Criminal Revision is a supervisory remedy provided under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) that enables higher courts to scrutinize the correctness, legality, or propriety of inferior court decisions. Unlike an appeal – which is a statutory right of the parties – a revision is discretionary and predominantly aimed at preventing miscarriage of justice (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION) (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). The revisional jurisdiction is typically invoked to rectify glaring errors of law or jurisdiction in lower court orders, rather than to conduct a re-hearing on facts. In essence, the High Courts and Sessions Courts act as sentinels of justice through revision, stepping in to correct grave irregularities or illegality in criminal proceedings when no appeal lies or when parties have chosen not to appeal. This blog explores the contours of criminal revision under Indian law, covering its scope, the types of orders revisable, limitations on revisional powers, procedural aspects, and key judicial interpretations that have shaped this jurisdiction.
Legal Framework of Revisional Jurisdiction
Statutory Basis – Section 397 CrPC: Section 397 of the CrPC is the fountainhead of revisional jurisdiction. It empowers the High Court or the Sessions Judge to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before a subordinate criminal court to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, and the regularity of the proceedings (). This provision thus confers wide powers of supervision. However, Section 397(2) expressly curtails this power by prohibiting revision in relation to interlocutory orders of a trial court. Furthermore, Section 397(3) bars a second revision – if a party has already approached either the High Court or the Sessions Court, that same party cannot invoke revision before the other court against the same order.
Concurrent Jurisdiction of High Court and Sessions Judge: Both the Sessions Judge and the High Court have concurrent authority to entertain a revision. The litigant may choose either forum in the first instance, subject to the single application rule noted above (). Importantly, it is not obligatory to approach the Sessions Court first; one can directly file a revision in the High Court (). But once a revision has been decided by one of these forums, the aggrieved party cannot pursue another revision before the other forum on the same matter. The idea is to prevent multiple bites at the cherry through parallel revisions. That said, the High Court’s revisional powers under Section 401 CrPC remain paramount – this provision elaborates the High Court’s powers in revision, stating that it may exercise any of the powers of an appellate court (such as altering or reversing orders) for ensuring the legality and propriety of the proceedings. However, the High Court cannot, in revision, convert an acquittal into a conviction (an express prohibition under Section 401(3) CrPC), and generally it should not exercise revision as if it were a “second appeal” on facts. The revisional court’s role is thus one of supervision and correction, not routine reappraisal of evidence.
Inherent Powers – Section 482 CrPC: In tandem with revision, the CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 to ensure “the ends of justice” are met. This inherent jurisdiction is broad and can be invoked even where specific provisions (like revision) may not squarely apply, but it is meant to be exercised sparingly. There is some overlap between Section 397 and Section 482 – both can be vehicles for quashing or correcting untenable judicial proceedings – yet important distinctions exist. Generally, if a matter can be addressed via a revision under Section 397, the High Court will not resort to Section 482; inherent power is a residual remedy, not a substitute for an available revision remedy. The Supreme Court has clarified that while nothing in the CrPC “not even Section 397” limits the High Court’s inherent powers, self-restraint must guide the exercise of Section 482, especially when the bar on interlocutory revision or second revision would otherwise apply. We shall later contrast these two powers in detail, but it is crucial to note at the outset that the statutory revisional power (Section 397/401) and the inherent power (Section 482) collectively equip the High Court to supervise criminal proceedings and intervene to secure justice in appropriate cases.
Scope and Nature of Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC
The scope of revisional jurisdiction is narrower than that of appellate jurisdiction. A revision is not a matter of course but rests in the court’s discretion, to be exercised to correct jurisdictional errors, illegality or glaring impropriety in the lower court’s order (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION) (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that revisions are normally confined to questions of law or jurisdiction – the revisional court ordinarily should not re-evaluate the entire evidence or facts, as doing so would convert the revision into a de facto appeal (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). The power is aimed at ensuring that justice is done without the court stepping into the shoes of the trial court.
In Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court succinctly explained the nature of this jurisdiction. It held that the revisional power (or the inherent power under Section 482, when invoked for quashing) must be exercised with great caution, and only in rare cases to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice () (). The Court surveyed prior precedents and laid down guiding principles for interference at the stage of framing of charge or similar proceedings. Key takeaways from Amit Kapoor include: (1) The High Court should not interfere in a criminal proceeding at an initial stage unless the allegations in the FIR or charge, even if taken at face value, do not disclose any offense or the proceeding is patently frivolous or illegal (). (2) No meticulous examination of the evidence is permissible at the revisional stage – the court is not to weigh whether the prosecution’s case is likely to result in conviction; it only checks for a prima facie case or jurisdictional errors (). (3) Intervention is justified where there is a legal bar against the proceedings or where uncontroverted facts show that continuation of the case would be an abuse of the court’s process (). Thus, the threshold for revisional interference is high – the case must present some material defect (such as lack of jurisdiction, apparent absence of evidence for a vital ingredient of the offense, or a perverse finding) that would result in injustice if left uncorrected (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION) (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). Routine or minor errors are not meant to be canvassed in revision.
It is also notable that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised suo motu by the court. The High Court (and to a limited extent the Sessions Judge) can call for the record on its own initiative if it comes across information or a situation that warrants revision. Owing to this suo motu power, even a person who is not a formal party to the case – such as an informant, victim, or interested third party – may alert the revisional court to a grave illegality. The Supreme Court has recognized that “as the power of revision can be exercised by the revisional court suo motu, even an outsider or third party can question the legality of the order passed by the lower court and file a criminal revision against the order” (). For instance, in K. Pandurangan vs. S.S.R. Velusamy (2003) 8 SCC 625, it was affirmed that a stranger to the case could invoke revision since ultimately the court’s power does not depend on the applicant’s locus – the emphasis is on correcting the wrong in the record . This broad standing underlines that the purpose of revision is to subserve justice, not merely to vindicate parties’ rights.
Orders against which Revision Lies: Final, Interlocutory, and Intermediate Orders
A central question in criminal revision is what kinds of orders can be revised. The CrPC (Section 397(2)) bars revisions of “interlocutory orders,” but this term has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation. Broadly, orders in criminal cases can be categorized as final, interlocutory, or the judicially crafted category of “intermediate” orders, with only the latter two requiring analysis for revision purposes (final orders are obviously revisable if no appeal lies).
Final orders: These are orders that dispose of the case or proceeding completely, leaving nothing further to be decided by the court. Examples are a judgment of conviction or acquittal, or an order dismissing a complaint. Such orders, if not appealable or if an appeal is not filed, can be examined in revision for legality and propriety. A final order conclusively determines the rights of the parties in respect of the matter in controversy.
Interlocutory orders (purely interim orders): These are orders of a purely procedural or incidental nature which do not decide any substantial rights of the parties. Classic examples include orders granting adjournments, summoning witnesses, issuance of process, bail orders, or orders fixing dates for hearing (). Such orders “do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties” and thus are considered interlocutory (). The rationale for excluding these from revision is to prevent the revisional courts from being flooded with challenges to every procedural direction of the trial court, which would endlessly delay the main proceeding. In Amar Nath vs. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137, the Supreme Court illustrated this by holding that orders which are a step in aid of the pending proceeding (like summoning evidence or witnesses) are interlocutory and hence not revisable (). The Court observed that only an order which “substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties” can be examined in revision, and not routine interim directions ().
Intermediate (quasi-final) orders: Between these two extremes lies a class of orders which, though not finally deciding the case, do affect vital rights of the parties and have the potential to put an end to the proceeding if decided in a certain way. The Supreme Court, in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 (a three-judge bench decision), was confronted with the rigidity of the interlocutory bar and carved out an exception for certain orders which are not “purely interlocutory.” The Court held that an order rejecting the plea of an accused on a point which, if accepted, would conclude the particular proceeding, is not an interlocutory order for purposes of Section 397(2) (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). In other words, if a motion or objection is raised by a party and upholding it would result in termination of the case, then an order deciding such a motion is not merely interlocutory. These have come to be known as intermediate orders. For example, an order on charge – i.e. an order framing a charge or refusing to discharge the accused – does not finally dispose of the case, yet it decides an important right of the accused (the right not to face trial if the evidence is insufficient). Such an order has been held not to be “interlocutory” in nature (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). In fact, the Supreme Court in Amar Nath itself noted that compelling an accused to undergo trial without proper application of mind to the case can cause serious prejudice, and thus an order framing charges in a manner that raises a serious question of rights would not be a purely interim matter (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). Later, in V.C. Shukla vs. State (1980) 2 SCC 665, the Court reiterated that the term ‘interlocutory order’ in Section 397(2) must be given a liberal construction in favor of the accused – orders which are intermediary or quasi-final (though not ending the proceedings) may still be revisable if they decide substantive rights (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION).
The distinction was further clarified in Girish Kumar Suneja vs. CBI, AIR 2017 SC 3620, where a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court discussed the maintainability of revision in the context of orders passed during a trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court endorsed the concept of intermediate orders, holding that if an order is not purely interim in nature and decides an important aspect of the trial, the bar under Section 397(2) would not apply (). It observed that as far as an intermediate order is concerned – one that, for instance, affects the charge or the jurisdiction – the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked (). The test suggested is pragmatic: if deciding the issue one way would terminate the proceedings, then the order on that issue is not interlocutory (). For example, an order refusing to quash an FIR, or an order dismissing an application for discharge, would be intermediate – had the court allowed the application, the case would have ended, hence the refusal is open to revision as it substantially affects the accused’s rights. On the other hand, a routine order summoning a document, or allowing an amendment, etc., would not pass this test and remains interlocutory (revision-barred) ().
In sum, final orders are revisable (absent appeal), pure interlocutory orders are not revisable, and intermediate orders (orders not final but also not merely procedural) can be examined in revision. This categorization, developed through case law, ensures that while the revisional court does not intervene at every trivial juncture, it is not completely powerless to check serious errors at preliminary stages. Courts have thus struck a balance by permitting revision in crucial interim matters like jurisdictional questions or charges, but disallowing it for trivial procedural rulings that do not prejudice the parties’ rights in a lasting way () ().
Limitations on Revisional Power: No Fact Re-Appreciation & Finding of Fact
The revisional power, though broad in scope, is constrained by important self-imposed limitations. A fundamental principle is that the revisional court does not act as a second appellate court on facts (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). In its supervisory role, the revisional court is primarily concerned with the legality and propriety of the lower court’s decision-making process, rather than the mere accuracy of its conclusions on evidence. The High Court or Sessions Court will not reassess the entire evidence or substitute its own findings of fact for that of the trial court just because another view is possible. As the Supreme Court tersely put it, “ordinarily it is not open for the revisional court to re-appreciate the evidence in its revisional jurisdiction” (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). Even when the revision is exercised by the High Court under Section 401, the provision does not confer a carte blanche to act as if it were hearing a full appeal on facts; the endeavor is to correct injustice or illegality, not to reassess every factual finding (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION) (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION).
Several judicial decisions underscore this limitation:
In State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, AIR 1993 SC 1126, the Supreme Court highlighted that revisional jurisdiction should not be used for “taking water from the well” again – meaning the evidence should not be freshly dredged and evaluated as if in appeal (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION).
In M. Sainuddin v. Food Inspector (2001) 9 SCC 216, the Court held that where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence and the trial court has adopted one such view (especially if it’s a view favorable to the accused), the revisional court ought to be slow in interfering (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION). The deference is higher when the lower court’s view has resulted in an acquittal or discharge, because overturning it would subject the accused to further proceedings. Only if the lower court’s decision is perverse or manifestly illegal should the revisional court step in; but a mere divergence of opinion on appreciation of evidence is not a ground for revision.
The “perversity” or patent illegality standard is key. The revisional court may interfere with findings of fact only if such findings are grossly erroneous – for instance, if the lower court relied on evidence that was inadmissible, ignored crucial evidence, or arrived at conclusions that no reasonable person would reach on the available material (). In practical terms, interference is justified where: (i) the lower court’s finding is based on evidence not on record, (ii) the court ignored or excluded material evidence which had a bearing on the case, (iii) the decision relied on evidence that is inadmissible in law, (iv) material evidence was rejected on an improper legal premise, or (v) the finding is perverse – meaning it flies in the face of logic or established facts (). Short of such scenarios, the revisional court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact.
An illustrative instance of a perverse finding could be where a trial court acquits an accused despite overwhelming evidence of guilt, due to misreading of evidence or ignoring documents. While the revisional court cannot convert an acquittal to conviction (as discussed below), it can certainly set aside such an acquittal and order a re-trial or give other directions if the acquittal is based on manifest illegalities. Similarly, if a trial court erroneously fails to consider key testimony or documents while convicting someone, the revisional court can step in to prevent a miscarriage of justice, possibly by ordering a fresh evaluation or even a discharge if the ignored evidence would exonerate the accused.
Statutory Restraints – No Conversion of Acquittal to Conviction: A crucial statutory limitation on revisional power is contained in Section 401(3) CrPC – the High Court cannot “convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction” in revision. This means that if an accused was acquitted by the trial court (and the State did not appeal that acquittal), the High Court on revision by the complainant or otherwise cannot directly find the accused guilty (). The High Court could at best order a re-trial or give directions for fresh consideration, but it cannot simply convict the person in revision. This principle was affirmed in Shilpa vs. Madhukar & Others, 2001 (1) JIC 588 (SC), among other cases, to ensure that the revisional jurisdiction is not used as an appeal in disguise by private parties to overturn acquittals (). The proper remedy against an acquittal is an appeal (now even a victim has a right of appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC); revision cannot be a backdoor to upset an acquittal when the statute provides otherwise.
No Enhancement of Sentence without Notice: Similarly, while the revisional court (especially the High Court) has the power to enhance the sentence of a convicted person (because Section 401 empowers it to exercise the same powers as an appellate court, which includes enhancement), it cannot do so without giving the accused a proper opportunity of being heard (Section 401(2) CrPC) (). The law mandates issuance of a notice (often called a “show-cause notice”) to the accused if the court is contemplating enhancing the sentence or otherwise passing an order adverse to them. This again embeds principles of natural justice into revision proceedings and is a check on the court’s power.
Revisional Court and Additional Evidence: As a general rule, the revisional court does not take fresh evidence. Revision is decided on the record of the lower court. However, there have been exceptional situations where the higher courts have considered incontrovertible material that was not presented below, in order to do complete justice. A notable example is Harshendra Kumar D. vs. Rebatilata Koley, 2011 Cr.L.J. 1626 (SC). In that case, an individual was implicated in a cheque bounce prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act even though he had resigned from the company prior to issuance of the cheque. The resignation was evidenced by official documents. The Supreme Court held that criminal prosecution is a serious matter affecting personal liberty and reputation, and if there are public documents or indisputable materials that exonerate the accused, the High Court can take them into account while exercising its revisional or inherent powers (). In other words, “public documents or material relied upon by the accused which is beyond suspicion can be taken into consideration by the Court (High Court) while exercising powers under Section 397 or 482 CrPC” (). This is an exception to the normal rule and was done to prevent the abuse of process – forcing someone to undergo trial despite conclusive evidence of innocence would itself be unjust. Nonetheless, outside of such clear-cut cases, revisional courts do not entertain new evidence; parties are expected to build their factual record in the trial court and lower appellate court.
In summary, the revisional power is subject to the discipline of restraint: it targets illegality or material irregularity rather than mere factual errors. The High Court or Sessions Court will intervene to correct a jurisdictional error, legal infirmity, or perverse finding, but will not act as if it were conducting a fresh trial. The guiding ethos is that justice should be ensured without usurping the lower court’s role as the primary fact-finder (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION) (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION).
Admission of Revision and Procedural Implications
A revision petition does not automatically entitle the applicant to a full hearing; the High Court or Sessions Court has the leeway to admit or dismiss a revision at the threshold. Typically, when a revision application is filed, the court first examines whether a prima facie case for interference is made out. If the petition discloses no substance (for example, it challenges an interlocutory order plainly barred by Section 397(2), or raises trivial grounds), the court may summarily dismiss the revision without calling for the records or issuing notice to the other side. On the other hand, if the court finds merit or potential merit in the challenge, it will “admit” the revision – meaning it will issue notice to the opposing party (e.g., the State in case the accused filed revision, or the accused if the State or complainant filed revision) and call for the records of the lower court for examination. Unlike appeals, the CrPC does not prescribe a formal “leave to file revision” or preliminary admission hearing, but in practice High Courts do perform an initial screening.
Once a revision is admitted and the record is called for, certain procedural consequences follow. Notably, calling for the record of the subordinate court often means that the trial or proceedings in that court are held in abeyance (since the original case record is before the revisional court). In many cases, therefore, the revisional court explicitly or implicitly stays the lower court proceedings pending the outcome of the revision. (We will discuss the law on stay orders in the next section.) The revisional court then peruses the record and usually hears arguments from both sides before rendering a decision. The entire process is typically quicker and more summary than an appeal – evidence is not recorded afresh, and arguments are confined to legal or substantial defects in the lower court’s order.
An important procedural aspect clarified by case law is that once a criminal revision is admitted, it should be decided on merits and not dismissed for default of appearance. In other words, if the petitioner (revisionist) or their lawyer does not appear during the hearing, the court should not simply dismiss the revision for non-prosecution (which is what might happen in a civil case or an appeal). Instead, the court must adjudicate the revision on the merits of the record, because the revisional jurisdiction is seen as one vested in the court to ensure correctness of the lower court’s decision, rather than a dispute inter partes that can be abandoned (). The Supreme Court in Santosh vs. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 307 stressed this point – a criminal revision petition cannot be trivially dismissed for default; the court has a duty to examine the merits (especially if the absence of the petitioner is not willful, or even otherwise, to avoid sustaining a possible illegality) (). Thus, the revisional court may appoint an amicus curiae or rely on the record to rule on the revision if the petitioning party is absent. This principle ensures that the supervisory role of the court is not thwarted by mere non-appearance or dilatory tactics.
It is also worth noting that if the applicant could have filed an appeal but chose not to, the revisional court may be reluctant to intervene. In fact, Section 401(4) CrPC bars a party from invoking revision if they had a right to appeal but did not avail it. For example, if a convicted accused had a right to appeal against the conviction but misses the appeal and tries to use revision as a substitute, the court will not allow that misuse of process. Revision is not meant to circumvent the normal appellate hierarchy. However, this bar doesn’t prevent the State or a different party from seeking revision, nor does it restrict the High Court’s suo motu powers – it only precludes the defaulting party from using revision as an alternative to a forgone appeal.
In summary, the procedure in revision is relatively flexible: the court can summarily dismiss or admit the petition. After admission, the focus is on a swift and fair scrutiny of the lower court record. The absence of the petitioner will not automatically result in dismissal, reflecting that the dominant interest in a revision is the rectification of any injustice, which the court will carry out so far as the record permits .
Stay of Proceedings during Revision – Legal Principles
Often, the party filing a revision will seek a stay of the lower court proceedings or of the impugned order, to prevent fait accompli while the revision is pending. For instance, if an accused files a revision against an order framing charges, he may request the revisional court to stay the trial until the revision is decided. Conversely, if a complainant or the State files a revision against an order of discharge or acquittal, they might seek a stay on the accused’s release or the effect of that order. The law on grant of stay in revisions has evolved to prevent abuse of the process by dilatory tactics.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a revision does not automatically operate as a stay; a separate, reasoned order is required for staying proceedings. In recent years, the courts have grown wary of the tendency of revisions (and similar petitions) to stall trials for long periods. A landmark ruling on this aspect is Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. vs. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299. In that case – a three-judge bench decision – the Supreme Court issued firm directions to govern stay of proceedings in both civil and criminal matters. Key directives from Asian Resurfacing include :
Speaking Order for Stay: If a court grants a stay of trial court proceedings (be it in revision or appeal), it must pass a speaking (reasoned) order indicating why such stay is necessary (). Blanket or mechanical stays are to be avoided.
Time-bound Disposal: Once a stay is granted, the challenge (revision or appeal) should be heard and decided expeditiously – ideally within two to three months, with the matter taken up on a day-to-day basis if needed (). The higher court should not simply grant a stay and then allow the revision to languish.
Automatic Lapse of Stay: Critically, the Supreme Court directed that any stay of proceedings will automatically lapse after 6 months unless extended by a specific speaking order after reviewing the case progress (). In other words, no stay shall remain in force beyond 6 months unless the court explicitly finds it necessary to prolong it. This single measure was designed to ensure that criminal trials do not remain indefinitely frozen due to an interim order.
Conditional Stays: The court can impose conditions when granting stay (for example, that the trial may go on up to a certain stage, or requiring the petitioner to cooperate in expeditious disposal of revision). Unconditional, open-ended stays are discouraged ().
Applicability: These directions apply to both civil and criminal revisional/appellate jurisdictions and across all courts in the hierarchy (). Thus, whether it is a stay in a criminal revision before a High Court or a civil revision, the six-month rule and other norms equally govern.
The effect of the Asian Resurfacing ruling has been significant. It tackles the common problem of accused persons filing revisions or petitions at intermediate stages (like against charge, against summoning order, etc.) and obtaining a stay that halts the trial for years. Now, by operation of the Supreme Court’s mandate, after 6 months any such stay lapses unless renewed for good reason. High Courts across the country have since been cautious in granting stays in revision, ensuring compliance with these conditions (). In practice, if a revision is not decided within six months, the trial court can resume proceedings once the stay expires, unless the revisional court has extended it. This has compelled faster disposal of revisions and discouraged frivolous revisions aimed solely at delay.
It should be noted that even prior to Asian Resurfacing, courts often cited that stay of a criminal trial should be an exception, not the norm. The balance is between the accused’s right to avoid an illegal prosecution and the public interest in speedy justice. The 2018 directions have now codified a balancing mechanism. Additionally, grant of stay is not a matter of right – the applicant must demonstrate a strong prima facie case and potential prejudice if the trial or order is not stayed. For example, an accused seeking stay of trial on the ground that the charge is unsustainable must show a clear case in revision (such as lack of jurisdiction or lack of any evidence for the charge) for a court to consider stalling the trial even temporarily (). Otherwise, the trial should proceed and the accused can always raise the issue in appeal if eventually convicted.
In summary, while the revisional court can stay proceedings or operation of an order to effectively exercise its jurisdiction (since, as noted, calling records often pauses the trial), there are now strict parameters and time-limits on such stays. The overarching principle post-Asian Resurfacing is that justice delayed is justice denied – revisional corrections should not translate into protracted paralysis of the trial. Courts strive to protect the rights of the parties without derailing the timeline of the trial more than necessary .
Limitation Period and Condonation of Delay for Revision
The CrPC itself does not fix a specific limitation period for filing a revision, but by virtue of the Limitation Act, 1963, a time-frame is applicable. Article 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides a period of 90 days for filing a criminal revision (to the High Court) from the date of the order sought to be revised (). Similarly, revisions to the Sessions Court are generally expected within 90 days. This means that as a matter of diligent practice, a revision petition should be instituted within three months of the impugned order/judgment. If the applicant approaches the court after the expiry of this period, they must file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay by showing sufficient cause for not filing in time.
Indian courts have tended to adopt a liberal approach in condoning delays in criminal revisions, especially if not entertaining the revision would perpetuate a serious injustice. The reasoning is that if the lower court’s order is manifestly illegal or causes gross injustice, that illegality should not be allowed to stand just because of a procedural delay in moving the revisional court. The Supreme Court in Shilpa vs. Madhukar (2001) exemplified this approach, holding that a criminal revision should not be dismissed on a mere technicality of limitation if the impugned order is patently wrong (). The Court observed that the revisional power is for the court’s own satisfaction about the correctness of an order, and if an order is ex-facie illegal, the court should not refuse to exercise its corrective jurisdiction simply because the revision was filed late. In such cases, “the revisional court should adopt a liberal approach while considering the question of limitation in regard to a time-barred criminal revision” ().
However, this does not mean limitation is a dead letter. If a petitioner sleeps on their rights and cannot show any cogent explanation for a long delay, the court may decline to condone, especially if the opposite party accrued some benefit from the order (for example, an accused who was acquitted might have settled back into life – a very late challenge to that acquittal via revision would be viewed with disfavor absent compelling reasons). Common grounds for condonation include lack of knowledge of the order (the delay period can be computed from the date the petitioner became aware of the order, if they prove they were not earlier informed), illness, or other bona fide causes that prevented timely filing ().
It’s also noteworthy that the State (through the prosecutor) often files revisions in some scenarios (e.g., to enhance sentence, or against discharge) and may sometimes do so belatedly due to administrative approvals. Courts have excused reasonable delays for the State as well, provided the cause is explained.
In practice, when a revision is filed beyond 90 days, a separate application for condonation (under Section 5 Limitation Act) is taken up by the court first. If the court finds merit in the reasons given, it allows the delay to be condoned and then proceeds to hear the revision on merits. Given the criminal justice stakes, courts lean in favor of adjudicating the revision on merits if refusing to do so would result in injustice or allow an illegal order to stand uncorrected (). This policy is in line with the famous maxim that procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress.
In summary, 90 days is the standard limitation for criminal revisions, but delays can be condoned in the interest of justice. The approach is generally claimant-friendly in criminal matters – an arguably time-barred revision may still be entertained if the underlying order appears unjust or irregular, with the delay being overlooked for sufficient cause ().
Bar on Second Revision and Concurrent Jurisdiction of Courts
As mentioned, Section 397(3) CrPC imposes a bar on the second revision by the same party. This is a crucial check to prevent repetitive challenges and forum shopping. If an aggrieved party has already approached the Sessions Judge in revision and received a decision (favorable or unfavorable), that party cannot file another revision before the High Court on the same matter, and vice versa (). The provision intends that one full opportunity for revision is enough – multiple revisions would clog the system and undermine finality.
However, the bar is party-specific. It does not mean the High Court has no power at all after a Sessions Judge’s revision. If the Sessions Judge decided a revision, the High Court is not completely divested of jurisdiction – it’s just that the party who lost before the Sessions Judge cannot initiate a revision in the High Court. The High Court could still, on its own motion or on the application of another interested person (for instance, the complainant or victim, if they were not the revisionist in Sessions Court), call for the records and examine the correctness of the order under Section 401. In such cases, we often say the High Court is exercising its suo motu revisional powers, sometimes triggered by a petition under Section 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution presented by an aggrieved person.
The Supreme Court addressed this scenario in Kailash Verma vs. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corp., (2005) 2 SCC 571, clarifying that the law gives a choice of forum for revision but not a chance to use both forums . A party may directly go to the High Court or to the Sessions Court in the first instance – “it is not necessary that in the first instance the revision should be filed before the Sessions Judge” . But having chosen one path, the party cannot pursue the other remedy if unsuccessful. The underlying logic is akin to res judicata in criminal revision: the issues should not be re-agitated serially before two forums of co-ordinate revisional power.
That said, what if the first revision itself was decided ex parte or erroneously? Generally, even then, the aggrieved party’s remedy is not a second revision but perhaps a recall or review in the same court (though criminal courts have limited review power), or approaching the High Court under inherent jurisdiction to do what is essentially a revision in the garb of inherent powers. The Supreme Court in Krishnan vs. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 dealt with a situation of the State vs. accused revisions and held that the prohibition in Section 397(3) does not limit the High Court’s power to entertain a petition under Section 482 or Article 227 to secure justice. The Court opined that while a second revision by the same person is disallowed, the High Court can, in exercise of its inherent or constitutional powers, still correct a grave error committed by the Sessions Judge in a revision, because the overarching duty of the High Court to ensure justice remains. However, this power is used sparingly and only in “exceptional circumstances”, lest Section 397(3) be rendered nugatory. In practice, litigants sometimes attempt to file a petition under Section 482 CrPC in the High Court after losing a revision in the Sessions Court. High Courts will entertain such a petition only if a manifest illegality or gross injustice is shown – it is not an appeal against the Sessions Judge’s order, but a failsafe to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Most High Courts would first scrutinize whether the Sessions Judge’s order itself suffers from perversity or ignorance of law before interfering.
In scenarios where both parties have revisional powers (State and accused, for example), one party’s use of revision does not bar the other’s distinct revision if their interests are different. For instance, if an accused is convicted and does not appeal but the State files a revision for enhancement of sentence (assuming appeal was not available for enhancement in that situation), the accused having not filed any revision doesn’t bar the State’s revision. Conversely, if the accused’s revision is allowed and conviction set aside, the State cannot then file a revision to undo that – their remedy would have been an appeal. So the bar on “second revision” is specifically focused on the same party trying to get two revisional bites.
In summary, the High Court and Sessions Court have concurrent revisional jurisdiction, but Section 397(3) forces a choice – one can approach either, but not both (). After one opportunity, the matter attains finality at that level, subject only to the High Court’s extraordinary powers. This concurrency cum exclusivity design is meant to streamline the process. Parties must carefully choose their forum (often, serious matters are directly taken to High Court, while less serious or more routine ones might go to Sessions first). Once a revision is adjudicated by one forum, the revisional hierarchy is effectively exhausted for that party. The only vestige of recourse could be the High Court’s inherent powers or even the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution (special leave to appeal), but not a formal “second revision.”
Role of Third Parties and Suo Motu Revision
One interesting facet of criminal revision is that it is not strictly confined to the accused or prosecution; even third parties who are “persons aggrieved” or who have a legitimate interest in the case outcome may sometimes invoke revisional jurisdiction. This is linked to the suo motu power of revisional courts. Because the law allows the court to act on its own, information about a miscarriage of justice can reach the court through various channels, including by applications of third parties.
Third Party Revisions: Typically, the State (through the prosecutor) or the accused are the ones who file revisions, since they are the primary parties. But consider scenarios like: the complainant in a case is not the State (as in a complaint-case), or a victim of a crime where the State did not file an appeal against an acquittal or a too-lenient sentence, or an informant who set the criminal law in motion. Such persons, though not formal parties in the trial in the sense of prosecution/accused, are affected by the outcome. Courts have allowed, for example, a private complainant to file a revision challenging an order of discharge of the accused by the magistrate (since the complainant, having initiated proceedings, can be aggrieved by their termination). Similarly, prior to 2009 (when the law was amended to give victims a right of appeal in certain cases), the victim’s remedy against an acquittal was often to seek revision in the High Court. Even now, in some instances a victim might seek revision – for instance, against an inadequate sentence (if the State doesn’t appeal) or against an interlocutory order like granting bail or transfer of case.
The law on locus standi in revision is thus flexible. In K. Pandurangan vs. S.S.R. Velusamy (2003) 8 SCC 625, the Supreme Court entertained a revision petition filed by a third party, reiterating that because the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised suo motu, what matters is the legality of the proceeding, not the identity of the mover (). As long as the applicant brings to the court’s notice a serious grievance or error, the court can treat it as a cause to look into the record. Of course, busy courts ensure that the applicant has some genuine connection or concern with the case – random busybodies are discouraged. But, for instance, if a bank manager is cheated and the magistrate wrongly drops proceedings, the bank (though technically just a witness or complainant) could seek revision of that order.
Suo Motu Action: High Courts often exercise revisional powers on their own when glaring illegalities come to light. Some High Courts have Registrar Judicial wings that place such matters before the court. For example, if a magistrate passes an order completely contrary to law (say, granting an illegal probation release to a non-eligible offender, or taking cognizance of an offense barred by limitation), and no one challenges it, the High Court might call for the record on its own and correct the error. Suo motu revisions are a safety net ensuring that lack of initiative by parties does not allow injustice to persist.
There is, however, a procedural safeguard – when a court initiates a suo motu revision, it will still notify the affected parties and give them a hearing before altering any order. The power is not to be used whimsically; it is typically reserved for ensuring that obvious injustice does not go unaddressed due to inaction of parties.
Intervention by Complainant/Victim: A special sub-case of third-party revision is where the complainant or victim seeks to intervene in a revision filed by the accused (or vice versa). For instance, if an accused person files a revision against the order summoning him, the complainant (who obtained the summoning order) can appear in the revision to defend the magistrate’s order, even if the code doesn’t explicitly say so. The High Court would usually hear the complainant’s side in such revision to get a complete picture. Similarly, if the State files a revision for enhancement of sentence, the accused obviously will be heard, and if any private party is involved (like a victim for compensation issues), they too might be allowed to speak. In fact, recently, the law has evolved to allow victims certain participatory rights (for example, the victim’s right to appeal under CrPC and to be heard at various stages), which extends logically to revisions too.
In summary, revisional jurisdiction is not a closed shop limited to the immediate parties of the trial. Given its ultimate goal – to ensure legality and prevent injustice – the courts have permitted a fairly wide array of persons to set the ball rolling, including informants, complainants, victims, or even public-spirited individuals in exceptional cases (). The controlling factor is the court’s satisfaction that the case warrants examination. Once invoked, though, the process will adhere to natural justice (notice to all concerned and hearing, including the original parties who might be adversely affected by the revision).
Principles of Natural Justice in Revision Proceedings
Any exercise of revisional power must conform to the fundamental principles of natural justice, chiefly the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem). The CrPC explicitly incorporates this in Section 401(2), which provides that no order in revision shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or any other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in the revisional court. In practical terms, if a revision is filed by the State seeking to enhance the punishment or to set aside an acquittal, the accused must be put on notice and given a chance to contest the revision. Similarly, if a revision is filed by a complainant or victim seeking to overturn an order favoring the accused (such as discharge or acquittal), the accused must be heard. Even in a suo motu revision by the High Court, if the court contemplates passing an order that affects someone’s rights, that person should be brought into the proceedings and allowed to make submissions.
The courts have been vigilant about this. For example, if a revision court is inclined to reverse an order of acquittal (even though it cannot convict, it could order a retrial or frame charges afresh), the acquitted person must be heard. In one case, a High Court entertained a revision by a complainant and issued directions against an accused without hearing him, which the Supreme Court later frowned upon, reiterating the necessity of compliance with Section 401(2) CrPC ().
A concrete illustration is found in the Allahabad High Court case Jagannath Verma vs. State of U.P., AIR 2014 All 214. In that matter, an application under Section 156(3) CrPC (seeking a direction to police to register an FIR) had been rejected by a magistrate. The applicant (would-be complainant) went in revision to the Sessions Court, which allowed the revision and directed the police to investigate, effectively setting the criminal process in motion against the proposed accused. This order was passed ex parte, without hearing the person who would become an accused. The High Court intervened, underscoring that even the proposed accused was entitled to be heard at the revisional stage before such an adverse order was passed (). Citing principles of natural justice, the court held that whenever a revisional court is considering a matter where the outcome may adversely affect a person’s rights or subject them to prosecution, that person should be made a party and given an opportunity to present their case (). The Jagannath Verma ruling effectively extended the reach of audi alteram partem to even those who are not yet formally accused but stand to be directly impacted by the revision’s result.
Likewise, in Mohit @ Sonu vs. State of U.P., AIR 2013 SC 2248, the Supreme Court observed that a revisional court should not decide a revision petition without notice to the party who would be prejudiced by the decision. That case involved a situation where the complainant had sought cancellation of an accused’s bail via revision. The Supreme Court held that since the accused’s liberty (bail) was at stake, the High Court ought to have heard the accused before canceling bail in revision. The order passed without hearing the accused was set aside for violation of natural justice.
In essence, natural justice in revisions means: if X files a revision that could affect Y’s rights, Y must be heard. This applies whether Y is an accused, a complainant, or any other person who will be directly impacted. The only conceivable exception is if the order is entirely in favor of a person (for example, the State’s revision to convict an accused after acquittal cannot succeed due to the bar on conversion to conviction; but if it were to order a retrial, the accused would be heard). In practice, High Courts ensure that notice of the revision is served on all necessary parties. If a revision were decided without hearing someone who should have been heard, that decision is prone to be invalidated.
Natural justice also ties into ensuring the revisional court considers the submissions and material of both sides before reaching a conclusion. The revisional court’s order typically will reflect that it weighed the arguments of the revisionist and the respondent (e.g., State and accused). The integrity of the process is maintained by giving everyone a fair chance to present their case or defend the order under challenge.
Revisional Powers under Section 482 CrPC vs Section 397 CrPC
A topic of considerable interest (and sometimes confusion) is the interplay between the revisional jurisdiction (Section 397/401) and the inherent powers of the High Court (Section 482). Both are often invoked in criminal matters to quash proceedings or challenge orders. While we touched on this earlier in the legal framework, a more focused comparison is warranted:
Nature of Power: Section 397 is a statutorily conferred power – it allows certain higher courts to scrutinize lower court records. It comes with defined limits (like the interlocutory order bar, single revision bar, etc.). Section 482, by contrast, is not a grant of power but a saving clause. It recognizes the High Court’s inherent authority to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under CrPC, or to prevent abuse of process, or to secure the ends of justice. Inherent power is extraordinary and residual. It is a power that exists in the High Court by virtue of its position, not because any statute explicitly gives it. Therefore, it is broader in compass but expected to be used sparingly.
Overlap and Distinct Spheres: There is undeniable overlap – both revision and inherent power can be employed to quash unwarranted criminal proceedings or correct grave wrongs. For example, an accused seeking to challenge a charge framed against him might either file a revision (if maintainable as an intermediate order) or petition under 482 or both. However, the Supreme Court has drawn a principle of preferential hierarchy: if the situation is covered by an available remedy under the CrPC, that should be exhausted before invoking the inherent power. “Normally the Court may not invoke its power under Section 482 where a party could have availed of the remedy under Section 397,” says the Supreme Court. The inherent power should not be used to circumvent the statutory revision remedy. For instance, if an interlocutory order (like a mere summon to witness) is not revisable due to Section 397(2), can the accused directly invoke Section 482 to quash it? The answer is that while technically Section 482 is unfettered (“nothing in this Code shall limit...”), the High Court will exercise self-restraint and not use 482 to obliterate the effect of 397(2) unless there is something extraordinary at stake. In Raj Kapoor v. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43, the Supreme Court addressed this and held that the bar of Section 397(2) does not limit the High Court’s inherent power – yet the inherent power should be exercised in line with the legislative intention behind that bar, i.e., only in exceptional cases to prevent abuse of process. In effect, Section 482 can be invoked even in situations where revision is barred or not available, but only to redress a clear abuse of process or injustice. The opening words of Section 482 (“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers…”) make it clear that the existence of revisional power (or its limits) does not take away the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The High Court can thus entertain a petition under 482 to quash an interlocutory order (like an improper charge-sheet or summoning order) if not doing so would lead to gross injustice – this has been affirmed in decisions like Madhu Limaye and Raj Kapoor.
Breadth of Scope: Section 397 is confined to examining the record of a “lower court” for correctness, legality or propriety of that court’s findings or orders. Section 482 is broader – it can even be used to issue directives (like ordering clubbing of cases, or directing the police to not harass a person, etc.) which may not strictly fall under “correctness of a finding or order”. Section 482’s purposes include preventing abuse of the process. For example, if multiple frivolous FIRs are filed against a person on the same facts in different police stations, the High Court under 482 could step in to quash the redundant ones to prevent harassment, even if none of those cases have reached a stage where a “revision” would be applicable. Revision, in contrast, typically requires a proceeding in a lower court that resulted in some order. Inherent power can operate in the gaps – even before a charge is framed, or after a case is concluded (like expunging remarks, or directing the disposal of property, etc.).
Examples from Case Law: The Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) discussed both revisional and inherent powers together while laying down principles for quashing charges () (). It effectively treated a petition for quashing a charge as something that could be under 482 or 397, but the principles remain the same – interference only if there is a clear legal error or absence of material for the charge, etc. Another example is Dinesh Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014), where the court reiterated that if a revision to the Sessions Court has failed, a petition under 482 could be considered by the High Court in rare cases to prevent injustice. The guiding thought is: Section 482 should not become a means to bypass the restrictions of Section 397 casually. Yet, when required by justice, 482 will prevail, because it is of very wide magnitude and “free of restriction” except the court’s own restraint.
Use in Practice: In practice, many lawyers invoke both Section 397 and 482 in the heading of a petition in the High Court (especially when challenging charge orders or summoning orders). The High Court then decides under what provision to treat it. If the order is arguably not interlocutory, the court may treat it as a revision; if it is interlocutory or a second attempt, the court might entertain it under 482 if the conditions are met. The final nomenclature is less important than the substance of relief. For instance, in Girish Kumar Suneja (2017), although the Court spoke of revisional power for intermediate orders, often High Courts were using 482 to deal with such orders. Post Suneja, one might directly label it revision if intermediate. The powers do overlap and the High Court can exercise either – but being mindful of the statutory boundaries.
In conclusion, Section 397 and Section 482 CrPC serve complementary roles in the criminal justice system. Revisional jurisdiction is a creature of statute with defined channels (and limits), whereas inherent power is an overarching authority to ensure justice is done in cases not envisaged by the routine provisions. The inherent power does not supersede the revision; rather, it fills in when revision is inadequate or barred yet intervention is necessary to prevent injustice. As the Supreme Court eloquently noted, the inherent power should not be exercised in a manner that “subverts legal interdicts” written into the Code, but it remains available to break through procedural fetters in rare cases for higher ends of justice. Legal professionals should carefully assess which route is appropriate: a straightforward revision when maintainable is usually preferred, resorting to Section 482 only in exceptional or clearly warranted situations.
Practical Challenges in Exercising Revisional Jurisdiction
In applying the above principles and powers, several practical challenges and considerations emerge:
Delay and Case Backlog: While revision is meant to correct errors, it often has the side-effect of delaying the trial or proceeding in question. Courts are inundated with revision petitions, some of which are filed as a delaying tactic by parties (especially accused persons trying to postpone the inevitable progress of trial). This raises a challenge for judges to swiftly filter out frivolous or purely dilatory revisions. The Asian Resurfacing guidelines for time-bound disposal of cases with stay are a response to this issue (). Still, managing the docket remains an everyday challenge – prioritizing genuine revisions (where there is clear illegality) versus those filed routinely after every interim order of the trial court. Legal professionals need to be mindful that overuse or misuse of revision can be counterproductive; high courts increasingly impose costs or dismiss revisions that appear to be aimed at delay rather than redressal of a serious grievance.
Definitional Gray Areas – Interlocutory vs Intermediate: Despite Supreme Court judgments, distinguishing what is “interlocutory” and what is “intermediate” can be tricky in borderline cases. For example, an order on an application for medical re-examination of a victim, or an order directing a further investigation by police – are these interlocutory? Different courts have sometimes taken different views. The Girish Kumar Suneja decision provides clarity by focusing on whether the order finally decides a substantive right or could end proceedings if decided differently (). Yet, at the margins, debates continue. This uncertainty can lead to inconsistent practices – some judges might entertain a revision for a particular type of order, while others might label it interlocutory and reject it. Practitioners must carefully frame their petitions to convince the court that the order impugned does affect important rights (if they want it to be heard) or conversely, argue it’s interlocutory (if they want the revision rejected, say when defending a trial court’s interim order against an opponent’s revision).
Second Revision via 482 – Thin Line: Another challenge is the fine line between a prohibited second revision and a permissible inherent power petition. As discussed, the High Court can in theory use 482 to do what a second revision would have done, but it must guard against making this a routine. There is a practical hesitation: even if a litigant styles their petition as under 482 after losing in Sessions Court, the High Court often looks at it with suspicion, because allowing it freely would defeat Section 397(3). Therefore, advocates face the challenge of demonstrating exceptional circumstances – essentially having to show something like a jurisdictional error or a completely absurd outcome in the Sessions Court order – to justify a second bite. There is a thin line between using inherent power legitimately and abusing it to re-argue a failed revision.
Scope of Evidence Consideration: Since revisional courts generally cannot delve into evidence or new materials, there is sometimes a challenge when critical evidence is discovered later or was wrongly excluded. The revisional court might feel handcuffed by the record. For instance, if after a trial a key witness’s testimony is found perjurious, a revision may not be the right remedy – the accused might have to go for appeal or other relief. Similarly, if a magistrate refuses to call a particular witness and the case ends in conviction, the accused might argue in revision that this was a material illegality. Balancing adherence to the record versus doing full justice is a practical tightrope. The Harshendra Kumar D. case shows the court’s willingness to consider unimpeachable documents even at the revisional stage (), but that is an exception. Typically, revisions proceed on the record as-is, which can be a limitation if the record is deficient.
Coordination between Sessions and High Court: Because both levels can entertain revisions, there is sometimes duplication of effort. For example, a person might file a revision in the High Court and another person (or even the same person out of ignorance) files before the Sessions Court regarding the same order. The law forbids two simultaneous revisions on the same matter, so one of them will eventually be aborted. But ensuring that the right forum hears it and that judicial time is not wasted requires good coordination. The proviso to Section 397(1) actually prohibits a High Court or Sessions Judge from proceeding with revision if the other has already taken it up. In the modern era, with electronic case management, such conflicts are fewer, but they do occur. Lawyers have to be careful not to violate the single forum rule, and courts have to ensure compliance to avoid inconsistent rulings.
Ensuring Presence for Hearing: Since revision is largely a paper-based scrutiny, sometimes neither the revisionist nor the respondent shows much interest in arguing it (especially if one side is content with the status quo). The court, however, cannot dispose of it without perusing the merits (no dismissal for default once admitted). This can be practically challenging if the petitioner loses interest after getting a stay (a tactic sometimes used – get a stay, then drag feet). Courts tackle this by deciding on merits even ex parte, as noted in Santosh’s case (). Yet from a practitioner’s perspective, it’s important to follow through on a revision; abandoning it can result in an adverse judgment which remains on record.
Awareness and Training: For law students and young lawyers, understanding revisional jurisdiction intricacies can be challenging. It is neither an appeal nor a writ, but shares some characteristics of both. Practical exposure is key – observing how judges handle revisions, how much they entertain arguments on facts, etc. Over time, certain unwritten conventions develop in each High Court about revisions (for example, some High Courts have a practice of not entertaining revision against interlocutory orders at all, pushing parties to 482 route; some prefer that Sessions Court be approached first in certain classes of cases like minor offenses). Navigating these unwritten norms is part of the practical know-how one must gain.
Despite these challenges, the revisional jurisdiction remains a vital tool. It is often the last resort for a litigant who has no appeal, and the last check for an erroneous order that could otherwise cause injustice. The key practical advice is to use revision judiciously – present genuine issues of law or jurisdiction, respect the limitations of the court’s review, and avoid turning the revision into an attempt at re-trying the case. When used appropriately, the revision can correct serious wrongs with relatively less cost and time than a full appeal, serving the cause of justice efficiently.
Criminal Revision under Indian law is an embodiment of the higher judiciary’s solemn duty to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of law and justice. Through the revisional jurisdiction, High Courts and Sessions Courts act as custodians of correctness in criminal adjudication – stepping in to undo errors that could lead to injustice, while being careful not to usurp the fact-finding role of the trial courts. We have seen that Section 397 CrPC, read with Sections 399 and 401, furnishes a robust framework for this supervisory review, circumscribed by prudent limitations (no interlocutory interventions, no second revisions by the same party, no reversal of acquittals to convictions, etc.).
Over time, judicial interpretations – from Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye to Amit Kapoor, Girish Kumar Suneja and Asian Resurfacing – have fleshed out the meaning and breadth of revisional power. The result is a nuanced legal landscape: final orders can be revised for legality; interlocutory orders generally cannot be touched; and a special category of intermediate orders can be revised in the interest of justice () (). Courts have balanced the need to correct serious errors against the need to prevent endless delays, leading to doctrines like the six-month cap on stays () and a general reluctance to interfere in fact-findings absent perversity.
We also underscored the difference between revisional jurisdiction and inherent powers. While both aim to prevent abuse of the judicial process, revision is a statutorily guided power, and inherent power is a broad residuary reservoir. The High Court’s inherent power (Section 482) stands as a safety valve, ensuring that even where revision is barred or not invoked, the ends of justice can still be secured in extraordinary cases. Thus, in exceptional situations, the High Court may transcend the technical limits of revision to quash proceedings or orders that are plainly unjust, echoing the principle that “the limitation is self-restraint, nothing more”.
From a practical standpoint, criminal revision remains a potent remedy. It is often faster than an appeal and can be inexpensive, making it accessible for litigants seeking quick redressal of wrongful orders. It allows even third parties or victims to draw the court’s attention to miscarriages of justice (). However, with great power comes great responsibility – courts and practitioners alike must ensure revision is not misused as a stalling tactic or a substitute for full-fledged appeals on trivial grounds. The Supreme Court’s consistent message has been that revisional interference should be an exception rather than the rule, reserved for “glaring defects” or “manifest errors” that occasion a “flagrant miscarriage of justice”.
In closing, one might say that the revisional jurisdiction is the fine scalpel in the surgeon’s toolkit – meant for precise corrections of legal wrongs – as opposed to the hammer of an appellate court which can remodel the entire case. A sharp scalpel in steady hands can save the patient, but if overused it can also cause harm. The Indian judiciary, through careful jurisprudence, has endeavored to keep the scalpel sharp and use it judiciously. Criminal revision thus stands as a testament to the judicial commitment that no person should suffer injustice from a court’s order without at least one opportunity for that order’s correctness to be examined by a higher forum. In the words of the Supreme Court, the revisional court’s chief aim is to ensure that “justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the court” – a guiding light for all judges and lawyers navigating the law of criminal revision.
Sources:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 397, 399, 401, 482.
Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 – Scope of revisional power and guidelines for quashing charges () ().
Girish Kumar Suneja vs. CBI, AIR 2017 SC 3620 – Interlocutory vs intermediate orders, three-judge bench clarification () ().
Vinay Tyagi vs. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762 – Further investigation and the court’s revisional/inherent jurisdiction to order it (para 18).
Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. vs. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 – Directions on stay of proceedings in revisions/appeals (automatic lapse after 6 months) ().
Shilpa vs. Madhukar & Ors., 2001 (1) JIC 588 (SC) – Liberal condonation of delay in criminal revisions; illegality in order should not survive due to technical delay ().
Santosh vs. State of U.P., (2009) (3) SCC (Cri) 307 – Revision cannot be dismissed for default; must be decided on merits ().
K. Pandurangan vs. S.S.R. Velusamy, (2003) 8 SCC 625 – Revisional locus of third parties/strangers; even outsiders can trigger revision ().
Harshendra Kumar D. vs. Rebatilata Koley, 2011 Cr.L.J. 1626 (SC) – Revisional court can consider impeccable material evidence beyond record to prevent injustice ().
Jagannath Verma vs. State of U.P., AIR 2014 All 214 – Need to hear the proposed accused in revision; audi alteram partem in revisional proceedings ().
Raj Kapoor vs. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43 – Inherent powers vis-à-vis revisional bar; 397(2) does not curtail Section 482 in extraordinary situations.
Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 – Not all orders interlocutory; introduction of “intermediate order” concept (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION).
Amar Nath vs. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 – Definition of interlocutory order; examples and exception for orders affecting rights () (CRIMINAL REVISIONL JURISDICTION).