Court Has No Power To Condone Delay In Filing Written Statement Beyond 120 Days Maximum Limit Prescribed In DHC Original Side Rules: Delhi High Court

"However, beyond the period of 120 days, the Court is powerless when it comes to condoning the delay in filing the written statement, more so when the reasons such as the ones provided in the instant Application, are vague and do not depict a case of ‘exceptional’ and ‘unavoidable’ circumstances, " Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling, held that it lacks the jurisdiction to condone any delay in filing a written statement that extends beyond the mandatory 120-day outer limit prescribed under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad observed that the phrase "but not thereafter" used in the Rules acts as a terminal point, stripping the court of its discretionary power to accept late filings regardless of the reasons cited.

The dispute arose in a civil suit where Mrs. Minu Subba was impleaded as Defendant No. 2 via a court order on July 24, 2025. Following the impleadment, she was directed to file her written statement within 30 days as per the standard procedure. However, the defendant filed the written statement only on November 27, 2025, which was 126 days from the date of the impleadment order and six days beyond the maximum permissible grace period of 120 days.

The primary question before the court was whether the High Court possesses the power to condone a delay in filing a written statement beyond the 120-day limit specified in Chapter VII of the DHC OS Rules. The court was also called upon to determine if the inherent powers of the court under Section 151 of the CPC could be invoked to bypass these specific procedural limitations.

Provisions Of Original Side Rules Prevail Over Code Of Civil Procedure

The Court began by analyzing Rules 2 and 4 of Chapter VII of the DHC OS Rules, which set a 30-day primary limit and a 90-day "gracious period" for filing a written statement. It noted that while the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) provides a general framework, the Rules framed by the High Court for its original side jurisdiction occupy the field to the exclusion of the CPC wherever there is a conflict or a specific procedure provided.

Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Extend Time Beyond Mandatory Outer Limit

Justice Prasad emphasized that the issue is no longer res integra following the Division Bench judgment in Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani. The Bench noted that the inclusion of the preemptory phrase "but not thereafter" in the Rules indicates a clear legislative intent to fix an outer boundary that cannot be breached. The Court observed that "the words ‘but not thereafter’ will become otiose" if any other interpretation permitting indefinite extensions were adopted.

"The phrase ‘but not thereafter’ mentioned in the Rule indicates that the intention of the rule making authority was not to permit any replication to be entertained beyond a total period of 45 days. If any other interpretation is given to the said Rule, then the words ‘but not thereafter’, will become otiose."

Inherent Powers Under Section 151 CPC Cannot Sidestep Express Statutory Rules

The Defendant No. 2 had sought to invoke the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC to condone the six-day delay beyond the 120-day limit. The Court rejected this submission, holding that inherent powers cannot be used to circumvent or sidestep specific statutory provisions. The Bench remarked that "the inherent powers of the court are not to be used for the benefit of a litigant who has a remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure" or where a statute expressly exhausts the scope of judicial discretion.

"If there are specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the court... the inherent powers of the court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure."

Hierarchy Of Precedents And Binding Nature Of Division Bench Rulings

Addressing a perceived conflict with the coordinate bench decision in Amarendra Dhari Singh, the Court clarified that the principles of certainty and the hierarchy of courts must be maintained. It held that the Division Bench ruling in Ram Sarup Lugani remains the binding precedent on the mandatory nature of timelines under the DHC OS Rules. The Court noted that even if a judge harbors doubts about a precedent, the only recourse is to refer the matter to a larger bench, rather than treading a contrary line.

"Judgments rendered by coordinate benches or benches of a larger composition bind a court irrespective of doubts or views that may be harboured by individual judges... A novel argument or a mere fresh review of what a statutory provision entails or should mean has never been accepted as being sufficient ground to discard a binding precedent."

Application Of Law To The Present Case

Applying these principles, the Court found that the Defendant No. 2 had exhausted the maximum time of 120 days. The reasons provided for the delay, including personal difficulties and economic constraints in engaging counsel, were deemed "vague" and insufficient to qualify as "exceptional and unavoidable circumstances" even if the court had the power to consider them. The Court concluded that once the 120-day period expires, the right to file a written statement stands extinguished by operation of law.

The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay, reiterating that the timelines in the Original Side Rules are mandatory and not directory. The ruling reinforces the principle that special local laws governing court procedure take primacy over general statutes, ensuring that litigation on the original side proceeds with strict adherence to prescribed timelines to prevent indefinite delays.

Date of Decision: 27th February, 2026