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by sayum
09 January 2026 9:41 AM
“Charge may be framed even on strong suspicion—Court is not required to evaluate evidence meticulously at this stage”, ruled the High Court while dismissing a criminal revision challenging the framing of charge for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.
In a significant ruling Allahabad High Court dismissed the criminal revision filed in Ashok Singh @ Kali Singh v. State of U.P. and Another, wherein the revisionist had challenged the order taking cognizance and subsequent framing of charge under Section 306 IPC for alleged abetment of suicide, primarily based on a suicide note. Emphasizing the limited scope of interference under revisional jurisdiction at the stage of charge, the Court refused to quash the charge, holding that “grave suspicion and presumption are sufficient at the threshold stage; proof is a matter of trial.”
“No Obligation to Prove Guilt at Charge Stage—Presumption of Offence is Enough”: Court Cites Settled Law
The Court began its judgment by reiterating the fundamental principle that at the stage of framing charge, courts are not expected to meticulously evaluate evidence or determine whether conviction is certain. Rather, as laid down in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh and Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, the test is whether the material on record raises a strong presumption or grave suspicion that the accused has committed the offence.
“The word ‘presuming’ appearing in Section 228 CrPC is sufficient to infer that charge can be framed on presumption and not on concrete basis... which may be necessary for acquittal or conviction,” observed Justice Shailendra, clarifying the distinction between Sections 227 and 228 of CrPC.
The Court noted that recording of reasons is mandatory only in case of discharge under Section 227, and not for framing charge under Section 228 CrPC. “The judge is required to record reasons only if he decides to discharge the accused. But if he is to frame charge, he may do so without recording his reasons,” the Court quoted from Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal.
Suicide Note Found in Deceased’s Pocket Alleging Harassment by Brother
The case concerned the death of Deen Dayal Singh, who allegedly died by suicide on 2 March 2020 after being run over by a train. A handwritten suicide note was allegedly recovered from the deceased’s trouser pocket during inquest proceedings. The note, signed twice and running into multiple paragraphs, named the revisionist—his real brother Ashok Singh—and their deceased father as responsible for his death. A subsequent investigation led to the filing of a chargesheet under Section 306 IPC, culminating in the magistrate taking cognizance on 22.10.2021 and the Sessions Court framing charge on 24.01.2024.
The revisionist, through counsel Mr. Rajeev Chaddha, challenged both the cognizance and the framing of charge on several grounds including the disputed genuineness of the suicide note, discrepancies in dates, inconsistent statements of the widow, and the absence of specific instigation or abetment as required under Section 107 IPC.
Court Declines to Enter Into Evidentiary Arena at Pre-Trial Stage
Rejecting the petitioner’s primary challenge to the suicide note, the Court clarified that issues concerning its authenticity, presence of signatures at different paragraphs, and absence of date, are matters of trial, not charge.
“Mere fact that the suicide note is signed at the end of the first paragraph cannot be conclusively interpreted to discard subsequent paragraphs—especially when the note again bears signatures at the end.” the Court noted, emphasizing that such factual scrutiny was inappropriate at this stage.
On the argument that the suicide note mentioned the deceased’s father (who had died four months earlier) as being responsible, the Court held that this by itself does not invalidate the entire note: “It is possible the suicide note was partially written earlier or refers retrospectively. The absence of date on the note prevents conclusive inference at this stage.”
The Court further noted that handwriting expert reports were conflicting: the FSL found handwriting similarity but required more signatures for conclusive opinion, while a private expert report (submitted by the deceased’s mother) stated the writing was dissimilar. “Contradictory expert opinions require appreciation of evidence at trial—not at pre-trial stage,” the Court ruled.
Discrepancy in Cognizance and Chargesheet Dates Held Clerical, Not Fatal
One of the key grounds raised was that the Magistrate took cognizance on 22.10.2021, while the endorsement on the chargesheet by the Circle Officer was dated 23.10.2021. The revisionist argued this violated procedural law since cognizance cannot precede submission of the chargesheet.
The Court flatly rejected this hyper-technical contention as “not appealing to judicial conscience”, holding it was likely a “human error in writing the date”, and there was no material to show cognizance was taken without a chargesheet actually being before the court.
“To accept such an argument would require us to presume the Magistrate either took cognizance before the chargesheet was filed or visited the police station to endorse cognizance—a proposition that is neither practical nor plausible,” the Court remarked.
On Abetment of Suicide: Prima Facie Satisfaction is Enough, Guilt to be Established at Trial
Dealing with the core legal issue—abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC—the Court held that the ingredients of Section 107 IPC (instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid) need to be established at trial, not conclusively at the stage of charge. What matters at this juncture is whether the material, especially the suicide note and investigation, raises a presumption or grave suspicion.
“There is grave suspicion and presumption based on the suicide note and statements of witnesses—including the widow of the deceased—that the revisionist may have abetted the suicide. That is sufficient for the case to proceed to trial,” the Court held.
In particular, the Court noted that the widow’s final statement alleged longstanding property disputes, financial domination, and forced divorce involving the revisionist, all pointing toward a strained relationship and potential abetment.
Earlier Inconsistent Statements by Widow, Civil Suit Dismissal Not Material at This Stage
The Court also brushed aside the revisionist’s emphasis on earlier statements by the widow where she exonerated the family, and the subsequent dismissal of her civil suit seeking property rights. “Delay or inconsistency in statements is not determinative at the charge stage—such contradictions are to be tested during trial through cross-examination,” the Court observed.
Similarly, the fact that a civil suit was dismissed for non-disclosure of cause of action did not affect the criminal proceedings. “Rejection of plaint in civil litigation does not preclude or invalidate the framing of criminal charges where prima facie material exists,” the Court clarified.
Cited Judgments on Discharge Distinguished—Court Emphasizes Different Legal Threshold
The revisionist had relied on judgments like Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Satish Mehra to argue that the offence under Section 306 IPC was not made out and charge was unsustainable.
However, the Court held that these decisions pertained either to discharge applications under Section 227 CrPC or involved different factual matrices where even prima facie ingredients of the offence were absent.
“In the present case, we are concerned with a challenge to the framing of charge—not a discharge order. The legal threshold is different. At the stage of Section 228, only presumption and grave suspicion are required. Proof and analysis come at the trial,” the Court clarified.
No Interference Warranted—Let Trial Proceed
Dismissing the revision petition, the Court categorically held: “This Court is of the view that suspicion/grave suspicion/presumption did exist which obliged the Court to frame charge under Section 306 IPC... Hence, framing of charge is not faulty and does not call for interference.”
The Court vacated the interim order that had stayed proceedings and emphasized that none of its observations should influence the trial on merits.
Date of Decision: 07 January 2026