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by Admin
05 December 2025 4:19 PM
“If the informant knew the accused but didn’t name them in the FIR, later implication raises doubt of false involvement” — In a significant reiteration of evidentiary law under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Supreme Court of India, on October 6, 2025, held that failure to name known accused persons in the First Information Report (FIR) constitutes a material omission that critically undermines the credibility of the prosecution's case.
Supreme Court set aside the conviction of three individuals under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B IPC, citing numerous deficiencies in the prosecution’s case. Central to the Court’s reasoning was the non-mention of two appellants, Nazim and Aftab, in the initial FIR, despite the fact that they were well known to the informant (PW-1), the father of the deceased child.
“A known person not named in FIR raises the presumption of subsequent false implication”
The Bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma categorically held:
“The failure to name two of the three Appellants in the FIR, despite the complainant’s familiarity with them, casts a serious shadow on the subsequent attempt to implicate them. It raises a legitimate inference that their names were introduced at a later stage, thereby suggesting the possibility of false implication.”
The Court relied on the ruling in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 815, and emphasised the significance of omissions in the FIR when judging the veracity of the prosecution case:
“Omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case.”
In Nazim’s case, both PW-1 and PW-2 (who scribed the FIR) were familiar with Nazim and Aftab, yet chose not to name them in the FIR lodged just hours after the discovery of the body. It was only later during investigation that their names were introduced.
FIR as a Contemporaneous Statement: The First and Often Most Credible Account
The judgment underscores the evidentiary importance of FIRs as contemporaneous accounts of the alleged crime. While the FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia of all facts, exclusion of key accused—especially when the informant knows them—is not a mere oversight, but a substantive contradiction.
The Court observed:
“In a case based solely on circumstantial evidence, every circumstance must withstand rigorous scrutiny… This significant omission strikes at the root of the prosecution narrative, undermines its credibility, and constitutes a material fact that must weigh heavily in favour of the accused.”
Material Omission Weakens the Chain of Circumstances
The prosecution had argued that the omission was not fatal since investigation later revealed their involvement. However, the Court dismissed this rationale, pointing out that contemporaneous suspicion was directed only at six other villagers with whom the informant had enmity, and not against Nazim or Aftab.
This break in the initial narrative, especially in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, destroyed the necessary consistency and coherence required to complete the chain of circumstances.
Acquittal of All Appellants for Want of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the FIR omission, combined with other evidentiary deficiencies, including unreliable witness testimony, absence of test identification parade, and inconclusive forensic results, rendered the prosecution's case too weak to sustain a conviction.
“Tested against the five golden principles of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution’s case fails to meet the standard of proof required for conviction.”
Accordingly, the Court acquitted Nazim, Aftab, and Arman Ali of all charges under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B IPC and directed that their bail bonds and sureties stand discharged.
Date of Decision: October 6, 2025
