U.P. Revenue Code: Eviction Proceedings Are Summary In Nature; High Court Guidelines Mandating Cross-Examination Not Enforceable Until Adopted By State

"Once the Court itself has issued directions for the “adoption” of the said guidelines/rules by the State of U.P., then such adoption is necessary, and without such adoption, the guidelines framed by this Court cannot be implemented." Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), in a significant ruling, held that the proceedings for eviction from Gram Sabha land under Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, are summary in nature and the elaborate guidelines previously framed by a coordinate bench requiring oral evidence and cross-examination are not mandatory until formally adopted by the State Government.

A single-judge bench of Justice Alok Mathur observed that "proceedings under Section 67 of the U.P Revenue Code would have to be judged on the anvil of the existing procedure, till such time as the guidelines framed in the case of Rishipal (supra) are adopted by the state."

The petitioners approached the High Court challenging eviction and penalty orders passed by the Tehsildar, and upheld by the Additional District Magistrate, concerning an alleged illegal mosque constructed on Gram Sabha land recorded as a 'Khalihan'. The core grievance was that the revenue authorities did not permit the cross-examination of the Lekhpal, thereby allegedly violating the procedural guidelines laid down by the High Court in the 2022 case of Rishipal Singh v. State of U.P. The State countered that under the existing statutory framework, the proceedings are strictly summary in nature and are to be decided on affidavits.

The primary question before the court was whether the comprehensive guidelines framed in Rishipal Singh, which mandate the examination and cross-examination of revenue officials, possess the force of law overriding the existing summary procedure prescribed under the U.P. Revenue Code Rules. The court was also called upon to determine whether the eviction and penalty orders against the petitioners were legally sustainable under the extant statutory framework.

The Court meticulously examined the statutory scheme, specifically Rules 66 and 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code Rules read with Section 225-A of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. It noted that the legislature explicitly designed these proceedings to be summary in nature, where questions are to be determined primarily upon affidavits rather than oral trials. The bench highlighted that the Assistant Collector is empowered to rely on documentary evidence and affidavits, and the right to cross-examine arises only if the authority is explicitly satisfied that it is necessary. "Accordingly, as per the statutory scheme... all the questions arising for determination in any summary proceeding under this Code shall be decided upon affidavits, in the manner prescribed."

Turning to the petitioner's heavy reliance on the coordinate bench's decision in Rishipal Singh, the Court observed that the directions issued in that judgment were merely recommendations or guidelines meant to be adopted by the State Government. The bench clarified that the earlier judgment constituted a major departure from the prescribed statutory rules by effectively converting a summary procedure into a regular trial requiring oral evidence. The Court emphasized that it is the prerogative of the legislature to amend the rules, and the judiciary cannot unilaterally replace valid statutory procedures with new frameworks. "Therefore, after carefully examining the aforesaid directions... the major departure from the prescribed rules has been provided in Clause (vi) of paragraph 74 of the Rishipal (supra) according to which it would be mandatory for the authority to examine the person who submitted the report and to permit the said authority to be cross-examined."

Addressing the vacuum of law argument, the Court drew a sharp distinction between the present scenario and cases like Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, where the Supreme Court framed guidelines due to a complete absence of domestic legislation. Justice Mathur pointed out that valid, enforceable rules already exist for Section 67 proceedings. Consequently, the High Court cannot invoke extraordinary powers to enforce judicial guidelines that directly contradict existing statutory provisions, especially when the earlier judgment explicitly called for the State to suitably amend the rules. "The situation before the Supreme Court can be clearly distinguished from the facts of the present case, where specific, valid, and enforceable rules exist; therefore, there was no occasion to exercise the extraordinary powers of formulating enforceable guidelines unless and until the existing rules are declared to be ultra vires."

"It is for the aforesaid reason that we do not find that there was any intention to make the guidelines enforceable as such prior to adoption by the State, and necessary amendments in the rules..."

Applying the existing legal framework to the facts at hand, the Court found that the revenue authorities had strictly adhered to Rules 66 and 67. The authorities had issued the requisite notices in Form 20, considered the petitioners' replies, and rightly concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any title or interest over the Gram Sabha land. However, regarding the imposition of the Rs. 36,000 penalty, the Court found a glaring evidentiary gap. While upholding the eviction order, the Court struck down the financial penalty due to a lack of specific evidence tying the petitioners to the construction. "With regard to the imposition of penalty, this Court is of the view that there was no material to link the petitioners to either construction or occupation of the Mosque the same cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside."

The High Court dismissed the writ petition concerning the eviction from the Gram Sabha land, affirming that the summary procedure adopted by the revenue authorities was legally sound and compliant with the U.P. Revenue Code Rules. However, the Court granted partial relief by setting aside the imposition of the financial penalty against the petitioners due to a lack of linking evidence

Date of Decision: 25 March 2026