Excise Constable Convicted for Demanding Rs. 500 Bribe Cannot Escape on 35-Year-Old Technicalities: Supreme Court Upholds Conviction, Modifies Sentence Considering Age

"Act provides an opportunity to the accused to get himself examined in the open court on oath in order to reveal the truth but he has not dared to avail this opportunity", In a significant ruling reinforcing the sanctity of trap evidence and the evidentiary value of corroborated eyewitness testimony in corruption cases, the Supreme Court of India has upheld the conviction of a former Excise Department Constable for demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs. 500/- from a complainant threatened with false implication — while modifying the sentence on humanitarian grounds given the accused's advanced age of approximately 75 years.

A bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale affirmed the concurrent findings of both the Trial Court and the Uttarakhand High Court that held Raj Bahadur Singh, the appellant-accused, guilty under Section 7 and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court, however, exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence to the minimum prescribed — rigorous imprisonment of 6 months under Section 7 and 1 year under Section 13(2) — noting that the appellant had already served approximately 2 months and 24 days behind bars following his surrender in 2012.

Background of the Case

The case traces its origins to June 1990, when Raj Bahadur Singh, then serving as a Constable in the Excise Department in District Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarakhand, allegedly demanded an illegal gratification of Rs. 500/- from Kashmir Singh (PW-1), a liquor trader who had been apprehended and booked on three previous occasions for manufacturing contraband liquor. During a raid on 16.06.1990 on the complainant's village, the appellant allegedly compelled the complainant to sign certain documents and threatened that unless Rs. 500/- was paid, he would be forwarded to court by way of challan. The appellant even claimed to have prepared a "temporary bail" bond that would only be honoured upon payment of the demanded amount.

Refusing to succumb to what he described as persistent threats, the complainant filed a complaint on 18.06.1990 with the Superintendent of Police (Vigilance). A trap was organised at a restaurant in Khatima on 19.06.1990 wherein five currency notes of Rs. 100/- each were treated with Phenolphthalein Powder in the presence of two independent witnesses. When the accused accepted the money, his hands were soaked in Sodium Carbonate solution, which turned pinkish — confirming the presence of the powder on his hands. The accused was taken into judicial custody, and FIR No. 114 of 1990 was registered. A chargesheet was filed under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant in 2006, and the Uttarakhand High Court dismissed his appeal by judgment dated 13.04.2012.

Legal Issues and Court's Observations

The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether the concurrent convictions recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court warranted interference, particularly on the grounds of: alleged contradictions in eyewitness testimonies; alleged interested nature of the shadow witness; failure to produce tainted currency notes before the Court; denial of opportunity to the accused to examine himself as a defence witness; and the alleged motive of personal enmity behind the complaint.

On the Reliability of PW-1 and PW-2

The Court found no merit whatsoever in the challenge to the testimonies of the complainant Kashmir Singh (PW-1) and shadow witness Jeet Singh (PW-2). PW-1 gave a detailed, consistent account of the pre-trap, trap, and post-trap sequence of events — from the raid on his village, the demand for bribe, the filing of the complaint, and the actual acceptance of the tainted notes at the restaurant in Khatima. The Court noted that PW-1 "stood firm to his version" despite cross-examination, and that no contradiction or omission of such materiality was found as to render his testimony doubtful.

The High Court had summarised the prosecution evidence with approval, observing: "PW2 Jeet Singh is an independent witness who has corroborated the entire chain of occurrence in pith and substance leaving minor discrepancies, which are ignorable."

On the Allegation That PW-2 Was an Interested Witness

Addressing the contention that PW-2 was merely an acquaintance of the complainant and therefore an interested witness, the Supreme Court laid down an important evidentiary principle. The Court held that the mere fact of acquaintance between two witnesses cannot lead to the conclusion that one is hostile or interested against the accused. "To brand the witness as an interested witness, the defence is required to bring specific material before the Court showing the hostility of the particular witness," the bench ruled — a formulation of enduring relevance for practitioners handling corruption and trap cases.

On the Defence Witness — The Restaurant Owner

The attempt by the appellant's counsel to rely upon the restaurant owner, produced as a defence witness who denied that any raid had taken place at his premises, was firmly rejected. The High Court's reasoning, which the Supreme Court found entirely justifiable, was that a small restaurant owner running his business in Khatima — the same town as the accused constable — could not be expected to depose the truth against a government servant of the Excise Police with local connections: "A small restaurant owner cannot incur wrath of his native person and that too of a Government servant Constable of Excise Police, who has been linked with other Government servants, just to open door for all the troubles in running his small restaurant."

On the Accused's Failure to Examine Himself as Defence Witness

The appellant's counsel argued that the accused was not afforded an opportunity to examine himself as a defence witness under Section 21 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court found this ground to be without substance, endorsing the High Court's sharp observation that the accused had been given the statutory opportunity under the Act to step into the witness box and rebut the prosecution case on oath — but had declined: "The Act provides an opportunity to the accused to get himself examined in the open court on oath in order to reveal the truth but he has not dared to avail this opportunity." The Court noted that the accused's statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had also been duly recorded.

On Non-Production of Tainted Currency Notes

Perhaps the most legally interesting submission was that the tainted currency notes were never produced before the Court, and that this omission was fatal to the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court was unimpressed — for a pointed procedural reason. The Court noted that this ground was never raised before the Trial Court, never pressed before the High Court, and was not even mentioned in the grounds of the Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court itself. It was raised orally for the first time only during arguments before the bench.

Beyond the procedural bar, the Court found substantive reasons to reject the argument as well. The panchnama duly recorded the handing over of the tainted notes, their acceptance by the accused, and the subsequent turning pink of the accused's hands upon exposure to water — all forming an unbroken evidentiary chain. The Court thus declined to treat the non-production of the notes as fatal to the prosecution case.

On the Plea of Personal Enmity

The argument that the complainant had a personal motive to falsely implicate the accused in order to allow his contraband liquor business to operate without interference was similarly rejected. The Court noted that PW-1 himself had candidly disclosed before the Trial Court that he was engaged in the liquor trade and had been booked on three previous occasions, with cases pending against him. In such circumstances, the Court found it implausible that a person already facing prosecution would fabricate a trap case against a constable out of mere enmity.

On Modification of Sentence

While upholding the conviction in full, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to modify the sentence. The bench took note of three mitigating circumstances: the appellant was approximately 40 years old at the time of the offence in 1990 and is now approximately 75 years of age; the Court had refused him exemption from surrender by order dated 21.08.2012; and the appellant had in fact surrendered on 15.10.2012, remained incarcerated for approximately 2 months and 24 days, and was thereafter granted bail by order of this Court dated 07.01.2013.

Balancing these factors against the gravity of the corruption offence, the Court reduced the sentence to the minimum prescribed under the statute — rigorous imprisonment of 6 months for the offence under Section 7, and rigorous imprisonment of 1 year for the offence under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — without disturbing the fines imposed.

The ruling in Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand reaffirms several foundational principles in corruption trial jurisprudence: that corroborated trap evidence, supported by a consistent complainant and an independent shadow witness, is sufficient to sustain conviction; that the mere acquaintance between witnesses does not render testimony interested or unreliable; that an accused who declines the statutory opportunity to enter the witness box under the PC Act does so at his peril; and that last-minute oral arguments on grounds never raised at any prior stage of litigation will receive short shrift before the Supreme Court. At the same time, the judgment is a reminder that the Court's sentencing discretion remains sensitive to age and time served, even where the conviction itself is unimpeachable.

Date of Decision: March 13, 2026