Registered Adoption Deed Creates Only Rebuttable Presumption; Independent Proof Of 'Giving & Taking' Ceremonies Mandatory: Madras High Court

"It is trite that mere production of a registered Adoption Deed would not, by itself, conducively establish the factum of adoption nor automatically attract the presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956," Madras High Court (Madurai Bench), in a detailed judgment, held that a registered adoption deed does not provide conclusive proof of adoption but merely creates a rebuttable presumption.

A bench of Justice N. Mala observed that the person seeking to displace the natural line of succession by claiming adoption carries a heavy burden to prove the essential ceremonies of "giving and taking" through independent and cogent evidence. The Court set aside concurrent findings of lower courts, noting that they had ignored contemporaneous documentary evidence that contradicted the oral testimonies of the parties.

The dispute arose from a suit for partition filed by the plaintiffs (respondents herein) regarding properties originally belonging to one Nainakannu Bhattar [Senior]. The second plaintiff claimed a half-share in the suit properties as the adopted son of Nainakannu Bhattar [Junior], alleging the adoption took place in 1961-62 when he was three years old. The defendant (appellant), who is the brother of the deceased Nainakannu Bhattar [Junior], challenged the adoption as fraudulent and invalid, asserting his right as a reversionary heir to the estate.

The primary question before the Court was whether the second plaintiff had successfully proved his status as the adopted son through the registered Adoption Deed of 1981 and oral testimonies. The Court was also called upon to determine whether the presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (HAMA) is irrebuttable and if the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a Second Appeal.

Presumption Under Section 16 HAMA Is Rebuttable By Contra Evidence

The Court emphasized that while Section 16 of the HAMA mandates a court to presume that an adoption recorded in a registered document was made in compliance with the Act, this presumption is not absolute. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the bench noted that the inclusion of the words "unless and until it is disproved" in the statute makes the presumption flexible rather than rigid. The Court observed that it is always open to the opposing party to dislodge this presumption by demonstrating that the adoption is improbable or untrue.

Adoptive Claimants Must Discharge Heavy Burden To Displace Natural Line Of Succession

Drawing upon the ratio in Addagada Raghavamma vs. Addagada Chenchamma, the Court held that anyone seeking to divert the natural course of succession by setting up an adoption must prove it with evidence free from suspicion. The bench noted that such evidence must be of such cogency as to leave no room for doubt. In the present case, the Court found that the second plaintiff failed to meet this high threshold of proof despite the existence of a registered deed.

"A registered deed of adoption is not by itself, proof of adoption and the factum of adoption, including the ceremony of giving and taking, must be independently established by cogent evidence."

Registered Deed In 1981 Cannot Validate Adoption Alleged In 1961 Without Contemporaneous Proof

The Court scrutinized the Adoption Deed (Ex.A1) dated February 28, 1981, which claimed an adoption took place twenty years prior in 1961-62. Justice N. Mala pointed out that all significant school and college records (Exs. A37, B1, and B18) consistently described the second plaintiff as the son of his biological father, Karpoora Bhattar, long after the alleged adoption. The Court found it highly improbable that if a true adoption had occurred in 1961, his name and parentage would not have been updated in contemporaneous official records until the mid-1980s.

Statutory Embargo Under Section 10(iv) HAMA On Age Of Adoption

The Court observed that the story of an adoption at age three was likely introduced to circumvent the statutory bar under Section 10(iv) of the HAMA. This section prohibits the adoption of any person who has completed fifteen years of age, unless a custom or usage permits otherwise. As the second plaintiff was 23 years old when the deed was executed in 1981, the Court held that the adoption was ex-facie contrary to the Act in the absence of any proven community custom.

"The evidence unmistakably indicates that the story of an earlier adoption in 1961/1962 was introduced only with a view to overcome the statutory embargo contained in Section 10[iv] of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956."

Interference In Second Appeal Permissible If Findings Are Perverse

While acknowledging the limited scope of Section 100 CPC, the Court held that the restraint against interfering with concurrent findings of fact does not operate when such findings are shown to be "perverse" or based on a misreading of evidence. The bench found that the lower courts had relied on "stray documents" while completely overlooking contemporaneous documentary evidence that was wholly inconsistent with the plea of adoption.

The High Court concluded that the plaintiffs miserably failed to establish the alleged adoption of 1961-62. Consequently, the Court allowed the Second Appeal, set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court, and dismissed the original suit for partition. The Court held that the defendant, as the brother of the deceased, was entitled to the estate through natural succession.

Date of Decision: 01 June 2026