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by Admin
22 December 2025 4:25 PM
Madras High Court refusing to condone an extraordinary delay of 4864 days—over thirteen years—in filing a revision petition. Justice N. Sathish Kumar, while invoking the principles under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, held that the petitioner’s conduct reflected “a callous attitude” and that “such unexplained delay cannot be brushed aside.” The Court emphasized that relief in equity-based claims like specific performance must be pursued diligently, and delay borne out of indifference is not condonable.
The litigation stemmed from a suit for specific performance filed in 2004 by the petitioner’s mother before the District Munsif Court, Tindivanam. The mother passed away on October 21, 2005, and her legal heirs, including the petitioner and respondents 1 to 3, sought to be impleaded in the suit through an application filed in 2010—already delayed by 827 days. This application was dismissed on August 19, 2011.
The petitioner’s siblings (respondents 1 to 3) challenged that dismissal through a revision petition before the High Court in CRP No. 3476 of 2012. That revision was also dismissed on August 28, 2020, due to their failure to comply with the Court’s direction to pay Rs.25,000 as a pre-condition.
Nearly five years after the dismissal of her siblings’ revision and thirteen years after the original impleadment order, the petitioner, Pramila, approached the Court seeking to file a revision petition—accompanied by a plea to condone 4864 days’ delay.
The core legal question before the Court was whether the petitioner had shown “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for such a staggering delay.
The petitioner argued that she was unaware of the legal proceedings as she was living at her matrimonial home and had only recently learned of the rejection of the impleadment application. However, the Court found this explanation not only inadequate but indicative of a casual and negligent approach to legal remedy.
Justice N. Sathish Kumar observed:“Casually filing the petition to condone the delay in filing without any proper reasons, such huge delay cannot be condoned.”
He stressed that delay can be condoned only when no negligence or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party. But in the present case, the conduct of the petitioner, both during the earlier proceedings and even after her brothers' revision was dismissed in 2020, reflected neither urgency nor diligence.
Refusing to accept the explanation based solely on the petitioner’s residence in her matrimonial home, the Court remarked: “The only contention raised by the petitioner is that she was in matrimonial house and was not aware of the impugned order... Even after dismissal of the earlier revision in 2020, she has not come before this Court immediately to prove her bona fides.”
On the nature of the underlying dispute, the Court underlined that equitable relief like specific performance cannot be claimed as of right and is subject to scrutiny of the conduct of the party seeking it:
“In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief as a matter of right... While exercising discretion, the Court must keep in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the conduct of the parties, and the consequences of granting specific relief.”
The Court categorically held that the petitioner’s lack of follow-up even after the 2020 dismissal of the earlier revision underscored her indifferent and negligent attitude:
“All these facts would indicate the callous attitude of the petitioner and that cannot be brushed aside altogether in deciding a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
Dismissing the petition, Justice N. Sathish Kumar concluded that no sufficient cause had been demonstrated to justify the delay of 4864 days, and hence, the petition stood rejected. The unnumbered revision suit was also dismissed. No costs were awarded.
“Accordingly, this petition stands dismissed and unnumbered appeal suit stands rejected. No costs.”
The judgment reiterates that delay is fatal in civil litigation, especially when equitable relief is sought. The Court made it clear that the doors of justice cannot remain open indefinitely to those who sleep on their rights. Mere ignorance of proceedings or residence in a different household cannot be a shield for procedural negligence spanning more than a decade. The ruling serves as a caution to litigants that “liberal interpretation” of “sufficient cause” under the Limitation Act is not to be mistaken for judicial indulgence in the face of inaction.
Date of Decision: 02 June 2025