“If eligible persons built a house on any land held by a tenure holder except a Government lessee before 30.06.1985, the land is deemed to be settled with the house owner.”
The Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning that to effectuate the socio-economic object of the statute, it was “entirely immaterial whether the houses were built with the tenure holder’s consent, forcefully, or as trespassers.”
The High Court had observed:
“If the Legislature intended to exclude unauthorised occupants, it would have explicitly stated so.”
The Supreme Court agreed that the statutory fiction operated automatically from the cut-off date and could not be defeated by subsequent technical objections.
“Purchase Is Subject to Statutory Rights of Occupants”
The appellants had purchased the land in August 1984, when the occupants were already in possession and had altered the nature of the land.
The Supreme Court emphasised:
“What is materially important in the circumstances of this case is that the purchase by the Appellant(s) is subject to the statutory remedy available to the occupants.”
The Court held that the purchaser cannot set up title to defeat a statutory settlement operating in favour of eligible occupants under Section 123.
“The purchase cannot be set up to defeat the occupants’ claim or right under Section 123 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act.”
Thus, the relief of eviction could not be granted.
“Continuation of Suits Would Be Abuse of Process”: Article 227 Power Upheld
After recognising that the respondents became statutory owners by virtue of the deeming provision from 30.06.1985, the High Court had exercised suo motu jurisdiction under Article 227 to quash pending civil suits for eviction.
The Supreme Court found no fault with this course, observing that allowing such suits to continue after statutory settlement would amount to an abuse of process.
Limited Scope Under Article 136: No Interference Warranted
The Supreme Court noted that the controversy lay “in a narrow sphere” and that much deliberation was unnecessary given the factual matrix.
The Court held that the concurrent findings regarding possession, eligibility and statutory operation of Section 123 did not warrant interference under Article 136.
“For the above additional reasons, we agree with the High Court’s decision and dismiss the Civil Appeal accordingly.”
Consequently, the Special Leave Petitions were also dismissed, the Court observing that the High Court’s findings went “to the very root of the Petitioner(s) entitlement to seek eviction.”
The ruling reinforces the strength of statutory deeming provisions enacted for socio-economic justice. It clarifies that a declaration under Section 143 does not override or nullify the operation of Section 123. Most importantly, it affirms that a purchaser takes property subject to statutory protections operating in favour of eligible SC/ST occupants.
The judgment stands as a clear pronouncement that legal fictions created to achieve social reform cannot be neutralised by private transactions or technical jurisdictional objections.
Date of Decision: 25 February 2026