Child Witness Testimony In Sexual Assault Cases Can Sustain Conviction If It Withstands Cross-Examination: Supreme Court Restores Conviction In Rape Case

"The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence... minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.", Supreme Court, in a significant ruling, held that the testimony of a child witness in sexual assault cases is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it inspires confidence and withstands the rigors of cross-examination.

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that courts must not adopt an approach of "picking holes" in a prosecution case that otherwise remains positive and unequivocal. The Court set aside a Himachal Pradesh High Court judgment that had acquitted a man accused of raping a nine-year-old girl, noting that the High Court erred by demanding "mathematical precision" in the timeline of the offence.

The State of Himachal Pradesh challenged the High Court's reversal of a trial court judgment which had convicted the respondent, Hukum Chand, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 3(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The victim, a nine-year-old girl, was sexually assaulted in a cowshed in 2007 while returning from a neighbor's house with buttermilk. The High Court had acquitted the accused primarily on the grounds of improbable travel time and minor contradictions between the testimonies of the victim’s parents.

The primary questions before the court were whether the testimony of a child witness requires mandatory corroboration and whether minor inconsistencies in the timeline of the incident can override positive ocular evidence. The court was also called upon to determine the extent to which appellate courts should interfere with an acquittal based on a re-appreciation of evidence.

Discussing the principles governing the appreciation of child witness testimony, the Court emphasized that there is no hard and fast rule regarding the competency of a child to testify. The bench noted that competency depends on the Trial Judge being satisfied with the child's ability to distinguish truth from falsehood and understand the questions posed. The Court reiterated that even the non-administration of an oath does not render a child’s testimony unusable if the witness inspires confidence. "Whether or not a given child witness will testify is a matter of the trial Judge being satisfied as to the ability and competence of the said witness."

The Court addressed the High Court’s reliance on "mathematical improbabilities," specifically the finding that it was impossible for the nine-year-old victim to travel 16 kilometers to fetch buttermilk and return home within two hours. Justice Karol, writing the judgment, observed that human perception and memory are naturally imperfect and that trivial variations in timing do not collapse the core of a prosecution’s narrative. The Court held that as long as the factum of the sexual assault remains undisturbed, courts should not attach undue importance to discrepancies that do not affect the backbone of the case. "In proving the occurrence of an offence within a particular time frame, the Court does not look for mathematical precision."

Regarding the necessity of corroboration, the Supreme Court clarified that while seeking corroboration for a child witness is a matter of practical wisdom and prudence, it is not a requirement of law. The bench noted that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a sexual assault case is equivalent to that of an injured witness and can form the sole basis of conviction if it is found to be reliable. In the present case, the Court found that the victim had positively identified the accused and her testimony was further supported by medical evidence. "The conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration."

The bench also expressed deep concern over the public disclosure of the victim's identity in the court records, despite the mandate of Section 228-A of the IPC. The Court observed that the 1983 amendments to the IPC were intended to create a victim-centered orientation to prevent social stigma and ostracism. Noting that the victim’s name was used freely throughout the lower court records, the Supreme Court issued a stern deprecation of this practice. "The name of the victim is treated like that of any other witness and is freely used throughout the record; this must be deprecated in the strongest terms."

In its concluding directions, the Court allowed the State's appeal and set aside the High Court's order of acquittal, thereby restoring the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. The respondent was directed to surrender forthwith to serve the remainder of his ten-year rigorous imprisonment. Furthermore, the Court directed the Registrars General of all High Courts to ensure strict compliance with the proscription in Section 228-A IPC to protect the anonymity of sexual assault survivors in all pending and future litigations.

Date of Decision: 24 March 2026