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by sayum
06 July 2026 8:09 AM
“Executing Court Cannot Relegate Parties to Fresh Suit for What Has Already Been Decreed”, Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court reinforcing that terms incorporated in a mutual consent divorce decree—especially regarding immovable property—are binding, executable, and not subject to collateral challenge.
Setting aside the Family Court’s refusal to execute a consent decree, the High Court unequivocally held that Family Courts have full jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, to pass and enforce such decrees, and that the execution machinery under Order XXI Rule 34 CPC is available for the registration of documents agreed in such settlements.
“What Has Been Agreed, Decreed, and Accepted—Must Be Enforced”: Consent Terms Are Not Empty Promises
The Court was dealing with a situation where the husband and wife had jointly filed a petition under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for divorce by mutual consent. The petition contained detailed settlement terms, including a clause where the wife unconditionally agreed to relinquish her rights in a jointly owned flat at Bodakdev, Ahmedabad, and execute a release deed before the Sub-Registrar.
The petition was accepted and divorce was granted on 25.07.2019 “as per the terms and conditions stated in the petition”. However, when the husband later sought execution of the property-related term, the Family Court refused, holding that no specific decree existed for execution of a document and advised the petitioner to file a separate suit for specific performance.
Terming this approach legally erroneous, the High Court ruled: “The Family Court cannot go behind the decree or refuse to execute it on the ground that no issue was framed or no specific direction was given for document execution. Such refusal defeats the very object of the compromise.” [Para 29]
Family Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Property Disputes Between Spouses
Rejecting the contention that property terms cannot be enforced under Section 13B proceedings, the Court clarified that Section 7(c) of the Family Courts Act confers explicit jurisdiction over disputes related to property of spouses or either of them.
Referring to the Supreme Court's ruling in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida, (2003) 4 SCC 166, the Bench reaffirmed:
“The Family Court’s jurisdiction extends to all property disputes between spouses, even if the property was not gifted at the time of marriage.” [Paras 30–31]
The Court further emphasized that Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which speaks of property presented “at or about the time of marriage”, is an enabling provision and does not restrict jurisdiction over other property disputes.
Order 21 Rule 34 CPC Is Applicable to Consent Decrees
The Court addressed the execution mechanics under Order XXI Rule 34 CPC, which deals with execution of documents. Since the consent decree explicitly obligated the wife to execute a release deed, the Court held:
“Once a decree incorporates such terms, the executing court is duty-bound to execute and register the document even if a separate operative direction was not framed.” [Paras 23–25, 39]
Further relying on Section 28A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Section 18 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Court held that Family Courts are fully empowered to execute such decrees as civil courts would.
“One Cannot Pick and Choose Which Parts of Consent Decree to Honour”
In a scathing rebuke of the respondent-wife’s attempt to renegotiate the consent decree by insisting on adding the daughter’s name to the property title (which was not part of the original terms), the High Court held:
“Having accepted and acted upon the divorce decree without any challenge, the respondent is estopped from resiling from the terms. One party cannot accept favourable terms and refuse to honour others.” [Paras 29, 36]
The Court found the Family Court’s reasoning flawed, stating that when parties enter into a mutual consent settlement, it is precisely to avoid prolonged litigation and adjudication.
Judgments Cited in Support of Executability of Consent Decrees
The Court extensively relied on:
Deepa Bhargava v. Mahesh Bhargava, (2009) 2 SCC 294 – Consent decree valid unless set aside; cannot go behind it.
Pawan Kumar Arya v. Ravi Kumar Arya, (2020) 15 SCC 190 – Consent terms must be fully complied with; no selective execution.
Gyan Devi v. Leela Devi, 2007 (96) DRJ 426 – Consent decree must be executed as per terms; no modification permissible.
C. Vikram v. B.K. Sowmya, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 8653 – Executing court cannot revisit consent terms after finality.
Balkrishna R. Kadam v. Sangeeta B. Kadam, (1997) 7 SCC 500 – Section 27 HMA includes property linked to marriage even if acquired after marriage.
Equitable Directions for Minor Daughter: SIP of ₹15 Lakhs Approved
In a Speaking to Minutes Order dated 13 January 2026, the Court accepted the husband’s request to modify the systematic investment plan (SIP) for his daughter Milonee. Instead of investing ₹15,00,000 over 20 months at ₹75,000 per month, the Court permitted spreading the same amount over 30 months at ₹50,000 per month.
“SIP of ₹15,00,000 spread over 30 months, i.e., ₹50,000 per month shall be invested in the name of daughter Milonee.”
This direction ensures financial security for the minor child, reinforcing the Court’s approach to balance legal enforceability with welfare considerations.
A Binding Consent Decree Cannot Be Dismantled By Reluctant Compliance
In allowing the First Appeal and directing the Family Court to execute the release deed, the Gujarat High Court has sent a clear message: mutual consent decrees are not empty settlements; they are binding contracts backed by judicial imprimatur.
Any attempt to renegotiate or partially honour such agreements undermines the sanctity of consensual litigation and is contrary to both the letter and spirit of matrimonial jurisprudence.
Date of Decision: 16 December 2025
