A Party in Settled Possession Does Not Sue for Possession: Supreme Court Settles Century-Old Amogasidda Temple Pujari Dispute

“This Conduct Speaks Louder Than Any Decree of 1901” –  Supreme Court of India decisively addressing a protracted dispute over hereditary wahiwatdar pujari rights at the Amogasidda Temple in Karnataka.

The Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice K. Vinod Chandran dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s judgment dated 04.10.2012, affirming that the respondents are the hereditary pujaries entitled to perform puja, receive offerings, and conduct the annual jatra.

At the heart of the judgment lies a powerful reaffirmation of two core principles: the limited scope of interference under Article 136 of the Constitution and the legal effect of subsequent conduct overriding reliance on an old decree.

A Temple Dispute Spanning Over a Century

The dispute concerns the Amogasidda Temple, a Samadhi shrine of a saint who passed away nearly 600 years ago, situated at Mamatti Gudda, Jalgeri, Arkeri, Karnataka. Rival families claimed ancestral rights to perform puja and manage religious ceremonies.

The appellants relied heavily on a decree passed in O.S. No. 287/1901, contending that their predecessor had been declared entitled to pujari rights. However, the historical record revealed a crucial development: in 1944, their predecessor filed O.S. No. 88 of 1944 seeking possession of the temple and pujariki rights. That suit was dismissed in 1945. Though liberty to file a fresh suit was obtained in 1946, no fresh proceedings were initiated for 36 years.

In 1982, the present respondents filed O.S. No. 56 of 1982 seeking declaration as ancestral wahiwatdar pujaries with consequential injunction. The Trial Court partly decreed the suit. The First Appellate Court declared the plaintiffs as hereditary pujaries. After a jurisdictional detour involving Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, and a remand by the Supreme Court in 2003, the High Court ultimately dismissed the defendants’ appeals on merits.

The matter then reached the Supreme Court under Article 136.

“A Party in Settled Possession Does Not Sue for Possession”

The Supreme Court found a fundamental contradiction in the appellants’ case. If the 1901 decree had granted them possession and pujari rights, why was a possession suit filed in 1944?

The Court endorsed the reasoning of the courts below, observing:

“A party in settled possession does not sue for possession.”

The very institution of the 1944 suit was treated as a categorical admission that possession was not with the appellants’ predecessor at that time. The Bench emphasized that the written statement was conspicuously silent as to how possession was lost if indeed they had secured it under the 1901 decree.

The Court held that such inconsistency undermined the appellants’ reliance on the century-old decree.

“When Liberty Is Granted But No Suit Is Filed for 36 Years, Conduct Becomes Decisive”

A pivotal aspect of the ruling concerned the withdrawal of the 1944 suit with liberty to file afresh. The Court noted that after obtaining liberty in 1946, no fresh suit was filed for over three and a half decades.

The High Court had drawn an inference that the appellants’ predecessor reconciled to the factual position on the ground. The Supreme Court agreed, observing:

“When a party obtains liberty to file a fresh suit and consciously refrains from doing so for thirty-six years, the inevitable inference is that the said party had reconciled itself to the factual reality on the ground.”

The Bench memorably concluded:

“This conduct speaks louder than any decree of 1901 that the appellants seek to wave before this Court.”

Thus, subsequent conduct was held capable of diluting reliance on an ancient decree.

“Oral Evidence Cannot Be a Substitute for Pleading”

Another decisive factor was the inadequacy of pleadings by the appellants. The Court held that a party claiming hereditary pujari rights must specifically plead material particulars such as when possession commenced, when puja began, when obstruction occurred, and what steps were taken to assert rights.

The appellants’ written statement merely referred to the 1901 decree without foundational details.

The Court categorically observed:

“Oral evidence cannot be a substitute for pleading, and a case not made out in the pleadings cannot be erected on evidence alone.”

This observation reinforces procedural discipline in civil litigation, particularly in disputes concerning religious endowments and hereditary rights.

Revenue Records and Admissions: Documentary Evidence Prevails

The High Court had relied on Record of Rights (RTC) entries reflecting the names of the respondents’ ancestors in respect of lands granted for service to the temple. The appellants’ names were absent.

The Supreme Court held that in long-standing temple service disputes, such revenue entries cannot be lightly brushed aside.

The Court also highlighted a crucial admission by D.W.1 in cross-examination. While initially denying government grants, he admitted that lands related to the very temple in dispute were being cultivated by the respondents. The Court noted that this admission “clinches the matter” regarding the nexus between the land grants and the respondents’ hereditary service.

“Article 136 Must Be Used Sparingly” – No Interference in Concurrent Findings

Reaffirming settled jurisprudence, the Bench stressed that interference under Article 136 is exceptional, especially when concurrent findings of fact exist.

“It is neither novel nor uncertain that this Court… has held that the jurisdiction under Article 136… should be used sparingly.”

Unless findings are “manifestly perverse,” the Supreme Court will not reappreciate evidence. Finding the appreciation of evidence by the First Appellate Court and High Court to be careful and legally sound, the Bench declined to interfere.

Hereditary Pujari Rights Affirmed

The Supreme Court dismissed the Civil Appeals as devoid of merit and upheld the High Court’s decree declaring the respondents as hereditary wahiwatdar pujaries of the Amogasidda Temple. No order as to costs was passed.

The ruling stands as a strong precedent on three central principles: that institution of a possession suit amounts to an admission of lack of possession, that subsequent conduct may override reliance on an old decree, and that concurrent findings of fact will not be disturbed under Article 136 unless manifestly perverse.

Date of Decision: 25 February 2026