Wrong Quasi-Judicial Orders Without Extraneous Influence Cannot Invite Departmental Action: Supreme Court:

Passing a wrong order in exercise of quasi-judicial power is not misconduct unless tainted by extraneous considerations – Supreme Court delivered a significant judgment in the case of Amresh Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 10590 of 2024), decisively ruling that mere issuance of an allegedly wrong quasi-judicial order, absent any evidence of extraneous influence, cannot be a ground for departmental proceedings. The Court set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and restored the Single Judge’s order which had quashed the chargesheet against the appellant.

The appellant, Amresh Shrivastava, was a Naib Tehsildar appointed in 1981 and later promoted to Tehsildar. In 1997, while discharging quasi-judicial functions, he passed an order of land settlement after following the due procedure under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The said order remained unchallenged for years and attained finality. Surprisingly, after a gap of 12 years, a show-cause notice was issued in 2009, followed by a chargesheet in 2011 alleging that the order had conferred undue benefit upon private parties.  

The learned Single Judge quashed the chargesheet solely on the ground of inordinate delay and lack of any allegation of misconduct or malice, holding that such proceedings were unwarranted against a quasi-judicial officer.

 However, the Division Bench of the High Court reversed this decision, relying upon Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56, and directed continuation of disciplinary proceedings, stating that the appellant could not claim immunity if he had acted negligently or in a manner unbecoming of a government servant.

The Supreme Court framed two pivotal questions:

 Whether the chargesheet could be sustained under the principles laid down in K.K. Dhawan?  

1. Whether unexplained inordinate delay of 14 years itself was sufficient to quash the chargesheet?

Answering the first issue, the Court held:  “In the present case, we are of the considered view that the charges alleged against the Appellant in the chargesheet fall under the category of a wrongful order, which does not appear to have been influenced by extraneous factors or any form of gratification. It appears that the order has been passed in good faith, without any indication of dishonesty.”

 The Court extensively relied on the precedents of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India (1999) 7 SCC 409 and Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640 to hold that erroneous orders passed while exercising quasi-judicial functions cannot ipso facto be grounds for disciplinary action unless accompanied by serious allegations such as extraneous influence, bribery, or mala fide intentions.  

On the second issue, the Court emphasized: “In the instant case where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct being within the knowledge of the department, the answer must go in favour of the employee.”  

The Court further cited State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh (1990 Supp SCC 738) and P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board (2005) 6 SCC 636 where the Supreme Court had held that inordinate and unexplained delay would vitiate disciplinary proceedings due to mental agony and prejudice caused to the employee.

The Supreme Court categorically observed: “The power exercised by the Appellant in his capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing the order of Land Settlement Order, cannot be considered of a nature that would warrant disciplinary proceedings against him.”  

The Court found no material suggesting that the appellant had acted with ulterior motives. Moreover, it held that the 14-year delay in issuing the chargesheet without any cogent explanation was fatal to the proceedings.  

Finally, setting aside the Division Bench’s judgment, the Court restored the order of the learned Single Judge and quashed the chargesheet and disciplinary proceedings.  

This judgment reaffirms the legal protection available to quasi-judicial officers under the Judges Protection Act, 1985, and the judicial principle that bona fide quasi-judicial orders cannot invite disciplinary proceedings unless tainted by mala fide or extraneous factors.  

By emphasizing that “wrong orders alone without evidence of misconduct cannot lead to punishment”, the Supreme Court has sent a strong message preserving the independence of officers performing quasi-judicial functions.

Date of Decision: April 1, 2025