Execution Need Not Wait for Decree-Holder’s Signature—Power of Attorney Holder with Knowledge Can Move Execution: Allahabad High Court

“Rule 11(2) of Order XXI CPC makes it amply clear that a person other than the decree-holder, if proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, can validly sign and verify the execution application.” – Allahabad High Court

In a strongly worded and technically detailed ruling, the Allahabad High Court on 17 October 2025 clarified that execution proceedings do not hinge upon the personal signature of the decree-holder if another competent person, such as a power of attorney holder well-versed in the case, signs the application. Dismissing a petition filed by judgment-debtors seeking to invalidate a decades-old execution on hyper-technical grounds, Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal ruled that the procedural rules under Order XXI Rule 11(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure are not to be interpreted in a manner that “paralyzes execution” of a validly decreed claim.

The judgment came in Smt. Santosh Jain & Ors. v. Kewal Kishore & Anr., where the petitioners challenged the maintainability of Execution Case No. 27 of 2002 on the ground that the decree-holder had not personally signed the application, and that it was instead signed by his father and power of attorney holder, Gurudas Mal. The petitioners contended that the POA was limited to the trial and did not authorize conduct of execution. The Court found this argument to be meritless, describing it as “frivolous”, “highly technical”, and part of a deliberate attempt to stall execution proceedings that had already survived scrutiny up to the Supreme Court.

The Court observed, “Rule 11(2) CPC nowhere mandates that the execution application must be signed by the decree-holder personally. It rather allows the application to be signed by ‘some other person’ who is proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.”

“Execution Petition Is Not a Pleading—Verification Requirements Cannot Be Equated With Order VI Rule 15”: Court Clarifies Procedural Distinction

Rejecting the petitioners’ comparison between pleadings and execution applications, the Court sharply distinguished the nature of verification under Order XXI Rule 11(2) from that under Order VI Rule 15 CPC, which governs plaints and written statements. It held that execution applications are designed to be functional, tabular, and administrative, and are not required to follow the same formal verification structure as pleadings.

Quoting with approval from the Delhi High Court’s decision in International Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd. v. MCD, the Allahabad High Court reiterated, “It is the satisfaction of the Court which is material for the purpose of accepting or rejecting verification… execution petitions cannot be placed on the same pedestal as pleadings.”

In the present case, the Court found that Gurudas Mal, the POA holder and father of the decree-holder, had been actively participating in the litigation since 1981, and was therefore “well acquainted with the facts” of the case. He satisfied the legal requirement of Rule 11(2), and his signing the execution application was entirely valid.

The petitioners’ argument that the POA was not explicitly extended to cover execution was also dismissed. The Court found that since the POA holder had represented the decree-holder throughout the original suit, appeals, and revisions—right up to the Supreme Court—his continued representation in execution could not be viewed as unauthorized.

“Frivolous and Technical Objections Aimed at Defeating Execution Must Be Curtailed”: High Court Invokes Rahul S. Shah and Periyammal to Restore Sanctity of Decrees

In a compelling conclusion, the High Court invoked recent landmark decisions of the Supreme Court, including Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and Periyammal v. Rajamani, to reiterate the mandate that execution proceedings must not be allowed to drag indefinitely due to procedural sabotage.

The Court stated, “Execution of a decree is not a mere formality—it is the realization of rights lawfully determined. A decree-holder should not be punished with decades of delay because of obstructive tactics cloaked as legal objections.”

Noting that the decree in question was passed in 1993, upheld in revision in 1994, and finally affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2000, the Court was deeply critical of the fact that execution had still not concluded even in 2025.

Citing para 42.12 of Rahul S. Shah, the Court recalled that the Supreme Court has mandated execution proceedings be concluded within six months, extendable only with recorded reasons, and warned that any delay beyond that runs counter to the objectives of the civil justice system.

In language that echoed frustration with procedural abuse, the Court observed, “A highly technical objection has been raised by petitioners to delay the execution proceedings which are pending for the last 23 years.”

“No Requirement That Decree-Holder Must Personally Execute the Decree—Rules Must Serve the Ends of Justice, Not Delay It”

The Court firmly rejected the argument that the execution application was defective merely because the decree-holder himself had not signed it.

Referring directly to the statutory language of Rule 11(2), the Court held: “From the reading of Rule 10 and Rule 11(2), it is amply clear that they are complementary and not contradictory. Rule 11(2) permits signing and verification by a person other than the decree-holder, provided the Court is satisfied about their knowledge.”

The Court also noted that all relevant particulars under Rule 11(2)—such as suit number, date of decree, relief granted, costs awarded—had been correctly included in the execution application. There was no procedural infirmity or ground for rejecting it.

In light of this, the Court found no merit in the judgment-debtors’ objection under Section 47 CPC, which had already been rejected multiple times at different levels of the judiciary.

Petition Dismissed, Execution Directed Within Two Months

Ultimately, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition with a strong message that execution proceedings must not become a second round of litigation and should not be derailed by procedural hyper-technicality.

Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal concluded: “Looking to the fact that the decree is of the year 1993 and the matter has already attained finality by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Executing Court is hereby directed to proceed with Execution Case No. 27 of 2002 and decide the same in light of the dictum of Hon’ble Apex Court within a period of two months.”

The ruling thus restores urgency, finality, and procedural integrity to execution proceedings and stands as a stinging rebuke to litigation tactics that seek delay under the guise of compliance with rules.

Date of Decision: 17 October 2025