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by Admin
05 December 2025 3:16 PM
“Self-Incrimination Prohibits Compulsion to Confess, Not the Collection of Neutral Physical Evidence”: Supreme Court of India delivered a decisive ruling clarifying the scope of the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3). The Court held that a Magistrate is legally empowered to direct the collection of a voice sample—whether from an accused or a witness—and that such an act does not amount to testimonial compulsion.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the Calcutta High Court’s order, the Bench comprising Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran reaffirmed that the law laid down in Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2019) 8 SCC 1 is binding and continues to govern the field. The Court further observed that the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) has since codified this very principle under Section 349, thereby giving statutory sanction to what had already been judicially recognized.
The ruling reasserts that the collection of voice, handwriting, or fingerprint samples is not testimonial in nature, and hence does not violate the fundamental right against self-incrimination.
“The Rule Against Self-Incrimination Does Not Protect Silence From Neutral Evidence”: High Court’s Refusal to Follow Precedent Criticised
The controversy arose from a criminal case in West Bengal concerning the death of a 25-year-old woman under suspicious circumstances. During the investigation, the police sought to verify whether the second respondent (a witness) had threatened another witness on behalf of the deceased’s father. To confirm this, the Investigating Officer requested the Magistrate to direct the collection of the witness’s voice sample for comparison with recorded threats.
The Magistrate allowed the request, but the Calcutta High Court quashed the order, reasoning that no express provision existed under the old Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, empowering such a direction. The High Court also relied on the fact that the issue was once referred to a Larger Bench.
The Supreme Court found the High Court’s reasoning fundamentally flawed, remarking that:
“A purely academic question covered by a binding precedent was unnecessarily agitated and egregiously entertained. The reference to the Larger Bench had already been closed, and judicial discipline required adherence to the law declared in Ritesh Sinha.”
“A Voice Sample Is Like a Fingerprint—It Speaks Nothing Until Compared”: Supreme Court Reaffirms Doctrine of Innocuous Material Evidence
Referring to the constitutional reasoning in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808), the Court reiterated the classical test for self-incrimination:
“In order that a testimony by an accused person may be said to have been self-incriminatory, it must by itself have the tendency of incriminating the person. A specimen handwriting or voice sample, by itself, is no testimony at all—it is wholly innocuous and serves only as material for comparison.”
Building upon that principle, the Court declared:
“A voice sample is not a statement; it is a specimen. It becomes incriminatory only when matched with other evidence discovered in investigation. The Constitution forbids compulsion to confess, not the collection of neutral physical evidence.”
Thus, compelling a person—accused or witness—to provide a voice sample does not violate Article 20(3), as the sample itself is not a testimonial act but a mechanical aid for verification.
“Criminal Procedure Evolves With Technology”: BNSS Confirms Judicial Power to Order Voice Sampling
The judgment also clarified that the transition from the Cr.P.C. to the BNSS does not alter the validity of Magistrate’s powers. The Bench observed that the principle recognized in Ritesh Sinha had already filled the legislative gap under the old Code, and with the enactment of the BNSS, Section 349 now explicitly empowers Magistrates to direct any person to furnish a sample of voice, handwriting, or bodily substances.
Justice Chandran observed:
“It matters not whether the Cr.P.C. or the BNSS applies. The judicial power to direct voice sampling was already recognized by this Court in 2019, and the new statutory regime merely affirms what was constitutionally implicit.”
The Court thereby restored the Magistrate’s order and directed the respondent to comply with the voice sample collection, dismissing the High Court’s finding as inconsistent with settled law.
“Judicial Precedent Is Not Optional; It Is the Architecture of Certainty”: Court Rebukes High Court for Disregarding Binding Ruling
The Bench issued a sharp reminder on judicial discipline, observing that High Courts are bound to follow decisions of coordinate or superior courts unless expressly overruled. The refusal to apply Ritesh Sinha on the pretext of a “pending reference” was termed “a clear error of constitutional hierarchy.”
Chief Justice Gavai underscored that:
“When the Supreme Court has declared the law, the High Courts cannot treat it as tentative. Binding precedents must be followed until expressly overruled—judicial uncertainty undermines the faith of litigants in the justice system.”
The Voice Sample Ruling Bridges Technology and Constitutional Faith
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal reaffirms the balance between investigative necessity and constitutional liberty. It settles the lingering question of whether a Magistrate may order the collection of a voice sample from a witness and confirms that such a direction is constitutionally valid, legally enforceable, and technologically necessary.
The judgment echoes a nuanced understanding of modern evidence law—that a sample, whether of voice or signature, is not a confession of guilt but a scientific tool of truth.
As the Court aptly concluded:
“Self-incrimination begins where neutrality ends. A voice sample, like a fingerprint, has no voice of guilt—it merely echoes the truth science helps uncover.”
Date of Decision: October 13, 2025