-
by sayum
14 September 2026 6:04 AM
"The assurance fixes the outer limit of imprisonment and it does not permit periods of custody to be counted twice or otherwise contrary to the manner directed by this Court." Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated 10 September 2026, held that a sovereign assurance provided by the Executive during extradition proceedings cannot be construed as an instrument to bypass established judicial sentencing or to grant an "artificial or accelerated" computation of incarceration.
A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed that while the Government of India is bound by its solemn commitment to foreign nations regarding the outer limit of imprisonment, such a commitment does not alter the nature of a life sentence or grant a prisoner the right to claim a double benefit through overlapping jail terms.
Distinction between Executive assurance and Judicial sentence
The court underscored that the sovereign assurance extended to the Government of Portugal was an act of the Executive, whereas the life sentence imposed by the TADA Court remained a valid exercise of judicial power. The judiciary’s role is to determine the punishment commensurate with the offence, while the Executive’s role in remission or commutation is limited to the powers conferred by law. The bench clarified that the 25-year outer limit established in prior proceedings was merely a consequence of the sovereign assurance and did not convert a life sentence into a fixed-term sentence.
Overlapping periods of incarceration cannot be counted twice
The court rejected the appellant's attempt to use concurrent sentences to secure a "double benefit" by treating the same period of custody as both undertrial time for one case and post-conviction time for another. Emphasizing that concurrent sentences operate simultaneously, the bench held that the same period of incarceration cannot be notionally counted twice for the purpose of determining the completion of a sentence. The methodology adopted by the appellant, which artificially enlarged the period of custody, was found to be devoid of any legal foundation.
No right to jail-earned remission for life convicts
The bench further dismissed the claim that jail-earned remission could be notionally added to the period of incarceration to advance the date of release. The court observed that because the sentence imposed upon the appellant continues to be one of life imprisonment and not a fixed-term sentence, the benefit of remission is not applicable in the manner claimed. The court reiterated that the 25-year stipulation operates solely by virtue of the sovereign assurance and does not allow for a further reduction of time through jail-earned remissions.
"The law of precedent operates upon the ratio decidendi of a decision read in the context of its material facts and the legal issue arising therein. A precedent cannot be applied divorced from the factual and statutory setting in which it was rendered."
Precedents must be read in context
The court found the reliance placed by the appellant on various judicial decisions regarding remission to be misplaced, noting that those cases lacked the unique factual matrix of an extradition governed by a sovereign assurance. The bench clarified that the principles governing the computation of remission in standard criminal cases cannot be mechanically applied where the detention is subject to a specific international commitment. The judgment emphasized that a precedent is only applicable when the factual and statutory setting matches the case at hand.
Dismissal of the appeal
Finding no infirmity in the judgment of the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of the petition seeking habeas corpus and mandamus. The bench concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that his detention was illegal or that he had completed the 25-year period in accordance with the law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in limine, affirming that the sovereign assurance cannot be used to circumvent the judicial process or to claim benefits not explicitly contemplated by the court's earlier directions.
Date of Decision: 10 September 2026